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Abstract 
Agnotologies of Modernism examines the productive role of ignorance in the work of several 
key modernist authors. Borrowing concepts from speculative realist philosophers like 
Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, and Jane Bennett, as well as such thinkers as Gilles 
Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida, the dissertation endeavors to read modernism 
epistemologically, and treats ignorance as an active and creative force that often plays a key 
structuring role in the imaginative world of the text. Drawing from Bruno Latour’s notion of 
a “black box,” the study shows how ignorance can be transposed into an ontological entity 
which can then be attributed positive traits and characteristics. The notion of the black box 
thereby emerges as a key agnotological concept, as a mediator between an ontological 
presence and an epistemological absence. Chapter one examines one such black box in the 
form of monism and its relationship to vitalism in the work of Wyndham Lewis and Henri 
Bergson. The chapter shows how Lewis’s resistance to monistic theories of consciousness, 
and his embrace of an idiosyncratic form of vitalism, is foundational to his inter-war 
writings. Chapter two takes a similar approach to Virginia Woolf, analyzing the fundamental 
role of panpsychism in her work, in particular Mrs Dalloway and To the Lighthouse. For 
Woolf, panpsychism manifests not as a metaphysical belief but rather an epistemological 
tool, a way to synthesize the vast array of seemingly distinct sense impressions one 
encounters in daily life – permitting, by way of “consciousness,” an understanding of the 
events’ underlying continuity. The third chapter examines an analogous process in the 
writings of Ezra Pound, with “life” and “consciousness” in this case replaced by “nature.” I 
argue that both Pound’s politics and poetics are defined by an imperative logic, in which (like 
the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant) a rule is ethical if it can be said to function like 
a natural law. Finally, in chapter four I examine how in James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake the 
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notion of a “word” takes on this black box quality, serving a medial role between the 
undecidability of the Wakeian sign and the singularity of interpretation. As with the previous 
cases, the black box grounds the resulting interpretive system on an overwritten absence, 
rending ignorance not merely productive, but necessary.  
Keywords 
After Finitude; Agnotology; Black box; Bruno Latour; Correlationism; Ecology; Élan vital; 
Epistemology; Ezra Pound; Félix Ravaisson-Mollien; Finnegans Wake; Gilles Deleuze; 
Graham Harman; Henri Bergson; Ignorance; Immanuel Kant; Jacques Derrida; James Joyce; 
Jane Bennett; Knowledge; Modernism; Mrs Dalloway; Nature; New Materialism; Object 
Oriented Ontology; OOO; Phenomenology; Quentin Meillassoux; Richard Bucke; 
Speculative Realism; The Cantos; The Childermass; The Critique of Pure Reason; Time and 
Western Man; Timothy Morton; To the Lighthouse; Virginia Woolf; Vitalism; Wyndham 
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Introduction 
In Parse of Folly 
Idolaters by instinct, we convert the objects of our dreams and 
interests into the Unconditional. . . . Even when he turns from 
religion, man remains subject to it; depleting himself to create 
fake gods, he then feverishly adopts them: his need for fiction, 
for mythology triumphs over evidence and absurdity alike. 
— E.M. Cioran, A Short History of Decay1 
 
I will begin this study on the role of ignorance in modernist epistemologies with a 
text that has little to do with epistemology, ignorance, or modernism. In his 1956 short story 
“The Last Question,” Isaac Asimov describes a series of increasingly advanced civilizations 
each of which has built a super-computer. These computers – ranging from a Dyson sphere’s 
central intelligence in the year 2061 to an entity of pure intelligence floating in hyperspace 
just prior to the heat death of the universe – are all in turns asked variations of the same 
question: how does one reverse entropy, create matter and energy from nothing, and so 
prevent the termination of existence as we know it? Each iteration reports that it cannot 
answer the question, since it lacks sufficient information. But the computer’s final version, 
known as “AC,” existing effectively outside of space and time, spends countless eons 
processing the question, computing every possible variable and data point for trillions upon 
trillions of years, until time itself seems to end. Finally, at some impossibly distant point in 
the future, it produces a result: 
                                                 
1 E.M. Cioran, A Short History of Decay, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012), 3. 
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But there was now no man to whom AC might give the 
answer of the last question. No matter. The answer – by 
demonstration – would take care of that, too.  
For another timeless interval, AC thought how best to 
do this. Carefully, AC organized the program.   
The consciousness of AC encompassed all of what had 
once been a Universe and brooded over what was now Chaos. 
Step by step, it must be done.   
And AC said, “LET THERE BE LIGHT!”   
And there was light – 2 
A simple reading of this passage could take it as the Nth degree of Arthur C. Clarke’s third 
law of science fiction: that “any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from 
magic.”3 AC has become so advanced that it has grown into a god, quoting from Genesis and 
violating first law of thermodynamics.  
Yet at a glance to the computer’s earliest iteration (called “Multivac”) we can already 
see a glimpse of what it will become in a description of the engineers who served as its 
“faithful attendants”:  
                                                 
2 Isaac Asimov, “The Last Question,” The Best of Isaac Asimov: 12 Superb Stories by the Master of Science 
Fiction (New York: Fawcett Crest Books, 1973), 190. 
3 The law has had multiple formulations over Clarke’s career. One statement of the most well-known phrasing 
can be found in Arthur C. Clarke, The Lost Worlds of 2001 (Boston: Gregg Press, 1979), 189.  
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They had at least a vague notion of the general plan of relays and 
circuits that had long since grown past where any single human could 
possibly have a firm grasp of the whole. 
 Multivac was self-adjusting and self-correcting. It had to be, 
for nothing human could adjust and correct it quickly enough or even 
adequately enough. . . . They fed it data, adjusted questions to its needs 
and translated the answers that were issued.4 
In addition to the clearly religious and worshipful relation developing between the engineers 
and Multivac, what is interesting about this passage is how little we are actually told about 
the computer itself. Of course, Asimov could say as little about a computer in 2061 as he 
could about a hyper-dimensional super-consciousness existing at the end of time. What he 
could speak of, and what the story is ultimately built around, is the human operators’ 
relationship to their own ignorance. The computer provides a closed loop of productive 
agnosis – Multivac being an entity of which the operators can have no meaningful 
knowledge, which is then fed queries on matters on which they likewise know nothing, and 
then providing answers whose origins they can only guess. In this light, “The Last Question” 
emerges as a detailed meditation on how humans act when they encounter the unknown, and 
how in the face of overwhelming complexity even the most positivistic forms of scientific 
realism (“AC organized the program”) become at the level of perception a variety of 
religious experience (“LET THERE BE LIGHT!”).  
 What interests me, and what makes this story relevant to my study, is how Asimov 
accomplishes this encounter with ignorance. While ignorance is most commonly understood 
                                                 
4 “The Last Question,” 178.  
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and described in negative terms, as the absence of knowledge, in “The Last Question” it 
takes on a positive existence in the form of the computer. The various generations of 
Multivac are effectively repositories for the ignorance of the people encountering them – a 
void of knowledge displaced onto an ontological entity. This displacement, this offloading of 
an epistemological gap onto a metaphysical being, gives the characters’ relationship to 
ignorance a seldom recognized power. It actively changes their relationship to the world, as 
we see in the opening section where the Multivac engineers take on the motions of faithful 
priests beside an altar. At no point in the story does Asimov suggest that any magic or 
miracles are occurring here: AC is merely the product of extremely sophisticated 
engineering, no less real despite not being understood, with its seeming violation of the laws 
of physics arising from an especially deep understanding of how those laws work. Yet there 
remains the mysticism and the religious language, the suggestion that because no reader 
could conceive of how AC works it cannot appear as anything but supernatural. But by 
figuring that ignorance as a physical, present object, one whose very presence changes and 
conditions the human characters’ relation to their knowledge and perception, Asimov 
suggests (avant la lettre) that Clarke’s third law is insufficient to the task at hand. By 
implicitly treating ignorance as a mere negative, it blinds us to the manner in which 
ignorance is an active force, one continually pressing upon our perception and our thought.  
 This story thus explores in miniature the issues central to the present study. I intend 
here to undertake an analysis of how ignorance functions in modernist literature, with my 
focus here on four authors (Wyndham Lewis, Virginia Woolf, Ezra Pound, and James Joyce) 
whose works together demonstrate both the variety and complexity of modernist 
agnotologies. The word I use, “agnotology,” comes from the negative form of the Greek 
word “gnosis” (γνῶσῐς) meaning “knowledge,” and which provides the root for similar words 
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like “agnostic.” It is not my coinage, but rather comes from the essay collection Agnotology: 
The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance – a book of studies on the sociology of ignorance, 
with a particular focus on how interested parties have peddled and spread uncertainty 
regarding important scientific issues (like climate change and the dangers of tobacco). Robert 
N. Proctor’s editor’s introduction provides an excellent summary of how ignorance is usually 
conceived in the academic literature in purely negative terms, as being “like Kansas, a great 
place to be from” and “a primitive or native state . . . something to be fought and 
overcome.”5 But while the work being done by the essays’ authors is fascinating and 
valuable, and while the studies themselves are clearly cognizant of ignorance’s role as an 
active force upon perception, nothing in the collection ever rises to the challenge of 
theorizing in detail the abstract mechanics of this process. While I do not claim to have 
solved this problem, I hope that my work here will at least begin the process of thinking 
through the eternally unthought.  
 Thankfully, recent developments in continental philosophy have made this work 
easier. Under the various names of “Speculative Realism,” “New Materialism,” and “Object 
Oriented Ontology” (or “OOO” for short), philosophers have begun (thought seldom in these 
terms) to re-evaluate the role of ignorance in human thought and its importance as a point of 
intersection between epistemology and ontology. The text most often taken to have instigated 
this movement is Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency, in which he articulated and attacked a position that he calls “correlationism” – 
                                                 
5 Robert N. Proctor, “Agnotology: A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production of Ignorance (and Its 
Study),” Agnotology: Th Making and Unmaking of Ignorance, eds. Robert N. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 4. 
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or the belief that there can be no awareness of an existence beyond the boundaries of human 
perception (a position that he finds implicit in almost all post-Kantian philosophy). 
Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism involves what he refers to as “ancestrality,” or the 
trait of having existed prior to any possibility of conscious experience. It is the ancestral, 
Meillassoux claims, which shows that the anti-realism he sees in all modern European 
philosophy is untenable, since in order to conceive of an ancestral object (the big bang, for 
example) one must also conceive of “a time in which the given as such passes from non-
being into being.”6 Ancestrality does not merely refer to the fact that certain entities go 
unexperienced, but rather to an event: the passing-into experience of a universe that had at 
one point existed perfectly well without conscious attention, an event whose occurrence 
requires the existence of some reality outside of experience.  
 I should point out that while I find many problems in Meillassoux’s premise and 
argument – such as his assumption that all post-Kantian philosophy doubts the existence of a 
reality outside of consciousness, an assessment that I simply do not consider viable – I find in 
its re-litigation of seemingly-settled metaphysical debates a reserve of intellectual potential. 
If one considers the major developments in continental philosophy over the last several 
decades, it is surprising how many of them concern defining and describing the limits of 
knowledge and perception. The lack of a transcendental signifier, the performativity of 
identity, the interpellation of the subject to hidden power structures, the socially-contingent 
nature of seemingly immutable categories – in each of these (if I may grossly over-
generalize) we see a reduction of knowability, call to a modesty and multiplicity in our 
                                                 
6 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2008), 21. 
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epistemologies in recognition of the extreme limitations under which we always work. One 
possible way to interpret post-structuralism and its intellectual offspring is to see it as a form 
of agnotology, an attempt not only to define the limits of our language but also to reflect 
upon the limits of our world. I point this out because Speculative Realism and its related 
philosophies have frequently been offered up as alternatives to post-structuralist philosophy, 
as the “next big thing” that the humanities should huddle around now that Derrida and Co. 
are “out of date” – a framework that the Speculative Realists themselves, as we shall see, 
have been happy to foster.   
In this respect, it is important to remember that Meillassoux’s most notable and fertile 
philosophical interventions relate not only to ignorance but also to the way that it conditions 
and influences our relation to knowledge. In this sense, I suspect that the Speculative 
Realists’ disconnection from the recent history of Critical Theory has been overstated. One 
respect in which this is the case, and in which Meillassoux’s ideas integrate with the larger 
theoretical currents of my study, is the relationship between continuity and discontinuity as 
they relate to perception. As related above, the concept of ancestrality posits a fundamental 
discontinuity between the world as it is perceived and the world as it “for itself” exists – one 
that is both spatially and temporally localized to the first emergence of conscious thought and 
subjectivity. It is for this reason that Meillassoux emphasizes the non-centrality of human 
beings, their insignificance relative to the larger universe, and why he criticizes Kant for 
calling his philosophy a “Copernican revolution” on the grounds that Kantianism places the 
perceiving subject at the center of the universe, while Copernicus recognized “the eternal and 
frightening silence of infinite spaces” and “that the world possesses a power of persistence 
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and permanence that is completely unaffected by our existence and inexistence.”7 It is an 
experience of finitude like what Pascal describes, when he writes of the “brief span of [his] 
life absorbed into the eternity which comes before and after . . . the small space [he occupies] 
and which I see swallowed up in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I know nothing 
and which know nothing of me.”8 But this radical discontinuity between the perceived and 
the real creates, for Meillassoux, the possibility of discovering a hidden continuity in the 
physical laws of the universe – a processes that he calls “mathematization,” or the 
recognition that the universe follows laws that are knowable and universally in effect.  
The mathematization of scientific knowledge posits that beneath the discontinuities 
imposed by our perception, there is a smooth and continuous relationship between all entities 
in the universe – one created by their common adherence to the same physical laws. It is for 
this reason that, for instance, Galileo can perform an experiment on Earth and then use the 
results of that experiment to make accurate predictions of how a celestial body will move. If 
one believes that moons and stars and planets exist in ontologically distinct and 
discontinuous spheres, such experimentation simply makes no sense, since there would be no 
guarantee that the results of the test on Earth would be applicable anywhere else. What 
Copernicus and Galileo tell us (as Meillassoux argues) is that behind this apparent 
discontinuity (i.e. the illusion that the heavens are ontologically distinct) is in fact a 
continuity that is not only basic to the functioning of the universe, but which also operates 
with complete indifference to human perception. The conception of the universe as adhering 
to a set of self-consistent rules is for Meillassoux the most important evidence that the 
                                                 
7 Meillassoux, 116.  
8
 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A.J. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin: 1995), 19. 
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rejection of philosophical realism that he sees flourishing after Kant is erroneous. As he 
writes, “it is precisely insofar as modern science is mathematized that it is capable of raising 
the question of a possible temporal hiatus between thinking and being.”9 
Putting aside for now its specific place in Meillassoux’s thought, it should be easy to 
see how the mathematization of knowledge relates to agnotology, and how it makes the 
developments of Speculative Realism and its related systems useful to the study of ignorance. 
It is notable that Meillassoux explains this process by reference to mathematics, given the 
extent to which math distinguishes itself from science through its lack of empirical 
groundedness. Early in his text, Meillassoux asks “how is mathematical discourse able to 
describe a world where humanity is absent; a world crammed with things and events that are 
not the correlates of any manifestation?”10 As he has it, this ability is part of the problem 
faced by the “correlationists,” who after Kant abandoned any claim to a world outside 
experience. For if one understands the early history of the universe as not only beyond 
experience, but beyond the possibility of experience, then a purely empirical knowledge 
system is clearly inadequate. The comparison to mathematics is therefore quite apt, if 
somewhat idealistic.  
But one implication of mathematization that After Finitude never really addresses is 
the extent to which the concept’s basic components do not cease to exist once humans leap 
into existence and begin translating the blind maneuverings of the universe into knowledge 
and subjective experience. Ignorance remains an inescapable constituent fact of any subject’s 
relationship to the world. This phenomenological poverty is not merely the result of the sheer 
                                                 
9 Ibid, 113.  
10 Ibid, 26. 
 xvi 
 
quantity of existing things – though that would seemingly be enough on its own – but also of 
the inability of perception to penetrate into objects themselves, which (as Graham Harman 
holds) are always withdrawn into themselves. We see mathematization in effect, for example, 
in the scientists of the Asimov story who, despite their genuflections, remain aware of the 
machine’s grounding in scientifically testable laws – laws which they themselves seem to 
have some knowledge of, if not sufficient knowledge to fully reconstruct processes 
underlying the thoughts of the machine. Unfortunately, Meillassoux does not explore the 
concept of mathematization very far beyond what he needs in order to make his argument, 
and so he pays little attention to how the basic assumption of a mathematically rational 
universe conditions our relationship to the everyday ignorance imposed on us by our own 
perception.  
As the everydayness of ignorance is – for all my metaphysical diversions – the basic 
focus of my analysis, this limitation makes Meillassoux’s ideas a useful door but a useless 
key. Thankfully a key can be found elsewhere, in Bruno Latour’s valuable concept of a 
“black box,” which he first described in his 1987 Science in Action. The term itself is not 
Latour’s, but had been in use for decades earlier, primarily in computer science, to refer to 
any object or system in which a given input will result in a consistent output while the 
internal processes remain unknown.11 A computer, as Asimov has shown, is a very good 
example. While I have my word processor open, every instance in which I hit the M key 
leads to the letter M appearing on the screen. Since I am neither a computer programmer nor 
a computer engineer, I have little practical knowledge as to what happens in the intervening 
                                                 
11 For an early use of the term, see Mario Bunge, “A General Black Box Theory” Philosophy of Science 30.4 
(1963): 436-358.  
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space between button and letter – the computer, to me, is “black” in an epistemological 
sense, emitting no light from which I might glean its inner processes. Yet because the input 
and output are clearly correlated, I am nevertheless able to use this mysterious device 
productively.  
Latour extends this basic premise into a sociological examination of how scientific 
concepts are used and socially ratified into “facts” – i.e. ideas and arguments that are taken 
for granted, repeated in textbooks, assumed as given for the purposes of future research. So, 
for example, early in his study Latour describes the development of the super-computer 
Eagle and the frequent setbacks and difficulties that its creators ran into. Nevertheless, 
despite fears that the project would fail, the computer began to pass several important 
performance milestones: 
[A]fter Eagle had successfully run a computer game called 
Adventure, the whole team felt they had reached one 
approximate end . . . On Monday 8 October, a maintenance 
crew comes to wheel down the hall what was quickly 
becoming a black box. Why has it become such? Because it is 
a good machine . . . But it was not a good machine before it 
worked.12 
For Latour, the transformation of an object or concept into a black box is primarily a social 
phenomenon, one quite distant from the metaphysical caesura that Meillassoux describes. 
Successfully running the computer game means that Eagle has overcome the stability 
                                                 
12 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 11. 
 xviii 
 
problems that dogged it through its early development, and which kept it out of the hands of 
all but those familiar enough with its architecture to intervene when it broke down (that is, 
the people for whom Eagle would not constitute a black box). Once it attains dependability, 
the team can hand off the Eagle to a “maintenance crew” who are able to work on it despite 
not being part of the team that built it. Because the computer worked, the knowledge that it 
works has become mathematized: people assume that it will work in the future, they make 
plans and assumptions based on it working, they mentally treat the functions it serves as 
“taken care of.” Thus, for Latour, black boxes, arising from primarily social relations, act as 
repositories of ignorance, not only “holding” it but “holding it at bay” – allowing us to work 
and act despite it, as though it were not there.  
 Though I rarely refer to Meillassoux and Latour in the main text of this study, their 
concepts nevertheless serve as a conceptual background without which I would not have 
been able to develop my analyses as I did. The importance of these ideas should not, 
however, suggest that they have been employed without modification. Latour’s “black box,” 
already stretched in Science in Action and his subsequent work beyond its narrow usage in 
computer science, in my study leaves behind its strictly sociological definition. The black 
boxes I describe here can be the results of simple inattentiveness, of relations to subjectivity, 
of ontological withdrawal, of overlapping networks of complexity. In my effort to develop 
some of Latour’s ideas beyond the subjects of sociology and science studies with which he is 
usually associated, I am indebted to the work of Graham Harman. Though in some parts of 
this study I am highly critical of OOO and his contributions to it (particularly in chapter 
four), I have found his Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics to be an 
invaluable guide to how Latour’s ideas intersect with broader philosophical issues.  
 xix 
 
 As Harman summarizes it, a black box “allows us to forget the massive network of 
alliances of which it is composed, as long as it functions smoothly”13 and later writes that 
“by definition, a black box is low-maintenance.”14 This definition gets to the crux of what a 
black box is and does in the abstract, and also how it meshes with Meillassoux’s discussion 
of contingency in After Finitude. A concept can become a black box when it “is simply 
presented as a raw fact without any reference to its genesis or even its author”15 – or, as 
Latour writes in a very different context, “you never have a chemistry class that starts with 
the methodology of chemistry; you start by doing chemistry.”16 In this example “chemistry” 
– as a set of methodologies and an approach to knowledge generation – takes the role of the 
black box in a manner that makes it basically indistinguishable from what Thomas Kuhn 
called a “paradigm,” or a concept that “like an accepted judicial decision in the common law” 
becomes a template for further investigations.17 Left in their sociological and science studies 
context indeed the two concepts are very similar, but Harman’s formulation points to a 
broader application, in which the black box appears as both a guarantor of continuity and a 
screen on contingency.  
 I will address the second characteristic first. As we saw with the above example I 
cited from Science in Action, the process of transforming an object into a black box involves 
                                                 
13 Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 34 
14 Prince of Networks, 37. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Bruno Latour, Graham Harman, Peter Erdélyi, The Prince and the Wolf: Latour and Harman at the LSE 
(Winchester: Zero Books, 2011), 79. 
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in some way removing it from its original context – and in the case of the computer, from its 
original creators – and placing it in relation to subjects with no knowledge of its origins. It is, 
in this sense, a kind of commodity fetishism: in the same way that the marketplace hides the 
social relations underlying commodity production behind a screen of pure economics, the 
abstraction of the object into a black box conceals the contingency behind its creation. Latour 
is careful, in every instance, to show how any of his examples could have been otherwise: the 
Eagle computer could have had a different design or could have never worked at all, the 
double helix of the DNA molecule could have been described by someone completely 
unrelated to Watson, Crick, Franklin, and Wilkins. It is only in retrospect that these 
circumstances seem fixed, that their developments appear inevitable – which is what Harman 
means when says that black boxes are “low-maintenance.” As long as, for instance, the 
theory of evolution continues to fit the observed evidence, it can function as a black box for 
the purposes of understanding biology. But if it were to suddenly stop fitting the evidence – 
if it were to suddenly become a high-maintenance theory, in need of constant large-scale 
tinkering and adjustment – then the box would quickly cease being black. We would have to 
“open” the theory and understand its parts, just as one opens a broken computer – to fix it, to 
replace its parts, or to declare it a lost cause and go looking for a replacement. As we will see 
in my first chapter, it is not always the case that the creation of a black box writes over a 
contingent existence and replaces it with an inevitable one (though that is often the case). 
Rather, it forms a barrier between the perceiving subject and the actual presence or absence 
of contingency in a given area. 
 It is in concealing the nature of an entity’s contingency that the notion of the black 
box intersects with Meillassoux’s idea of the mathematization of knowledge. 
Mathematization, as I have already established, requires that the laws of the universe remain 
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consistent and the same in all times and places, whether or not they are observed by any 
subject. While our understanding of what those laws are may change, it will not be because 
the laws themselves are different, but because our perception of their workings is 
discontinuous and incomplete, and therefore open to revision. It is because of this tacit 
assumption of continuity that one can do an experiment today and use its result to say 
something about what happened a billion years ago: since the laws are the same, a result 
today is as good as a result back then. But as Meillassoux has it, this belief is unsupportable. 
There is, he says, no discernable reason for why the universe functions in the manner that it 
does, which means that, in principle at least, “we must seriously maintain that the laws of 
nature could change.”18 Whether or not one accepts this conclusion, it remains the case that 
one seldom begins studying science with a rigorous metaphysical argument for why the 
universe as it is presently arranged must necessarily be so. Instead, the universe’s 
universality is simply taken for granted – in effect becoming a black box.  
 Just as the black box, here taking the form of a philosophical presupposition, covers 
over the possibility of contingency, also does it fill in discontinuities in perception and 
awareness. It is for this reason that a black box always “functions smoothly,” in Harman’s 
phrasing, and why its ceasing to do so would cause it to lose its status. For simplicity’s sake, 
let us return to the example of the home computer and word processor – and for 
phenomenology’s sake, allow me to bracket off all but my immediate subjective awareness 
of what the computer is and what it does, and allow me to abandon the presumption that from 
the keyboard to the screen there exists a knowable chain of causality that proceeds without 
gaps. Lacking, as I do, detailed knowledge of how this chain proceeds, and abandoning, as I 
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have, the advice of the computer’s designers on whose word I had previously taken this 
continuity as given, I encounter my computer as nothing less than an epistemological 
chimera. I have no way to become like the designers of the Eagle computer or the 
discoverers of the double helix, whose detailed knowledge allowed them to function without 
treating the objects of their work like black boxes. But nor am I able – on pain of ruining the 
thought experiment – to simply accept this continuity on external authority. Consider how 
seriously this state would impair my ability to interact with the computer: typing, using the 
mouse, even turning it on or off all require an assumption of continuity, that the input and the 
output will align. And so I must adopt a notion that is no less fantastical for being accurate 
and accept that the connection exist “somehow” simply as a prerequisite for engaging with 
the object at all. I become, in essence, just like the engineers in Asimov’s story, who 
genuflect in front of a machine they neither made nor understand.  
 These two traits provide the basic schematic for how black boxes condition our 
relation to the everyday world. Stripped to its essentials, the process is actually fairly simple, 
though as I will show in the subsequent chapters the manifestation of one of these 
agnotological beings “in the wild” (so to speak) renders them far more complex and 
multifaceted than this hitherto schematic explanation makes them seem. The key point here is 
that, despite the wide range of variation, the agnotologies I analyze all function in terms of a 
reaction to ignorance. A black box, for the purpose of my study, is any real or imagined 
entity or process that attaches a positive ontological status to an absence of knowledge. The 
manner in which it does so will vary from case to case, and will not necessarily take the form 
of a scientific theory or a technological device (the preponderance of which in the 
introduction so far being mainly the result of the ease by which they can serve as examples, 
and also of Latour and Meillassoux’s interest in the philosophy of science). But it should be 
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clear how useful the concept is to the study of agnotology, and in particular of the ways in 
which ignorance conditions, molds, and modifies our subjective relation to the world.  
 As should be clear by now, I have conducted this study within the general headspace 
of Speculative Realism. Though I am by no means an uncritical user of this family of notions 
– indeed, many of my arguments arise from the critique of Speculative Realist concepts. I 
have found that its critiques of Continental metaphysics open up more windows than they 
close, and that these philosophies together form an intellectual framework too novel and 
exciting for me to simply ignore. While I do not believe that it is wise to associate oneself 
with Speculative Realism as it currently exists without a library’s worth of distancing and 
qualification, I do not believe that it is bereft of value. Probably the most straightforward 
introduction to this philosophical domain is Peter Gratton’s Speculative Realism: Problems 
and Prospects, which picks up on the basic network of thinkers one finds in most summaries 
of the movement (Meillassoux and Harman form central nodes on their own that then point 
to other writers – Jane Bennett, Ian Hamilton Grant, Ray Brassier) while also addressing 
work by less intuitively related writers, like Elizabeth Grosz. Of particular value is Gratton’s 
observation that Meillassoux, despite his bluster, never actually gets beyond correlationism, 
but instead formulates “a critique of previous correlationisms in order to provide the basis for 
another correlationism anchored in the real”19 – a conceptual anchor that should be in the 
cargo of any reading of After Finitude.  
 We encounter similar canon-forming efforts in two recent essay collections. The first 
is The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, which is edited by Levi 
Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, and boasts in its star-studded table of contents 
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works by Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Bruno Latour, and Isabelle Stengers. Its list of editors 
and its content marks it as a clear effort to provide a unified sense of what Speculative 
Realism “is,” which makes it a useful primer on the movement for precisely the same reasons 
that one should approach it with caution. As should be clear from the list of names above, the 
texts the collection contains are highly diverse and complex, and indeed they gesture to the 
sheer creativity and diversity of the movement – and I will not endeavor here to provide them 
with a necessarily inadequate summary. But the collection’s introduction and framing is also 
a flagrant example of Speculative Realism’s bizarre obsession with dissociating itself from 
poststructuralism, despite (or perhaps because of) the strong lines of continuity that run 
between the two domains. We see this impulse in the introduction’s first paragraph, which 
holds that “no dominant hero now strides along the beach, as the phase of subservient 
commentary on the history of philosophy seems to have ended”20 – “commentary” is all that 
the work of the previous generation amounted to, as if the importance of Derrida or Foucault 
could be to any extent profitably read through their status as “heroes.” One can see much of 
what is wrong with Speculative Realism expressed in that one line, its limitations laid out 
symptomatically in the very gesture of its establishment.  
 The other collection – The Nonhuman Turn, edited by Richard Grusin – overlaps with 
the previous one in both focus and authorship, but is notable for its focus on the increased 
role of non-human entities in Continental philosophy. As with the previous two books, it 
seeks to balance the demands of its heterogeneous subject matter with an impulse to 
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consolidate and summarize a development in modern philosophy that quite desperately and 
self-consciously wants to be read as a “movement” (and which to a certain extent has become 
one). The introduction quite usefully provides a more narrow and detailed genealogy of its 
eponymous “turn” than the previous text, usefully linking the rise of Latour’s Actor Network 
Theory to co-incident developments, such as Donna Haraway’s publication of her “Manifesto 
for Cyborgs,” developments in media studies, and the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and 
Brian Massumi.21 Its refusal to see Speculative Realism and its related developments as an ex 
nihilo break from a two-centuries-long philosophical stupor is admirable, and it lends the 
collection a level of intellectual honesty that the more ambitious Speculative Turn simply 
lacks.  
 Though he was not included in the above collection (which only mentions him twice), 
Eugene Thacker is a clear contributor to the growing body of work on the philosophy of the 
non-human. His After Life can be profitably read as a map towards an extra-human 
philosophy, tracing the various conceptions of “life” and “living” as they have developed in 
European philosophy from Aristotle, through medieval scholastics like Duns Scotus and John 
Scotus Eriugena, through to Kant, at each step with close attention paid to how these earlier 
conceptions reappear in more recent writers – Heidegger, Bataille, Derrida, etc. Of particular 
value to my study (in particular, its first two chapters) is Thacker’s analysis of the 
relationship between correlationism and vitalism, in which he argues that vitalistic 
conceptions of life emerge from a conflict between “self” and “world” created and 
conditioned by the correlationist split. As he writes, “a vitalist correlation is one that fails to 
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conserve the correlationist dual necessity of the separation and inseparability of thought and 
object, self and world, and which does so based on some ontologized notion of ‘life.’”22 This 
is as good a summary of how “life” and its cognates can manifest as a black box as one is 
likely to find anywhere, and it likewise points the important role played by ignorance and 
discontinuity in the formulation of a vitalist ontology.  
 Mel Y. Chen approaches many of the same issues as Thacker in their Animacies: 
Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect, but, as the book’s subtitle suggests, they do 
so through a very different lens. Their study focuses on “the production of humanness” as a 
socially mediated category,23 with particular attention to the role of sex and race. Chen’s 
value for my study lies in how animacy (that is, the appearance of having agency or 
awareness) is encoded into modes of representation – word choices, metaphors, postures, 
symbols. For instance, its fifth chapter analyzes the rhetoric around a scare in 2007 over the 
presence of lead in children’s toys manufactured in China. The de-territorializing effects of 
lead contamination, which can move unseen through toys, water systems, and other unseen 
points of contact, aligns with the problematically localized origins of the problem – which at 
once arises from a specific place (China) and a non-localizable system (globalized trade). 
The implied animacy of the resulting racist “yellow peril” rhetoric adopted by the American 
news media – which, in addition to its racial coding of the event, also treats the proliferation 
of a (dead) metal in similar rhetorical terms as it would a (living) disease – can thus be read 
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as a response to this problematic localization. The hiddenness of lead permits it this linguistic 
overcoding: it becomes alive precisely to the extent that it remains unseen.  
 While the previous texts have either sketched the landscape of these new materialisms 
or attempted to extend or develop their basic questions, other works, like Adrian Johnston’s 
Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism, attempt not only to respond to, but push beyond, 
the work already done. Johnston’s work – which at the time of this writing only exists as one 
volume of a projected three – places Meillassoux’s philosophy in conversation of that of 
Lacan and Badiou. His work is particularly useful for its analysis of how supposedly 
materialist philosophies (including Meillassoux’s) often dissolve into subtly mystical or 
religious explanations – a point that he takes from Lacan. Johnston’s argument that “After 
Finitude [is] apparently irreligious but conceal[s] kernels of religiosity”24 – though I think 
hampered by its focus on religion as a cardinal anti-realism – does gesture to the origin of the 
various mysticisms and theologies that one often finds in the study of agnotology. Though I 
cannot of course judge the success of Johnston’s project until such a time that he completes 
his second and third volumes, I do agree with his primary point that many of these 
“religious” epistemologies arise from instabilities in the very materialisms they ostensibly 
oppose.  
 Another recent example of what we could consider “outsider” intervention in 
Speculative Realism is Catherine Malabou’s Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality. 
Malabou addresses the recent reinterpretations of Kant that began to proliferate in response 
to After Finitude, with specific attention to the role of the transcendental in both the First 
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Critique and its recent detractors. Much of the text turns on paragraph 27 of the Critique of 
Pure Reason and Kant’s discussion of the epigenesis of the transcendental categories. As 
Malabou argues, “it is never the thing in itself that is mysterious for Kant, and we have to ask 
why so many readers stop there. The real difficulty is life. The fact that thought belongs 
simultaneously to a transcendental subject and to a living being – which is something other 
than an empirical subject.”25 This focus on epigenesis in Kant is a valuable antidote to the 
Kant we encounter in Meillassoux, since it permits Malabou to emphasize the malleability of 
the transcendental, its capacity to change, its development in relation to empirical knowledge 
– a relation that, we see, has few of the destructive effects that After Finitude describes. In 
this sense, Malabou points to how we might address the opening that Meillassoux creates 
while also escaping the entrenched terms of the present philosophical debate.  
 While Malabou’s text clearly situates itself in relation to Meillassoux, Patrice 
Haynes’s Immanent Transcendence: Reconfiguring Materialism in Continental Philosophy 
addresses the recent new materialisms from the perspective of Deleuze, with notable 
comparisons to Adorno and Irigaray. But even with this altered frame, Haynes, like Malabou, 
points out the importance of the transcendental’s intersection with the empirical, an in 
particular how for Deleuze transcendence devolves into merely “thought captured by its own 
creation,”26 a position that allows Deleuze to construe immanence as “a determinate yet open 
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whole”27 and also a suitable substrate for his metaphysics. This “open” immanence is 
likewise an escape from the mechanism implied by many materialist philosophies, a way of 
arriving at a relation to the world that, as with Malabou’s epigenesis, can be both dynamic 
and realist at the same time.  
 Though the theoretical issues outlined above have not yet had as large an impact on 
literary criticism as they have had on philosophy, critics like Anthony Uhlmann have begun 
to translate these debates into valuable interpretations of key modernist texts. In, for example, 
his Thinking in Literature: Joyce, Woolf, Nabokov, Uhlmann asks whether modernist novels 
“might be understood to be . . . machine[s] for thinking” and also means “of coming to terms 
with what it means to think.”28 Drawing primarily from Spinoza and Leibniz, Uhlmann 
sketches out the relationship between the representation of thought and its enactment, and 
how this relation might occur in the arena of modernism – describing, for example, how 
Woolf’s To The Lighthouse “develops into a logic of sensations that allows us to see the 
strong interfolding of the particular into the general fabric.”29 For Uhlmann, modernist 
fiction enacts and produces patterns of thought rather than merely capturing them – a 
characteristic that is essential to recognize if one is to analyze a modernist literary 
agnotology.  
 Beci Carver’s Granular Modernism follows a similar tactic, in this case through an 
analysis of the role of detail and accumulation in modernist literature in terms of that 
literature’s relation to naturalism. These accumulative texts, says Carver, “militate against the 
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kinds of continuous meaning that give direction to – or ‘make sense’ of – a discourse.”30 
Again then we encounter an analysis that takes up the role of thinking in modernist writing 
not merely in terms of representation, but also of enactment. A modernist text can be said to 
“think” in relation to (in Carver’s case) naturalism in a manner peculiar to it, and one can 
determine what that manner amounts to through a careful analysis of how that text constructs 
its own particular world. Detail and accumulation is one access point, perception and 
ignorance another – the point is that works like Carver’s and Uhlmann’s participate in the 
kind of immanent analysis that I wish to perform here, which takes up the text not merely as 
an object of analysis but as an intellectual agent operating on equal terms with the theoretical 
texts I bring to bear.  
 The intersection between this form of critique and the upsurge in interest in 
materialism most clearly overlaps with modernist ecocriticism, a domain that is particularly 
important in my second and third chapters. Modernism has been rather late to the ecocritical 
party, and so the library of texts in this area, though growing, is nowhere near what one finds 
in, say, romanticism. This dearth is part of what makes Joshua Schuster’s The Ecology of 
Modernism: American Environments and Avant-Garde Poetics so valuable a contribution. 
With close attention to the “generative constraints” that condition ecological thinking,31 
Schuster examines the manufacture of textual ecologies through contact between the world of 
the text and the world of the “great outdoors.” Nature arrives as a cultural entity as often as a 
physical one. In asking what nature can mean in modernism “when artists either overlook or 
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underplay” the natural resources that undergird the commodity cultures of their texts,32 
Schuster places the question of nature and ecology firmly at the intersection between 
economics and perception, between the circulation of money and of representations. That the 
modernists’ apparent oversight is not enough to expunge nature from their works is precisely 
the point – for the exclusion is itself an attitude, one as open to critique as any other.  
 The collection Beyond Nature Writing: Expanding the Boundaries of Ecocriticism, 
edited by Karla Armbruster and Kathleen R. Wallace, follows a similar tactic, explicitly 
targeting authors and texts that “do not obviously foreground the natural world or 
wilderness” and therefore tend to be overlooked by ecocritical studies.33 Of particular interest 
to me is Charlotte Zoë Walker’s essay on Virginia Woolf, which analyzes how the natural 
world, for Woolf, appears not in the form of obvious pastoral language and nature metaphors, 
but as an “intense and crucial interlocutor in the questionings about life and death, patriarchy 
and gender, and spirituality and the rejection of traditional religion.”34 Thus, as with 
Schuster, one cannot simply speak of nature and ecology simply as nature and ecology, but 
must also expand one’s attention to include the matter of how these categories condition the 
thought processes woven into the text.  
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 We see a similar attitude arise in relation to a different subject matter in George M. 
Johnson’s Mourning and Mysticism in First World War Literature and Beyond: Grappling 
with Ghosts, which traces the rise of spiritualism and mystical thinking in the wake of the 
First World War. Though the study is in no way ecocritical, we can see a very similar tenor 
to the framing of the texts above in Johnson’s argument that “the attraction to mysticism in 
all its varied forms made perfect sense within a culture of mourning, of large-scale loss and 
bereavement.”35 Mysticism and its related belief systems are not merely superstitions, but are 
expressions of a particular relation to the world – one that is formed by one’s subject 
position, historical context, perceptive frame, and epistemological preconceptions. This 
attitude will be of specific use in my first two chapters, but it appears in some form or 
another throughout the work. What Johnson’s study shows is how a belief system cannot 
simply be understood anthropologically or in terms of its truth value, but must instead be 
looked at in terms of an isometric relationship between thinking and thought.  
 Katherine Ebury’s Modernism and Cosmology: Absurd Lights extends this attitude 
into an examination of another of modernism’s great historical caesuras: the radically new 
picture of the cosmos drawn by the work of Einstein and others around the turn of the 
century. Comparing the attitude of Ebury’s text to Johnson’s is instructive, for while we 
might (with great justification) take the world described by the physicists more seriously than 
the one described by the mystics, their effects on modernists’ subject positions are quite 
similar. As Ebury writes of Joyce’s use of the theory of relativity in Finnegans Wake, “these 
ideas are accepted but also parodied and transformed, misread and reinvented, often in a 
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sexual manner, creating links between the comic and the cosmic, human sexuality and the 
universe.”36 Science, like mysticism and nature, forms a framework not just for 
understanding the world, but for perceiving it. Joyce’s text does not merely use these ideas, 
but thinks with them, metabolizing them into the rest of its body until they are clearly both 
themselves and not.  
 Turning now to my study itself, it should be clear from my tentative references to 
mysticism above that it is very easy when discussing ignorance to look down on the object of 
study, to treat it as a deprivation and to treat those people under discussion as naive fools. 
But to approach the subject in this way would be a mistake, not only because ignorance is so 
common, but also because this arrogance would pose a severe impediment to the study. An 
agnotological reading of a text must proceed, in Jacques Derrida’s words, “from the 
inside.”37 It must remain attentive to the specificity of the text, its nuances, its background, 
its construction, and its deconstruction. It can in no way proceed dogmatically, but must 
instead remain attentive to the specificity of the texts under examination. It is for this reason 
that I have called this study Agnotologies of Modernism – with the plural fully in place, a 
decision inspired by the title of Peter Nicholls’s expansive and similarly pluralistic study 
Modernisms.38 Unfortunately, the level of attention required to do each analysis well 
precludes any kind of systematic “history of modernist ignorance” or some such work, as the 
resulting book would simply be too big.  
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This study thus seeks to fulfill two roles. First, it provides the basic outline of a map of 
how modernist agnotologies work through an accumulation of interlocking conceptual 
relations. Each chapter not only serves as an analysis of its focal author’s work, but also as a 
set-up to the chapter that comes after it, so that the abstract conceptual structure of the work 
forms a chain that will demonstrate by example the basic commonalities underlying the 
otherwise highly diverse works under discussion. Second, each chapter demonstrates how the 
particular agnotology of its subject – organized around the relevant black box – destabilizes 
common pre-conceptions of how that author’s work functions and opens up new domains in 
the analysis of their work. In addition to the obvious benefit of providing a novel contribution 
to the study of the author’s work, my goal was to again demonstrate by example: in this case, 
to provide evidence of the value of ignorance as a critical lens.  
 The relationship between Wyndham Lewis and Henri Bergson, and in particular their 
disagreements on the subject of vitalism, serves as a useful access point to the larger project, 
and as such is the topic of my first chapter. Lewis’s attack on Bergson’s ideas in his Time 
and Western Man and elsewhere have led to a permeant linkage between the two authors in 
Lewis criticism. As in much of Bergson’s reception, comparative studies have tended to 
focus on the role of time in Lewis’s reaction to Bergsonism.39 Much of this focus is 
understandable given the extent to which both authors emphasize the role of time in their 
respective philosophies, but this emphasis has sidelined the important role of vitalism in their 
works, and in particular the way that their approach to vitalistic philosophies relates to the 
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problem of monism. Vitalism, or the belief that living things in some way possess a “vital 
force” (such as entelechy, the soul, or some such) which differs them from inanimate objects, 
became newly popular at the turn of the century. Vitalist and (in the former case) quasi-
vitalist authors like Bergson and Hans Driesch acquired tremendous popularity and in many 
cases drew serious interest from the intellectuals of the day. The psychologist William James, 
for example, paid close attention to Bergson’s writing and incorporated elements of his 
philosophy into his own writing and thought.  
 At stake for the vitalists was the question of whether or not human consciousness 
existed as part of a continuous relationship with all other physical processes – that is, whether 
consciousness followed and arose from the same physical laws as everything else. The 
possibility was raised and then dismissed by René Descartes, who famously posed a dualist 
conception of consciousness, in which the mind was ontologically distinct from the body and 
functioned according to independent processes. The maneuver was explicitly hierarchizing: 
human beings were conscious and possessed free will, but other animals did not, and were 
therefore simply highly complex machines. As Derrida formulates it, the Cartesian animal is 
that which “doesn’t reply, not really, not ever”40 – existing beyond logos, beyond the “I 
think,” beyond any kind of signification. Bergson placed himself firmly in this camp, 
implicitly with his early work in Time and Free Will, and then explicitly in the opening of 
Matter and Memory where he called his project “frankly dualistic.”41 But a case had long 
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been made for the opposite proposition. As far back as 1747 Julien de La Mettrie, drawing on 
Descartes but abandoning his defense of free will, wrote in Man a Machine that “the human 
body is a self-winding machine, a living representation of perpetual motion.”42 This position 
is often referred to as “mechanism,” or perhaps as “physicalism,” but for my purposes the 
most important trait is its monism – or the belief that consciousness and matter all amount to 
the same unitary substance, that they are ontologically continuous.  
 I focus primarily on monism for two reasons. First, I do so because it allows me to 
examine Bergson’s relationship to two of his most notable predecessors and philosophical 
opponents – the British evolutionary philosopher Herbert Spencer and the French spiritualist 
(and Bergson’s former professor) Félix Ravaisson-Mollien. As Bergson recalls in a letter he 
wrote to William James, prior to his work on Time and Free Will he had been obsessed with 
Spencer’s work, and in particular fixated on Spencer’s argument in his First Principles and 
elsewhere that all human cognition could be understood as a manifestation of “habit,” and 
could thus be understood mechanistically and deterministically.43 According to the letter, 
Bergson violently rejected Spencer not long before he began writing the Ph.D. dissertation 
that would eventually become Time and Free Will, and though Spencer’s ideas are rarely 
referred to in this book, its argument can largely be understood as a response to Spencer’s 
determinism. (Indeed, one could also quite easily see Bergson’s use of Darwin in Creative 
                                                 
42 Julien de La Mettrie, Man a Machine and Man a Plant, trans. Richard A. Watson and Maya Rybalka 
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Evolution as an attempt to reclaim evolution from its deterministic proponents, though this 
reading would be rather speculative.)  
 Determinism – a consequence many mechanist philosophies often considered 
undesirable – would therefore seem like the more logical focus of the chapter rather than 
monism, and indeed it plays an important role. But focusing on monism, among other things, 
permits us to see the relationship between Bergson’s rejection of Spencer and his attempts to 
distance himself from Ravaisson. Like Spencer, Ravaisson saw habit as essential to the 
functioning of cognition, but while Spencer took this relationship to be mechanical and 
deterministic Ravaisson understood habit as a kind of grounding for thought – arguing in his 
Of Habit that habit serves as a kind of mediator between external stimulation and internal 
individuation and creativity. But in an essay on Ravaisson later re-published in The Creative 
Mind, Bergson ignored the essentially creative nature of habit in Ravaisson’s work, 
describing it instead as merely “the fossilized residue of a spiritual activity.”44 
 That the mechanistic habit of Spencer and the creative habit of Ravaisson elide 
together in Bergson so easily indicates an underlying structural similarity, one that, as I 
show, is reproduced in both Bergson’s notion of élan vital and also Lewis’s response to it. 
Though very different in their particulars, both forms of habit take the form of a leap from 
the information available to a perceiving mind to the response that this perception leads to. 
That is to say, Spencer’s use of “habit” to explain consciousness is as much a black box as 
any theory of vitalism, since it, as Bergson would later write of vitalism, is simply “a sort of 
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label affixed to our ignorance.”45 Both the vitalists and the mechanists (whether Spencerian, 
behaviourist, or what have you) were simply repeating the same rhetorical and conceptual 
gesture, differing mainly on whether the “inside” of the black box contained a dualist 
ontology or a monist one.  
 For Lewis in his post-Bergson phase, this elision becomes both a source of comedy 
and of great philosophical stress. Though Bergson bears a clear mark on his later writing, 
Lewis excoriated him in Time and Western Man for disguising as a vitalist philosophy one 
that betrayed a clear monism when placed under enough pressure. What Lewis clearly fears, 
and what he goes out of his way to reject, is what the Deleuzian philosopher Manuel 
DeLanda calls a “flat ontology,” or an ontological system in which all objects occupy the 
same “level” of being, are arranged horizontally without any qualitative difference 
recognized between them.46 That physicalism produces a flat ontology ought to be clear 
enough, but for Lewis, Bergson’s approach is also far too egalitarian in that it recognizes no 
essential difference between human and non-human life. Thus, in Lewis’s writing we see 
numerous instances of seemingly vital, “living” characters revealing themselves to be 
mechanical and predictable, in The Childermass, for instance, as well as in Lewis’s theories 
on comedy where, as with Bergson, Lewis identifies the comic with the mechanical, the 
predictable, and the unconscious.  
 But while Lewis pursues a vitalist conception of life and consciousness, he differs 
strikingly with Bergson on the matter of the extent to which consciousness and vitality can be 
found. For Bergson, élan vital is present in all life, and is the driving force for evolution. It is 
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for this reason that Lewis attacks Bergson, arguing not only for a view of vitality limited to 
human beings, but only certain human beings – those who attain it through vigorous thought 
and reflection. It is in this way that Lewis’s rejection of his influences mirrors Bergson’s: 
both develop dualist, anti-deterministic philosophies which they cast against predecessors 
who they termed overly monist and ignorant of fundamental divisions inherent to nature. 
Their respective agnotologies are, thus, basically identical, amounting to the creation of a 
black box that contains and represents a hidden discontinuity around which they can 
construct their respective systems. In both cases is the creation of the box likewise a 
reactionary measure against monism, and their primary disagreement is where exactly the 
dualist split occurs, and in what entities the black box of consciousness should be placed. The 
chapter therefore deploys vitalism as a kind of model agnotology, or a place in which to 
explore the basic contours of an ontological displacement of ignorance and in which I can 
tease out the pattern I will find taking other shapes in the authors that I read subsequently.  
 The relationship between consciousness and discontinuity comes up again in Virginia 
Woolf, the subject of my second chapter, whose complex responses to the problem also 
provide an opportunity to extend some of my conclusions in chapter one towards a more 
generalized theory of the agnotological functions of consciousness. Roughly the first half of 
the chapter I devote to an analysis of Woolf’s relationship with Richard Maurice Bucke, 
whose Cosmic Consciousness Woolf likely encountered as a book critic for the Times 
Literary Supplement. Bucke was an advocate of panpsychism, a philosophical position that 
attributes some form of “life” or consciousness to all entities in the universe, including 
inanimate objects – an argument that today has its strongest articulation in the “vital 
materialism” of Jane Bennett. But Bucke’s text is not so much focused on the existence of 
consciousness in all objects as the awareness of it – the “cosmic consciousness” that 
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(similarly to what we see in Lewis) is present only in a small number of gifted individuals. 
For Bucke, cosmic consciousness was a stage of evolution, one that followed naturally from 
the “simple consciousness” of most animals and the “self-consciousness” possessed by 
humans. But while in the distant future all human beings would possess this heightened 
awareness, a small number of people (including the founders of most major religions) would 
attain it via a moment of epiphany, a radical discontinuity in which their previous pattern of 
thought would be suspended and when they would attain a sense of the world that was 
fundamentally new.  
 As I describe in the chapter’s first half, this pattern maps quite nicely onto the 
character of Septimus Smith of Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway – and is certainly a better fit than the 
trauma framework through which he has usually been read. Septimus evidences little of the 
repetition compulsion and involuntary memory that is a hallmark of literary depictions of 
trauma, and his visions of cars and trees exhibiting awareness and consciousness, along with 
his desire to start a new religion, bears little resemblance to any of the usual symptoms of 
trauma (symptoms that would have been well known to Woolf, writing years after the end of 
the First World War). But the content of his visions clearly amounts to panpsychism, and 
their etiology, and in particular their appearance in the sudden rupture of his war experience, 
identifies them closely with cosmic consciousness.  
 As I go on to argue, though, the similarity between the origin of cosmic 
consciousness and the origin of psychological trauma is not merely a coincidence. Both can 
be understood in terms of a play between continuity and discontinuity, and in particular in 
terms of a perceptual relationship to flat ontology. It is notable, for instance, that while Freud 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle famously points to the importance of shock and surprise in 
a traumatic experience he also in the same book identifies shock as the origin of scientific 
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knowledge.47 Shock, as Woolf would note in “A Sketch of the Past,” has great 
epistemological value, tearing down one’s old preconceptions and potentially leading one to 
see something genuinely new. For Bucke, that knowledge is the existence of a perfectly 
continuous relationship between all entities in the universe, a flatness that gives panpsychism 
more than a little resemblance to physicalism (in form if not in content). A shock – that is, an 
experience of epistemological discontinuity – is ironically a gateway to the abolition of 
surprise, a sense of universal continuity so complete that nothing could ever take one off 
guard again. Or, at least, that is the implied trajectory of mechanism and its deterministic 
universe. But since the omniscience that this approach requires is unattainable, the 
mechanists employ their own black box – the “habit” of Spencer, which explains about as 
little as the vitalist “life force,” despite all of its scientific pretensions.  
 The universal “life” proposed by Bucke, Septimus, and the other panpsychists is 
likewise a response to the conflict between the awareness of continuity provided by their 
philosophy and the continuing sense discontinuity imposed by their limited knowledge and 
perception. Bucke’s universe, despite its flatness, is non-deterministic – which means that he 
needs to explain how the universe can have knowable laws, and how those laws can apply 
equally to stones and human minds, and yet still not conclude that the world is mechanical. 
Bucke does so by abandoning the premise (taken for granted by determinists) that stones are 
themselves inanimate. Instead, he says, they are full of life, and in standing at their level we 
are full of life as well. His system is therefore able to metabolize unpredictability by 
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encapsulating it in the black box of life, permitting him (and Woolf) to embrace continuity 
while still recognizing the shocks inherent to the marriage of epistemology and perception.  
 Panpsychism therefore resembles vitalism in that both provide frameworks within 
which otherwise incommensurable relations of continuity and discontinuity can be resolved. 
In Woolf this resolution comes attached to an epiphanic epistemology, one centred on 
moments of shock that serve as access points to the essentially continuous nature of the 
universe. Indeed, the epistemological effect of surprise – in cosmic consciousness, traumatic 
experience, and scientific experimentation – is perhaps uniquely able to resolve this split. 
Surprise is most often the result of a limited perspective, an ignorance created by one’s 
specific subjective position. If a baseball were to strike me in the head as I was walking down 
the street, it would not be surprising because I considered it impossible for a ball to fly at the 
particular speed and in the particular trajectory that would cause its line of flight to intersect 
with my face. Such an event would be perfectly within the bounds of the laws of physics, and 
from a god’s-eye-view would be a fairly unremarkable event. But I do not have a god’s-eye-
view, but rather a limited frame of sensory perception. And the ball is surprising because I do 
not see it – it seems, phenomenologically, to leap into existence at the exact moment of 
connection. But in being surprised I acquire knowledge: of the ball, its thrower, its flight 
path, of a totally continuous and deterministic causal chain which had existed all along 
behind the shock, and which I never would have encountered had the moment of surprise 
never occurred. This example is, of course, quite basic and simple, and not exactly what 
Woolf seems to have in mind in “A Sketch of the Past,” but it does outline what I consider to 
be an essential component in Woolf’s epistemology.  
 It is furthermore this epistemological relationship that allows us to see the ways that 
the panpsychism of Mrs Dalloway extends itself into Woolf’s later fiction. As I show in the 
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analysis of To the Lighthouse which rounds out the chapter, much of the characters’ 
obsession with prediction (an obsession that is strongest in Mr. Ramsay) is related to an 
anxiety over perceived discontinuities. It is notable, for example, that when Mr. Ramsay 
ruminates on his own limitations as a philosopher, he imagines each stage of his thinking as a 
discrete unit, so that one works out an idea by hop-scotching from A to B and then to C, 
hoping one day to make one’s way to the enlightenment of Z. Mr. Ramsay, here, greatly 
resembles Zeno of Elea in Bergson’s critique of the paradoxes – in which he accuses Zeno of 
imagining time (a fully continuous process of becoming) in the same manner as space (which 
can be divided up into discrete chunks). By pulling a Zeno on his own imagination, Mr. 
Ramsay has denied himself the Bucke-like epiphany that would make him able to surpass the 
divides and instead range over his philosophy with the aggressive freedom of an animal let 
out of its cage. Instead he responds to the threat both to his pride and to his identity as a 
provider for his family by imposing a continuous relationship where one cannot be properly 
said to exist – that is, he predicts the weather. Instead of facing his limited subjectivity head-
on, he imagines that he possesses the god’s-eye-view of the world that would banish all 
surprise forever. But his consciousness is far from cosmic, and his luck in predicting the rain 
proves meaningless in the face of the immense discontinuities that “Time Passes” thrusts 
upon him.  
 The first two chapters form a kind of set – insofar as they both concern the black box 
of “consciousness” in one form or another, and also set up the larger issue of the isometric 
epistemological relationship between continuity and discontinuity which is essential to my 
larger analysis of modernist agnotologies. In my chapter on Pound I analyze a completely 
different black box, though one that functions according to a similar pattern. My key 
argument in this chapter concerns the intersection between ecology, politics, and aesthetics in 
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Pound’s work, an intersection which I come to refer to as his “imperative logic.” I adopt the 
term “imperative” by way of the categorical imperative of Kant, and in particular a reading of 
the concept by the phenomenologist Alphonso Lingis. For Kant (as Lingis points out) the 
categorical imperative is not merely a good or useful way of constructing an ethical 
framework, but also an expression of a particular sense of humanity’s relation to the natural 
world. For Kant, the fact that human beings possess free will means that they are essentially 
separate from the natural world, since they are able to act on their desires instead of being 
pushed about by the laws of physics. But unlike Bergson and Lewis, who both jealously 
defend humanity’s capacity for free action and creativity, in Kant’s ethics free will is a 
problem, since it makes unethical behaviour possible. The categorical imperative, then, is at 
its most abstract level less a system of maxims and rules, less indeed an approach to meta-
ethics than it is a command to overcome our division from the natural world, to act as if our 
inter-personal relations were bound by rules as inviolable as gravity.  
 The contours of Pound’s political thought are quite similar in this regard, though in 
the content of his ethics he is clearly no Kantian. The biggest difference is also the most 
fundamental: whereas Kant considers humans essentially separate from nature, divided at 
birth by the endowment of free will, Pound treats continuity as basic but finds everywhere 
instances of the natural order being contravened, the more perfect structure of the natural 
order torn down in the name of avarice. It is in part for this reason that Pound was prone to 
conspiratorial thinking while Kant was not: for Pound the split from nature is not essential, 
but imposed, a conclusion that naturally led him to ask “imposed by whom?” It was not 
necessarily the case that this question would lead him to anti-Semitism, but it did provide a 
framework in which his answer to the question could appear to make sense.  
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 But I am getting ahead of myself. Before one can consider the role of Pound’s 
imperative logic in his poetry, one must determine what his conception of “nature” is and 
how it relates to an ethical system. It is C.H. Douglas, the founder of Social Credit, who 
among Pound’s key influences provides the most straightforward definition in this regard. As 
Douglas writes, a law should be considered “natural” if it proceeds in a way that is 
“automatic and inexorable,” and in a way that empowers “the individual.”48 Though I cannot 
be sure if Pound would have formulated his sense of what “nature” is in this way, it is a 
useful guideline given both the influence that Douglas had on Pound’s thinking and the ease 
by which this definition complements his thinking in other areas. (It is also a classic black 
box structure: Douglas’s nature, like the supercomputer in Latour, just works by itself, so no 
need to interfere with it.) Pound’s idiosyncratic interpretation of Confucius, for example, 
adopts this automatism as a way to translate individual characteristics and actions into large-
scale social changes. For Pound, Confucius holds that the character of the head of a 
government directly affects the character of that government in the same way that the head of 
a family dictates that family’s fortunes. Thus, Pound resembles Lewis and Woolf in his 
relationship to continuities: the black box of nature when plugged into an imperative ethics 
allows Pound to jump at will from the actions of an individual person across vast and 
complex causal relations and contingencies to land on a particular fact about the fortunes of 
the society that the person lived in. Thus, one understands the history of China by studying 
its emperors, the history of America by studying its presidents, the history of the Italian 
renaissance by studying the Malatestas and Medicis who helped create it. It is therefore to be 
expected that Pound’s Cantos, a poem that “contains history,” contains more biography than 
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any other kind of historical writing. The power of the imperative is such that the jump from 
individual to group is nearly instantaneous. 
 What one should remember when examining the underlying ecology of Pound’s 
politics is that while nature itself proceeds automatically, human beings do not. Indeed, 
Pound’s writings are rife with instances of waste and destruction wrought by those who 
would act against nature, with the most well-known and egregious case being usury. In a 
sense, usury plays for Pound the same role that free will does for Kant: it introduces 
discontinuity to the world, dividing human beings from the natural automatism which is the 
source of their wealth and happiness. But for Pound this discontinuity, though present, is not 
a basic fact of human existence, but rather a contingent one which can perhaps be overcome. 
Pound goes farthest in figuring out how this overcoming might be possible in his poetics, but 
it is also here that some of the contradictions built into his approach become apparent. The 
basic problem that Pound runs into is that he at once wants both individual people as well as 
society to be perfectly immanent with nature, existing in a complex mesh of reciprocal action 
in which the behaviour of a single person really can affect whole populations, while at the 
same time treating whole categories of human behaviour (like usury) as radically outside the 
scope of nature, counter to it in some inexcusable way. How, for example, does one embrace 
such a hyper-individualistic philosophy as Pound’s without also concluding that the avarice 
of the capitalist elite is justified? Nothing Pound wrote manages to answer this question, and 
the excesses of his later political writings affirms that no coherent answer exists.   
 I analyze how this conflict plays out in Pound’s poetics through an extended analysis 
of how metaphor works in “In a Station of the Metro” and its origins in Japanese haiku. 
Critics of the poems have often taken the relationship between the poems first and second 
lines as metonymic, amounting to a displacement from the first image to the second. And 
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indeed, from a certain angle the poem can seem to function like two still frames from a film 
which between them “cut” our view from one scene to another. But this reading not only 
misunderstands Pound’s technique of “superposition,” but also the ecological logic of haiku 
poetry – which historically have described a more immanent relationship between humans 
and nature more in line with what Pound supports in his politics. The two lines, then, are best 
read in terms of metaphor and condensation, with the two images combining to create a third 
composite image that exists beside its components, never superseding or overcoming them 
but instead simply forming a third independent frame.  
 Reading “In a Station of the Metro” metaphorically – with the metropolitan “crowd” 
condensed with the natural “bough,” neither overcoming the other – allows us to see an 
image of the overarching coherence that Pound speaks of in the Drafts and Fragments as 
well as his translation of Women of Trachis. But it is important to remember that this 
immanence exists only in a single place and moment, enabled by the brevity of the haiku. 
Pound could not make the same thing happen across the monster of obsession that is his 
Cantos, which in their theme and structure requires not only immanence at the individual and 
momentary level (which Pound could clearly provide) but also at higher levels of complexity. 
The Cantos would require an integration with nature that was systemic, complex, and all-
extensive in a way that would seem to preclude Pound’s emphatic individualism. In ecology, 
after all, it is not this tree or this animal which is important, but trees and animals in 
aggregate: one could hardly ask for an epistemology more opposed to Pound’s ethics and his 
art. In adopting an imperative logic, Pound sought a bridge across this discontinuity, one 
built from the black box of a “nature” that simply sees the world proceeding “on its own” 
without investigating its complexity and the basic interdependence of all within it. It is, in 
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effect, a tool for turning metonymy into metaphor – and had Pound been a demigod, it might 
have been enough.  
 My fourth chapter examines a similar problem inherent in the reading of Joyce’s 
Finnegans Wake. I begin with an analysis of the first line of the Wake, and with the 
(intentionally obtuse) argument that there are no words in Finnegans Wake at all. In Joyce 
criticism, a “word” in the Wake effectively means a sign in the text which can be taken for 
granted, one that does not require the extended glosses that analyses of this text are usually 
so ready to provide. If we see, for example, the phrase “it’s as semper as oxhousehumper” 
(FW 107.34) we eagerly put on our glosses for “semper” (if we know no Latin) and 
“oxhousehumper” (if we know no Hebrew) but not for “it’s” or “as.” Yet as I show (and as 
my above example suggests) whether or not a sign is a “word” is unstable, both because of 
the text’s multilingualism and because each sign is often part of multiple, mutually-exclusive 
networks of signification. One can easily gloss “semper” as the Latin word for “always” and 
call it a day, but that would mean ignoring the word’s sonic resemblance to the English 
“simple” as well as the phrase’s rhythmic similarity to the phrase “it’s as simple as A B C.” 
“Semper,” then, is far less stable than it first lets on, and this instability means that one 
cannot let one’s reading stop at the dictionary.49 Nor can a simple word like “is” be allowed 
to rest, in part because these smaller words often become incorporated into larger semantic 
units in such a way that a given use of the word is only understandable when the larger 
relationships are considered. When we read, for instance, that “the citye of Is is issuant” (FW 
601.5), it is entirely insufficient to say that “is” is the present-tense of the verb “to be.”50 
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Rather we must recognize that the word/non-word distinction is insufficient and unstable, 
that all signs in Finnegans Wake exist as part of multiple overlapping signifying chains, and 
that instead of seeing the sign as the empirical designator of a given concept Joyce demands 
that we see it as the medial point between numerous conflicting patterns and strains.  
 To state the case simplistically, I argue that reading every sign in the Wake is like 
trying to open a black box. Reading Joyce is always a lesson in humility, but in Finnegans 
Wake the process takes on a special edge due to the gulf between the complexity of a sign’s 
origin and the simplicity of its placement. Non-words in the Wake mock us with their 
modesty, often taking the form of well-known words that should be easy yet are not. Every 
sign is a problem, a machine that refuses to run. To attain any reading one must open the box 
and begin to cross this discontinuity by whatever available means – historical, textual, 
genetic, deconstructionist. But with sufficient care we can often find the various strains in 
conflict, precluding a simple resolution, or if not that then the variety can overwhelm us, 
bogging the reading down with detail and definitions so that nothing of value can emerge 
from the mass. Nothing in Finnegans Wake is definite, is only one thing, yet a reading must 
be definite. To hedge and qualify, to clarify before or after that whatever one says one must 
grant the instability of the text, is merely to defer the moment of transgression. Nothing short 
of re-capitulating the text of the Wake – in itself and for itself – would permit one to be equal 
to the task of reading Joyce’s text, which is to say that one can only “read” the Finnegans 
Wake by writing it, repeating it, almost traumatically. Clearly this kind of gesture is beyond 
what one usually finds in the pages of the James Joyce Quarterly, or in what scholars 
euphemistically call “readings” of a passage or a single word. Indeed, the curiously common 
gesture in Wake criticism of turning one’s argument on the “exhaustive” exegesis of one of 
Joyce’s coinages (my chapter looks at examples in the work of Umberto Eco and Derek 
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Attridge specifically, but they are quite common) can be understood as an incomplete 
reaching towards the fuller re-writing that the complexity of the Wake demands, even if it 
does unspeakingly repeat the word/non-word dichotomy that the text of Finnegans Wake 
rejects.  
 In any case, nobody attempting to understand, or read, or critique some portion of 
Finnegans Wake actually goes ahead and tries, like Borges’s Pierre Menard, to repeat Joyce’s 
gesture and so respond to the book in a manner that approaches its complexity. What one 
does instead is permit the creation of words, which is to say that one produces a falsely-
definitive reading of the text by ignoring (intentionally or not) the passage in question’s 
divergent or opposing signifying networks – a process that I refer to as “de-mediation.” I do 
not mean anything in this chapter to be a “criticism” in the oppositional sense; this is not an 
attack. Indeed, I have serious doubts that the kind of idealized reading-through-rewriting that 
I proposed above is even possible. Rather, it is my attempt to approach the Wake’s peculiar 
hermeneutic demands as a kind of totally immanent agnotology, a continuous dance with 
ignorance that, far from being negative, actually produces the text.  
 But why name this process “de-mediation?” The origin of the term actually brings my 
“cyclewheeling history” (FW 186.2) back to Speculative Realism by way of its cousin OOO, 
as approached by the philosopher Graham Harman. Though on a first reading Harman’s 
philosophy seems obsessed with a re-interpretation of Heidegger, its ontology is highly 
Aristotelian, taking as its subject fixed objects with defined essences that remain eternally 
separate and “withdrawn” from each other by way of their mutual unfathomability. As 
Harman points out at the end of Tool-Being, the nature of this separation is such that it 
implies that no interaction between objects is possible, that his system in effect precludes any 
kind of causality. Harman attempts to solve this problem via what he at first calls 
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“occasionalism” and then re-brands as “vicarious causation.” In neither case does he argue 
for the explicitly religious explanation for causation implied by the first term. Rather, he says 
that in OOO causation is always mediated (i.e. “vicarious”) through another object. In my 
critique, I show how this rather deus ex machina solution actually shows the way to OOO’s 
dissolution, how it takes what was supposed to be an ontology grounded in definite, 
mutually-withdrawn objects and instead transforms it into an ontology of constant inter-
penetration and becoming. Yet this continuous over-coding only happens, as it were, “under 
the hood,” visible when one takes apart the nature of causality in detail but not at the level of 
stationary instantaneous objects seemingly removed in their timelessness from their 
interrelations (i.e. when one examines objects in the precise way that Harman’s writing 
usually does). OOO’s peculiar objects are, in effect, the product of de-mediation, a result of a 
kind of ontological hermeneutic. 
 By way of Joyce’s close and entirely under-studied reading of Giordano Bruno I 
integrate this critique of OOO with the semantic ontology of Finnegans Wake. It was from 
Bruno that Joyce took the peculiar notion of the unity of opposites and the related notion of 
the mutual immanence of the microcosm and the macrocosm in the same domain. Just as the 
flatness of OOO places events at an interplanetary scale on the same plane as a minuscule 
transfer of electromagnetic charge, so too does Bruno’s cosmology posit the link between the 
divine and the quotidian as basic to the normal functioning of the universe. In Finnegans 
Wake, this relationship becomes a kind of undecidability that is basic to the text, where a 
given sign’s place in a grand monomythical pattern may at one point seem to “explain” a 
whole swath of text that, when read in its minutia, seems obsessed with something entirely 
unrelated (a phenomenon I examine in more detail in relation to the “Norwegian Captain” 
and “The Ondt and the Gracehoper” sections of the book). Explanations, rather than closing 
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down the discourse, actually open up the text – causality becomes the enemy of determinism, 
instead of (as in Bergson and Lewis) its friend and its enabler. One can look at any reading of 
the Wake to see how it balances these criss-crossings and contradictions, how it produces 
despite everything a clearly defined “object” out of the mass of interpenetrations and 
becoming. That is, in its most basic form, what de-mediation is – a process as pernicious as it 
is essential, a polygamous concept wedded both to knowledge and to ignorance at once.  
In my concluding chapter I discuss how these findings relate to modernism generally, 
and argue that the question of ignorance has gone too infrequently asked in large part 
because scholars fail or refuse to recognize its omnipresence in subjective experience. 
Ignorance is inescapable, a basic fact of life, and so when literature represents life it also, 
without even trying, represents ignorance. Treating ignorance like a dirty word, or refusing to 
consider it as a valid object of inquiry, clouds our vision, and limits our ability to critique and 
investigate the texts before us.   
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Chapter 1  
The Ghost in the Machine is Also a Machine:  
Wyndham Lewis and the Spectre of Monism 
Wyndham Lewis wore a wide black hat, like a character in 
the quarter, and was dressed like someone out of La 
Bohéme. . . . At that time we believed that any writer or 
painter could wear any clothes he owned . . . but Lewis 
wore the uniform of a prewar artist. 
— Ernest Hemingway, A Moveable Feast51 
My Latin quarter hat. God, we simply must dress the 
character.  
— James Joyce, Ulysses52 
 
1.1 The Demeaning of the Wild Body 
Wyndham Lewis begins his 1927 essay on “The Meaning of the Wild Body” – a dilation 
on his theory of comedy – with something like an axiom. For his theory to work, he says, 
one must “assume the dichotomy of mind and body . . . without arguing it; for it is upon 
                                                 
51 Earnest Hemingway, A Moveable Feast: The Restored Edition, ed. Seán Hemingway (New York: 
Scribner, 2009), 88-89. 
52 James Joyce, Ulysses, eds. Hans Walter Gabler, Wolfhard Steppe, and Claus Melchior (New York: 
Vintage, 1986), 3.174. 
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that essential separation that the theory of laughter here proposed is based.”53 Whether or 
not they accept dualism so easily, critics of Lewis have long taken at his word its 
essential place in his criticism – of comedy in the above essay, of politics in The Art of 
Being Ruled, and of art and philosophy in Time and Western Man, to give only a handful 
of examples.54 It appears that accepting that the (real or fantastical) separation of mind 
and body is an axiom of Lewis’s thought has become simply the cost of doing business in 
the world of Lewis studies. There are good reasons for this tendency, not least of all 
being the effort Lewis put into cultivating his intellectual and artistic persona around the 
mind/body problem, a tendency that peaked with his attack on “Bergsonism” in Time and 
Western Man, but which persists in one form or another across his published works.  
In the Lewisian role of “the enemy,” this chapter will abandon this line of 
thinking and adopt a diametrically opposed one – that to understand the place of the 
mind/body problem in Lewis’s thought, it is a looming monism, rather than dualism, that 
must take our attention, and that furthermore it is the constant possibility of dualism’s 
failure which structures his thinking rather than opposes it. Monism emerges in Lewis’s 
thought as a central black box, and a key to his agnotology. Appropriately, the disavowal 
                                                 
53 Wyndham Lewis, The Complete Wild Body, ed. Bernard LaFourcade (Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow 
Press, 1982), 157. 
54 For instance, Toby Avard Foshay makes frequent mention of Lewis’s dualism throughout his Wyndham 
Lewis and the Avant-Garde: The Politics of the Intellect (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 
1992). More recently, Jamie Wood’s interpretation of Lewis’s theory of comedy retains the assumption of 
its dualism while still pointing out its close similarity to certain ideas from behaviorism (“The Siamese 
Demon: Wyndham Lewis and America” Modernism/Modernity 17.2 [2010]: 392-93).  
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of monism takes a similar role in Lewis’s work as it does in Henri Bergson’s, whose 
difficult relationship to the thought of his former professor, the Spiritualist philosopher 
Félix Ravaisson-Mollien, gives his work an analogous anxiety. Ravaisson’s 1838 Of 
Habit – rarely studied outside of France, and only translated into English in 2008 – 
distinguishes him from his firmly dualist contemporaries, but also from the mechanistic 
and deterministic form of monism championed by scientists in his day and after, such as 
Herbert Spencer and the behaviourists. Bergson rejected his argument that habit provided 
the means by which mechanistic physical processes lead to creativity. By giving up on 
the possibility that there would be a middle path between the two poles of vitalism and 
mechanism, Bergson created a situation where his ideas on creativity demanded the 
expulsion of mechanism from human thought (which proved quite difficult to achieve). 
We can see this expulsion most clearly in Laughter, where he figures the social function 
of the laugh to be a kind of remediation, a punishment afflicting any who descend into 
thoughtless automatic movements, or a means of vitalist maintenance. Lewis’s theory of 
laughter follows strikingly similar lines, but with the addition of his artistic elitism, which 
reserved vitalist creativity for those artists who had done the hard work of breaking from 
socially-imposed roles, rather than (as in Bergson) extending élan vital, itself functionally 
a black box, to any living thing.  
Whereas Lewis flips the equation, attributing comedy to the appearance of life in 
a mechanical object rather than the other way around,55 the distinction he makes between 
                                                 
55 See Vincent Sherry, “Anatomy of Folly: Wyndham Lewis, Body Politic, and Comedy,” 
Modernism/Modernity 4.2 (1997): 121-138 for a summary of the development of Lewis’s theory of 
comedy.  
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the autonomous behaviour of the average person and the creative work of the artist still 
demands the enforcement of a dualistic vitalism, the drawing of hard lines distinguishing 
life from the machines.56 Indeed, when Lewis offered up a definition of “vitalism” in his 
memoir Rude Assignment, he emphasized its insistence on “the independence of organic 
from inorganic life.”57  Yet throughout Lewis’s work we see examples of Bergsonian 
lapses, of vital, living minds in some way or another falling into habit, cliché, and fixed 
social roles. (The later parts of this chapter will focus on this pattern in more detail 
through a reading of The Childermass.) Even this narrow, elitist form of dualism proves 
remarkably difficult to maintain, and yet Lewis resolutely abandons in Time and Western 
Man the possibility of all human consciousness being reducible to mechanistic processes. 
What is being rejected here is the contiguity between mind and matter, or the possibility 
that human thought and behaviour can smoothly shift from vitalist creativity to mechanist 
repetition and back again, as Ravaisson would have it. It is because the division is so 
stark that both the machine’s attempt to come to life and the human’s fall into thoughtless 
automatism require the remedial force of laughter.  
                                                 
56 As David Dwan describes, the need for an underlying mechanical structure from which the suitably 
gifted subject can escape inflected also Lewis’s attacks on Romanticism, which he accused of being 
irrational and occasionalist (“The Problem of Romanticism in Wyndham Lewis” Essays in Criticism: A 
Quarterly Journal of Literary Criticism 65.2 [2015]: 163-165). For a deeper analysis of occasionalism and 
its relationship to modernism, see my fourth chapter, on Joyce.  
57 Wyndham Lewis, Rude Assignment: An Intellectual Autobiography, ed Toby Foshay (Santa Barbara: 
Black Sparrow Press, 1984), 129n2. 
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Lewis is therefore right that his theory would fall to pieces without the mind/body 
division, but his attempt in “The Meaning of the Wild Body” to deflect the possibility of 
monism masks the extent to which an anxiety towards that division’s collapse is a 
structuring element in his work. Much like how Bergson in Matter and Memory asserts 
that his thinking is “frankly dualistic,”58 the casualness of this dismissal should be read 
symptomatically, as a marker of its importance as a presupposition. Mechanism – the 
belief that all life or consciousness can be reduced to a series of “mechanical” cause-and-
effect relationships – is necessarily monistic, as (especially in the extreme form that 
Bergson usually has in mind) it not only posits a continuity between inanimate objects 
and thinking subjects, leaving no room for vitalist notions like “entelechy” or the soul, 
but also brooks no hierarchy between mind and matter. It takes scientific reductionism as 
both an epistemological process (in which one learns more about something by 
describing its parts) and an ontological one (in which the processes being reduced to are 
considered more real or more meaningful than the higher-order ones).  
Though a critique of this position, in its strongest form, runs throughout 
Bergson’s work from Time and Free Will to the end, its “frank” statement in Matter and 
Memory testifies to the rhetorical role of the position that runs parallel to the 
philosophical one. As Bergson goes on to say in the book’s introduction, the text “deal[s] 
with body and mind in such a way as, we hope, to lessen greatly, if not overcome, the 
theoretical difficulties which have always beset dualism, and which cause it . . . to be held 
in small honour among philosophers” (MM xi). Looking back to Time and Free Will, we 
                                                 
58 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1950), xi. Future citations will 
be parenthetical, indicated with “MM.” 
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can see the importance of this defense. There, Bergson attacks mechanism in the context 
of determinism, to which he considers mechanism to be interminably linked. Specifically, 
Bergson says that determinists have been “condemned . . . in advance” to a form of 
mechanism that “has no value beyond that of a symbolical representation” and which 
“cannot hold good against the witness of an attractive consciousness, which shows us 
inner dynamism as fact.”59 Mechanism, and by extension monism, thus figures as a pre-
philosophical presupposition on the parts of the determinists, a presupposition that 
Bergson says cannot stand up in the face of actual creative intelligence. Thus, he 
substitutes his own presupposition, dualism, to act as a bulwark against the real enemy, 
since if determinism requires mechanism, and mechanism requires monism, then a 
system that presumes dualism cannot be deterministic.  
Dualism thus takes the role for Bergson (and as I will later show, for Lewis) of 
what Gilles Deleuze referred to in Difference and Repetition as an “image of thought.” 
These “images” take the form of philosophical presuppositions that determine the terms, 
scope, and direction of subsequent thinking, often appearing under the guise of “common 
sense.” As Deleuze writes, “it is in terms of this image that everybody knows and is 
presumed to know what it means to think. Thereafter it matters little whether philosophy 
begins with the object or the subject . . . as long as thought remains subject to this Image 
which already prejudges everything.”60 I must clarify that it is not strictly dualism that 
                                                 
59 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F.L. 
Pogson (New York: Dover, 2001), 172. Future citations will be parenthetical, indicated with “TFW.” 
60 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 131. Deleuze and Guattari reiterate this position in What is Philosophy?: “the image of thought 
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occupies this position, for either Lewis or Bergson, but rather the rejection of mechanism 
and monism. Indeed, Lewis’s own rejection of the mechanist position sometimes 
struggles to rise to the level of an argument, as evidenced by his rejection of A.N. 
Whitehead’s “organic mechanism,” the implications of which Lewis says make it “not 
such an agreeable belief” (TFW 173).  
That both have arrived at dualism through the rejection of determinist mechanism 
explains in part why both promoted theories of laughter which establish a hierarchy with 
consciousness at the top and mechanical processes at the bottom. In Bergson’s Laughter, 
the automatic and mechanical elements of human thought and action appear most clearly 
as a threat, a lurking possibility that laughter evolved to suppress. As he writes, the 
human body’s “attitudes, gestures and movements . . . are laughable in exact proportion 
as that body reminds us of a mere machine,”61 and he explicitly links human automatism 
to absentmindedness (L 8).62 The belief that attentiveness and intellect can banish the 
automatic tendencies that (if Laughter is to be believed) are present in seemingly 
everyone, is in part to blame for the implicit anti-egalitarian strain in Bergson’s thought 
that we later see magnified in Lewis. A taste of that anti-egalitarianism appears in that 
                                                 
gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought” (Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell [New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994], 37). A few pages later they call these images “prephilosophical” (40).  
61 Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans Cloudesley Brereton and Fred 
Rothwell (New York: Dover, 2005), 15. Future citations will be parenthetical, indicated with “L.” 
62 For an incisive analysis of the role of the mechanical in Bergson’s theory of comedy, see: Alenka 
Zupančič, The Odd One In: On Comedy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008), 110-127. 
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earlier mention of the “attractive consciousness” in the passage I quoted from Time and 
Free Will, but it appears in greater force in a little-known speech that Bergson gave in 
1895 called “Good Sense and Classical Studies.”  
The occasion of the speech was the award ceremony for that year’s concours 
général, a prestigious academic competition given to upper-year French high school 
students.63 Its subject is the question of what constitutes “good sense” and whether (and 
how) it can be cultivated by education. On this question, Bergson decisively splits from 
René Descartes’s assertion in A Discourse on the Method, that “good sense is the most 
evenly distributed thing in the world.”64 Rather, Bergson says, good sense “requires 
constant wakefulness” and “dreads nothing more than the ready-made idea.”65 Both 
habits (KW 347) and clichés (KW 350) receive Bergson’s opprobrium, taking the blame 
for diverting people from their intelligence (and, presumably, into something other 
people would find laughable). Thankfully, education can productively act, “not so much 
to communicate an élan as to remove obstacles” (KW 349). The difference between these 
two possibilities is vital, for Bergson is not arguing that good sense can arise from 
nothing, or that education inscribes on a mental tabula rasa. Rather, it merely modifies 
                                                 
63 Bergson was a previous winner of the award – taking the 1877 prize in mathematics for a solution he 
devised to one of Pascal’s problems. The appearance of this solution in the Annales de Mathématiques was 
his first publication.  
64 René Descartes, A Discourse on the Method, trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 5. 
65 Henri Bergson, Key Writings, eds. Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey, trans. Melissa McMahon 
(New York: Continuum, 2002), 346. Future citations will be parenthetical and indicated with “KW.” 
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an independently-existing process – which is a good thing, Bergson says, for if good 
sense was entirely tied to education, then it would thereby become the domain of a 
privileged few, meaning that “we would have to be saddened at the sight of the 
irresistible trend which places power into the hands of the majority” which, because 
education is closed to them, lack the sense to use their power wisely  (KW  346).  
This thought process, which argues that democracy depends on a partial division 
between good sense and education (with good sense here figured as the opposite of 
automatism and habit), itself depends on rejecting the possibility that mechanical 
processes can lead to creative results – that is, it depends on the rejection of monism, and 
the establishment of a hierarchy of mind over matter. Laughter and “Good Sense and 
Classical Study,” though peripheral texts in Bergson’s oeuvre, are vital for making 
explicit a hierarchy that is operative throughout his other more well-known works. And it 
is this hierarchy where Bergson and Lewis begin to align politically, in the sense that this 
relationship between the partial separation of education from good sense and the 
possibility of democratic government is a fork from which their political roads diverge. 
Because Bergson believes that education, and the class privilege it entails, is not 
completely necessary for good sense, it follows that democracy (dependent as it is on a 
suitably informed populis) is a viable form of government. But Lewis does not believe in 
this viability, instead arguing that it was only “the wealthy, intelligent, or educated” who 
had the power to escape the straitjacket of contemporary life.66 It is in this sense that we 
can see the political import of Lewis’s idea of comedy, for as Vincent Sherry observes 
                                                 
66 Wyndham Lewis, The Art of Being Ruled (London: Chatto and Windus, 1926), 3. Arthur Mitchell. New 
York: Dover, 1998. Hereafter cited parenthetically as “ABR.” 
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“Lewis’s comic characters are not some subnormal exception; they comprise a usual 
humankind, whose strenuous but vacuous attempt to supersede their animal-mechanical 
nature affords the constant opportunity for comedy.”67  
Lewis’s tendency to, in reading Bergson, assume his premises while arriving at 
opposite conclusions – “accepting what Bergson discards, rejecting what Bergson 
endorses”68 – has led him to a system of thinking in which creativity and conscious 
thought, potentially open to all in Bergson’s thinking, is so rare among the average 
person that any striving for it becomes ipso facto comical. Lewis’s reactionary stance 
towards Bergsonism has led, not in the opposite direction, but towards an intensification 
of Bergson’s hierarchy. Whereas for Bergson intuition, good sense, and élan vital are 
foreclosed only from automatic processes and inanimate matter, and are thus (at least in 
principle) available to everyone, Lewis combines this hierarchy with a layer of social 
elitism which places the educated and artistic mind above all. It is for this reason that the 
spectre of monism is such a threat to Lewis’s system – for by doubling down on the 
hierarchy, he has given himself more to lose. And yet in establishing his system through 
opposition to Bergson, Lewis “effectively ensures [its] centrality.”69 As such, Lewis 
inherits the system’s instabilities as well, including the ever-present possibility of 
monism.  
                                                 
67 Sherry, 123. 
68 SueEllen Campbell, “Equal Opposites: Wyndham Lewis, Henri Bergson, and Their Philosophies of 
Space and Time” Twentieth Century Literature 29.3 (1983): 357. 
69 David Ayers, Wyndham Lewis and Western Man (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 18.  
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The next several sections of this chapter will further examine the roles of dualism 
and monism in Lewis’s thought and their relationship to the problem of habit in Bergson. 
The next section goes more deeply into the place of dualism in Lewis’s political 
philosophy, paying particular attention to his contributions to the two issues of BLAST 
and also Time and Western Man. One key point of this section is the extent to which 
Lewis defined his own thinking in opposition to others – not merely Bergson, but also 
those like Whitehead and the Behaviourists. This account will show how dualism, forged 
from the “image” of his rejected monism, formed the basis of much of Lewis’s non-
fiction writing during the inter-war period. The following section moves into a more 
thorough critique and historicization of Bergson’s philosophy. It provides a fuller account 
of Ravaisson’s philosophy, its possible influence on Bergson (in particular, the 
similarities between Ravaissonian “habit” and Bergsonian “duration”), and the 
implications this has for the status of monism in Bergson’s thought. As it did for Lewis, 
Bergson’s rejection of monism has a specific source: the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, 
which Bergson read and admired for many years until he rejected him, developing his 
philosophical project in the process. It is through this rejection that Bergson’s anti-
monism takes on its status as a Deleuzian “image” rather than a well-defined “concept.” 
The next section compares Lewis’s novel The Childermass to his painting A Battery 
Shelled through the lens of Manuel DeLanda’s concept of “flat ontology,” or the 
elimination of hierarchical relationships between ontological states. Borrowing additional 
concepts from Deleuze, Graham Harman, and Levi Bryant, this section demonstrates how 
The Childermass, which Fredric Jameson described as “a veritable summa of Lewis’s 
12 
 
narrative modernism,”70 depicts beneath its apparent dualist hierarchy an inescapable 
monist substratum into which the characters interminably risk falling.  
It appears as though for the philosophies of both Lewis and Bergson, monism 
exists as an omnipresent danger in the shadowed corners of their thought. Having rejected 
monism through its association with determinism, and having built up increasingly severe 
hierarchies from that rejection, the possibility posed by Ravaisson that creativity may 
arise from mechanical processes poses a genuine threat. The evasion of this possibility 
was thus a top priority for both writers, and this evasion left an indelible mark on their 
thought. 
1.2 Art Without Men 
Lewis’s attacks on his fellow modernists have become minor legends. But while his 
critique of Joyce’s “Bergsonism” in Time and Western Man has taken (for good and for 
ill) a central place in the collective memory of his literary criticism,71 his attacks on 
Pound are surprisingly savage given their close friendship. In Time and Western Man, 
                                                 
70 Fredric Jameson, Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1979), 6. 
71 “The most powerful, and surely the best known, of [Lewis’s] oppositions was Lewis’s championship of 
space in aesthetics against time. . . . The modernists were obsessed with temporality, according to Lewis . . 
. [And] the supreme literary representative of this obsession was James Joyce” (Scott W. Klein, The 
Fictions of James Joyce and Wyndham Lewis: Monsters of Nature and Design [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994], 2).  
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Lewis calls Pound a “revolutionary simpleton” and “a genuine naïf,”72 and later in the 
same chapter writes that “Pound is enthroned as the master-poet of the absolutely new 
epoch; but all that was ever new of that showed any signs of wanting to evolve . . . has 
evaporated. . . . There was never anything new about Ezra . . .” (TWM 42). Later, in Men 
Without Art, Lewis’s assessment of Pound becomes even more blunt: “Ezra,” he writes in 
his chapter on T.S. Eliot, “is pure mechanism.”73 The critique here reads like the 
unveiling of a great deception: Pound’s stature as “master-poet” functioning as a 
widespread error, a trick that has been played on the poetry-reading public. What Pound 
has claimed is that he is new, that is, creative in the sense of being non-mechanical, and 
his readers have eaten it up. Despite this claim, Pound, in Lewis’s eye, has buried his 
mind in erudition, so that “the dead with whom he consorts in his quaint poetics are so 
numerous that they have numbed away any trace of originality.”74 So Lewis’s role as 
“enemy” here means that he must step in to oppose the consensus, first to fulfill the role’s 
performative demands, and second to save modernism from a potentially stultifying 
consensus (such as he sees in the “time-cult”).   
 Though it takes up only a small section of a very large book, Lewis’s critique of 
Pound has notable implications for his approach to dualism in the latter, more 
                                                 
72
 Wyndham Lewis, Time and Western Man, ed. Paul Edwards (Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 
1993), 37. Future citations will be parenthetical and indicated with “TWM.” 
73 Wyndham Lewis, Men Without Art (London: Russell and Russell, 1964), 68. 
74 António M. Feijó, Near Miss: A Study of Wyndham Lewis (1909-1930) (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 
186. 
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philosophically-oriented half where the attacks on Bergson, Whitehead, Alexander, and 
the like, begin in earnest. Of particular note here is that, scattered among the various 
claims of Pound’s non-existent creativity, is the claim that he had recently endorsed 
Futurism (TWM 40-41). Lewis bases this argument on an article in the Christian Science 
Monitor which mentions Pound promoting an alignment between industrial life and 
music. That it would be this which Lewis latches on to when trying to turn “Marinetti” 
into a four letter word makes sense when one remembers the nature of Lewis’s criticism 
of the Futurists, and his reasoning in distancing them from his own (distinct, though 
aesthetically similar) Vorticist movement. In his memoir Blasting and Bombardiering, 
Lewis recalls an argument he had with Marinetti where he had claimed that “you Wops 
insist too much on the Machine.”75 Likewise, in his essay “Automobilism,” Lewis 
critiqued “the childishness of the Latins over mechanical inventions,” and said that the 
Futurist obsession with industrial machines had “nothing very new about it”76 – a claim 
resembling Lewis’s critique of Pound.  
 A notable trait of these anti-Futurist statements is their foregrounding of 
Marinetti’s Italian origins, a nationalistic pigeon-hole that can often get quite specific – 
such as when Lewis points out that Marinetti is a “milanese prefascist” (TWM 41) rather 
than, say, one from Tuscany or Trieste. Lewis consistently associates the assumption of 
social roles with mechanical or deterministic processes of thought and action. As he 
specifies in The Wild Body, “the ideally ‘free man’ would be the man least stereotyped, 
                                                 
75 Wyndham Lewis, Blasting and Bombardiering (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937), 37.  
76 Wyndham Lewis, “Automobilism,” in Creatures of Habit and Creatures of Change: Essays on Art, 
Literature, and Society 1914-1956, ed. Paul Edwards (Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press, 1989), 33. 
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the man approximating to the fewest classes, the least clamped into a system – in a word, 
the most individual.”77 On the other hand, as the Vorticist manifesto of BLAST contends, 
“the moment a man feels or realizes himself as an artist, he ceases to belong to any milieu 
or time.”78 From Lewis’s earliest work, then, we have a dichotomy: the emancipated 
artist contrasted with the common person fixed into a role. National caricatures are one 
such role, and so this pattern of emphasizing Marinetti’s origin in the process of 
critiquing his aesthetics, which Lewis repeats across multiple texts, appears to follow the 
same rhetorical strategy that Lewis deployed in attacking Pound. Marinetti is mechanical 
not only because he adores machines and industry, but also because he is (says Lewis) 
stereotypically Italian. Thus it would follow that Pound, in endorsing (implicitly or 
explicitly) a quasi-Futurist aesthetic, has allowed himself to fall into a way of making art 
derived from a predictable, mechanical pattern. Pound thereby reveals himself to be as 
uncreative as any other “Bergsonian” writer Lewis pillories in Time and Western Man.  
 The attack on Pound helps to focus exactly what Lewis is trying to accomplish in 
his massive and varied philosophical-critical tome. Its diversity of targets and arguments 
makes finding a common thread difficult, but what unites much of the work (at least 
rhetorically) is a repeated overturning, a structure of arguing that holds that those who 
say that they oppose the mechanism of modern society (be they Pound, or Joyce, or 
Bergson) are in fact perpetuating the very crimes they criticize. There is a resemblance 
                                                 
77 Lewis, The Complete Wild Body, 167. 
78 Wyndham Lewis, ed. BLAST 1 (Berkeley: Gingko Press, 2009), np. It is also worth pointing out that the 
statements on humour under both “BLAST” and “BLESS” specifically refer to English humour, rather than 
humour in general (17, 26).  
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then to the satirical aims of The Apes of God, Lewis’s immense roman á clef, which 
attacks the many “apes” of the London intelligentsia  (principally Bloomsbury and the 
Sitwells) for claiming that they are artists, when their artistry is merely affective, the 
assumption of a role. Pound and the Sitwells are, according to Lewis, guilty of two 
counts. First, in their aesthetic practice they promote modes of art that are essentially 
anti-creative, falling out of the high place that Lewis affords the artist into the domain of 
mere machines. Second, and most serious of all, is that in promoting their methods as 
artistic and as creative, they attack the very terms of Lewis’s hierarchy, transforming 
“non-conformity” into a role unto itself, and thereby crowding out the genuinely free. 
Hence Lewis’s desperation to distinguish himself from Marinetti,79 which culminated in 
him and several other Vorticists crashing a London lecture, an event that Lewis describes 
in terms of a military action: “Marinetti had entrenched himself upon a high lecture 
platform, and he put down a tremendous barrage in French as we entered. Gaudier went 
into action at once. . . . He was sniping him without intermission . . . The remainder of 
our party maintained a confused uproar.”80 This would not be the only attack. In a letter 
                                                 
79 These various attempts seem to have been only partially successful, as Vorticism and Futurism continued 
to be lumped together by scholarship published well after Lewis’s death. For example, Jeffrey Herf writes 
that “the avant-garde associated technology with a new antibourgeois vitalism, masculine violence and 
eros, and the will to power . . . Marinetti and the futurists in Italy, Wyndham Lewis and Ezra Pound in 
England . . . were all drawn to right-wing politics partly out of their views on technology” (Reactionary 
Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984], 47).  
80 Lewis, Blasting and Bombardiering, 36. 
17 
 
signed by many of the most prominent Vorticists and published in a June 1914 issue of 
The Observer, Lewis put his displeasure with Futurism on the public record, writing that 
“there are certain artists in England . . . who do not . . . agree with the futurism of Sig. 
Marinetti.”81 This division between the artist and the machine cannot, it seems, be 
permitted to blur – a point that will become important in my later analysis of The 
Childermass. 
 The problem of deception and the problem of mechanism are therefore joined at 
the hip, in that they both undermine the creative/mechanical hierarchy that is a 
cornerstone of Lewis’s dualism. And it is because of this convergence that Lewis can 
critique Pound’s supposed lack of creativity in the early section of Time and Western 
Man and then later in the same book critique the behaviourism of John Watson in largely 
the same terms – “you are sorry for Professor Watson: he has to say the same things over 
and over again: for the whole of what he effectively has to say can be put into two lines. 
It is the last, monotonous, dogged negation of scientific or critical philosophy” – and also 
in the terms with which he attacked Marinetti – “Watson could have existed in no time or 
place except modern industrial America” (TWM 319). Behaviourism, through the 
synecdoche of its inventor, becomes the one-trick pony of a “revolutionary simpleton,” 
and the emblem of a stereotypically American mindset (an assumption that tacitly ignores 
Watson’s debt to the Russian Ivan Pavlov). This is but one of many swipes that Lewis 
would take at behaviourist psychology, which as popularized by Watson took as its goal 
“the prediction and control of behavior” and which “recognizes no dividing line between 
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man and brute.”82 Lewis turned his satirical eye to behaviourism most directly with his 
1932 novel Snooty Baronet, but we can encounter assaults on the doctrine in his non-
fiction from much earlier than that.  
The growing popularity of behaviourism in psychology through the early 
twentieth century can be seen as something of a disaster for Lewis’s intellectual goals. Its 
deterministic monism makes it a clear example of what Lewis saw as science’s tendency 
to “regard life as a machine” (ABR 12) and to “[make] us strangers to ourselves” (ABR 
13). But most insidious was the way behaviourism destroyed the hierarchies that Lewis 
spent so much of his time advocating. “Behaviourism,” writes Paul Scott Stanfield, 
“allowed for no exceptions, and for Lewis it was precisely on the exceptions that all 
depended.”83 Indeed, Lewis’s attacks on behaviourism, and Watson in particular, often 
take on the hint of a straw-man argument.84 But it is in the similarity between the critique 
of Watson and the attacks on Pound and Marinetti that we can start to see the lines of 
rhetorical similarity that draw together the heterogeneous bundle that is Time and 
Western Man – and also the larger project, The Man and the World, that it was part of. 
Repetition (Pound/Watson) and adherence to a national character (Watson/Marinetti) 
become for Lewis evidence of a pervasive mechanistic thought. If the goal of the 
                                                 
82 John B. Watson, “Psychology as the Behaviourist Views It” Psychology Review 20.2 (1913): 158. 
83 Paul Scott Stanfield, “‘This Implacable Doctrine’: Behaviourism in Wyndham Lewis’s ‘Snooty 
Baronet’” Twentieth Century Literature 47.2 (2001): 250.  
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Vorticist artist is to become established “beyond Action and Reaction,”85 then both 
Pound and Marinetti, by Lewis’s estimation, have failed to live up to the role.  
In this sense, Watson and (to a lesser extent) Marinetti are at least honest in their 
intentions, stating their positions outright in their respective manifestos. For Pound, 
Bergson, and others, Lewis must uncover (successfully or otherwise) a hidden monism 
that lurks behind professions to the contrary. One of the constant refrains in Lewis’s 
mode of critique was that “all those expedients by which modern writers sought to 
encompass value . . . were themselves no more than ideological expressions of the 
processes by which modern citizens were kept childish and powerless.”86 Modernity 
figures in Lewis’s thought as a mass deception, and so in at least some respects Watson 
and his followers are un-deceived. Yet their ideas abandon the essential dualism, the 
internal division of the mind, that Lewis thought was necessary to maintain an 
individualistic personality. As he writes in the second issue of BLAST, “you must catch 
the clearness and logic in the midst of contradictions: not settle down and snooze on an 
acquired, easily possessed and mastered, satisfying shape.”87 The contradictions in the 
short manifesto from which I take this line, in which Lewis at once calls for the embrace 
of machines while also claiming that they are the key to individuation, speak to the 
difficulties Lewis must grapple with as he tries to prop up the house he has built on 
dualism. As Lewis comments in a short piece called “Life Has No Taste,” “the best artist 
                                                 
85 Lewis, Blast 1, 30. 
86 Paul Edwards, Wyndham Lewis: Painter and Writer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 324. 
87 Wyndham Lewis, ed. Blast 2 (Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 1981), 91. 
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is an imperfect artist” – art that is perfect becomes “dilettante” inexorably. Thus, while 
one “should be human about EVERYTHING” the artist must also be “inhuman about 
only a few things.”88 The drive to perfection is thus a drive towards the very self-
deceptions that Lewis attacked in The Apes of God. The undivided and self-consistent 
mindset of a “perfect” artist begins to resemble the likewise undivided and predictable 
mindset of a behaviourist.  
It is in this sense possible, by looking at Lewis’s philosophical writings through 
the lens of his rejection of monism and its related philosophies, to see the line that 
connects his anti-behaviourist stance to his attack on such seemingly unrelated figures as 
Whitehead and Bergson. Surely, one would think, a philosopher like Bergson, so often 
categorized (dismissively or admiringly) with the vitalists,89 could not be attacked in the 
same breath as Watson, Pavlov, and Skinner. And yet we see Lewis attack Bergson 
(while lumping him in with Einstein) for not being vitalist enough: “under the 
characteristic headings of Duration and Relativity the nineteenth-century mechanistic 
belief has now assumed its final form” (TFW 84), then writing later that “the theoretical 
                                                 
88 Ibid, 82. 
89 For an example of a contemporary attack on Bergson in terms of his vitalism, see Bertrand Russell, 
“Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,” in Sceptical Essays (London: Routledge, 2004 [1928]), 51-52. For 
a more approving inclusion of Bergson with the vitalists, see Hans Driesch, The History and Theory of 
Vitalism, trans. C.K. Ogden (London: MacMillan, 1914), 182. Another useful primary source on Bergson’s 
reception as a vitalist is the debate between Russel and H. Wildon Carr contained in The Philosophy of 
Bergson (London: MacMillan, 1914). While Bergson’s categorization as a vitalist is not unproblematic it is 
clear from a cursory glance of the contemporary debates around him that his philosophy was read and 
reacted to in those terms. 
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truth that the time-philosophy affirms is a mechanistic one” (TFW 91). The comparison 
between Bergson’s philosophy and the Victorian variety of mechanism is rather ironic 
considering Bergson’s own rejection of Herbert Spencer.90 But it does fit the rhetorical 
pattern already sketched out, in which Lewis claims that someone thought to be on the 
side of dualistic vitalism is revealed beneath his gaze to have been a mechanist all along. 
The specific reasons for this argument come down in large part to Bergson’s elimination 
of Lewis’s precious hierarchy.  
What Lewis accuses the “time philosophers” of following is often not, strictly 
speaking, vitalism, but rather a related philosophy called panpsychism, or the belief that 
some form of consciousness, soul, or vitality is present in all forms of matter.91 The 
intricacies of panpsychist thought and their relationship to modernism are quite complex, 
and I deal with them in more detail in my second chapter, but for the purposes of Lewis’s 
argument panpsychism is essentially monism achieved by other means. Dualism, broadly 
speaking, defines two separate entities – mind and matter – and argues that they are 
ontologically separate and parallel. Mechanism and panpsychism are both monistic, the 
first by extracting mind from matter and the second by flooding matter with mind. While 
the appropriateness of tarring Bergson with this brush is at best debatable, it is true that 
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his theory of élan vital does not rise to the levels of hierarchy that Lewis’s philosophy 
demands. According to Creative Evolution, élan vital drives the entire process of 
Darwinian evolution, and so it follows that anything that has evolved is also possessed of 
this vitality. It is a qualified egalitarianism very similar to what he expressed in “Good 
Sense and Classical Studies,” in that it creates a division and a hierarchical relationship, 
but one that still places most of humanity on the “good” side of the line. (Recall that for 
Bergson, the automatic behaviour that elicits laughter is not the norm, whereas for Lewis 
it is.)  
Whitehead’s philosophy of “organism” as expressed in Science and the Modern 
World92 earns Lewis’s censure for similar reasons. Critiquing vitalism (though not 
Bergson specifically) Whitehead calls the position “an unsatisfactory compromise” 
between the proponents of mechanism and those who would prefer to see a place for free 
will to exist – unsatisfactory because “the gap between living and dead matter is too 
vague and problematical to bear the weight of such an arbitrary assumption, which 
involves an essential dualism somewhere.”93 Thus, Lewis attacks Whitehead, whose 
“hypothesis . . . leads to the assumption of an equal reality in everything, a 
democratically distributed reality, as it were” (TWM 425-26), terms quite similar to those 
he uses to attack Bergson’s “Time-doctrine” a scant few pages earlier (TWM 421). These 
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hints of ontological equality are simply too much for Lewis, whose political analysis rests 
on the contrast between “the single figure of the privileged king with the subservient 
Many,”94 a division that must be clear and distinct if it is to function. 
1.3 “The Fossilized Residue of a Spiritual Activity”  
In Bergson’s philosophy, creativity is a matter of no small importance. From its earliest 
development as a key portion of Bergson’s thought in Time and Free Will to its eventual 
role as a cornerstone of Bergson’s argument in Creative Evolution, questions of what 
creativity is, how it works, and whether it is possible ceaselessly drive the development 
and growth of Bergson’s system. That it would eventually be Darwin who provided the 
basis for Bergson’s fullest explication on creativity in retrospect seems strange, 
considering the extent to which the theory allowed scientists to fill in the many gaps in 
our understanding of how life developed and change, shrinking the domain of ignorance 
within which earlier vitalist and quasi-vitalist philosophies had found a ready 
agnotological home. From Friedrich Wöhler’s synthesis of urea in 1828 – which 
disproved the argument that organic compounds could not arise from inorganic ones95 – 
the various knowledge gaps that vitalists of centuries past had used to justify themselves 
began to fall one by one beneath the steamroller of scientific discovery. That evolution, 
the crown jewel of Victorian science, holds such a ready place in Bergson’s thought thus 
appears at first glance counter-intuitive.  
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 The answer becomes clearer in light of Deleuze’s essay “Bergson’s Conception of 
Difference.” As Deleuze writes: 
Biology shows us the process of differentiation at work. . . . 
Life is the process of difference. In this instance, Bergson is 
thinking less of embryological differentiation than the 
differentiation of species, i.e. evolution. . . . Opposing a 
particular mechanism, Bergson shows that vital difference 
is an internal difference. Furthermore, he shows that 
internal difference cannot be conceived as simple 
determination . . . it is [instead] indetermination itself.96 
An important point to remember while interpreting this passage in relation to Bergson’s 
larger philosophy (and its origins) is that, despite what many of his contemporaries and 
later interpreters would argue, Bergson emphatically denied that he was a vitalist. Rather, 
as he says in a 1935 letter to Floris Delattre, he sees élan vital as a middle ground 
between mechanism and finalism. “The image of an élan,” he writes, “is nothing other 
than this indication” (KW 367). What ties mechanism and finalism together is their 
insistence that the future is already in some ways defined – either in the chain of causality 
branching off from an original state (mechanism) or a teleology that processes inexorably 
follow into the future (finalism). Both systems, furthermore, posit themselves as non-
agnotologies, in which every black box has been opened and all contents are known. The 
key to finding this middle ground is Bergson’s dualism. In Matter and Memory, the mind 
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is emphatically a unitary entity, and its indivisibility is contrasted with the perpetually 
divisible multiplicity of matter (MM 235). It is from the relation between the two that 
allows creativity to occur. Importantly, Bergson draws a line between creative thought 
and pure spontaneity, which he says would resemble too much “the case in the animal” 
(MM 243). Instead, free and creative actions are possible because of a synthesis of 
external multiplicities through intuition.  
 The result is what Bergson refers to as “becoming in general, i.e. a becoming 
which is not the becoming of any particular thing.”97 In the works leading up to Creative 
Evolution, Bergson established a model for creative action in which mental and physical 
forces continually push against each other, making and unmaking themselves and thereby 
creating a space of flux which is neither random nor determinate. Thus, when we see 
Bergson oppose intuition to intellect in Creative Evolution – “intuition goes in the very 
direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in 
accordance with the movement of matter”98 – we encounter the fullest expression of a 
long-developing system. And when this form of creativity is folded into the theory of 
evolution to become the “impulse which thrusts life into the world” (CE 132), it functions 
more like a drive rather than an entity, as that which ensures that “the future is not the 
selection from a number of possibilities but the continual creation of unforeseen and 
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diverging trajectories.”99 Bergson’s vision of evolution thus looks quite a lot like that of 
the Situationist dérive – aimless but purposeful, creative yet guided by the environment, 
forward-moving but with nowhere to go.  
 A major issue that this model runs into is that it essentially takes dualism as an 
axiom. It is not necessitated by Bergson’s philosophy so much as it functions as a pre-
condition for it. Deleuze’s book on Bergson makes frequent mention of its implicit 
monism. He writes that Bergson’s dualism is “only a moment, which must lead to the re-
formation of a monism . . . just as integration follows differentiation.”100 Later Deleuze 
mentions that “the Bergsonian method has shown two main aspects, the one dualist, the 
other monist,”101 and then goes on to point to what he sees in Duration and Simultaneity 
as “a monism of time.”102 This is the first of many ways in which Bergson’s thought 
resembles that of Lewis: his dualism doth protest too much. Explaining why involves 
recourse to two major nineteenth century philosophers whose influences on Bergson are 
as indelible as they are often overlooked – Herbert Spencer and Félix Ravaisson. As far 
as I have been able to find, Bergson only mentions Ravaisson in three of his published 
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works. The first two are off-hand citations in Matter and Memory (MM 232n) and his 
1889 short thesis on Aristotle,103 which has yet to be translated from Latin into English.  
 The third example, an essay called “The Life and Works of Ravaisson,” was 
delivered as a speech in 1904, published in a journal later that year, and then re-edited 
and published as an introduction to a 1932 study of Ravaisson’s works. I include this 
summary of the essay’s publication for two reasons. First, because that 1904 presentation 
coincides with the period when Lewis was in Paris and, still “militantly vitalist,”104 was 
attending Bergson’s presentations in earnest.105 Second, I mention this history to draw 
attention to a footnote appended to the 1932 version of the essay, as reproduced in The 
Creative Mind, which includes a quote from the publication committee for the book that 
the essay introduced: “The author had at first thought of making a few revisions. Then he 
decided to re-edit these pages as they were, even though they remain, as he says, exposed 
to the accusation . . . of having ever so slightly ‘Bergsonized’ Ravaisson.”106 This 
accusation is in fact too kind, particularly when it comes to Bergson’s summary of 
Ravaisson’s theory of habit. Reading Bergson’s summary and comparing to what 
Ravaisson says in Of Habit, one may wonder whether Bergson had read a different book 
entirely. 
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 The essay tries to cover all of Ravaisson’s life and work in very few pages, and 
even within those bounds treats Of Habit like an afterthought. Yet what little it has said 
has had a strong influence on Ravaisson’s subsequent reception.107 One passage bears 
quoting: 
[M]otor habit, once contracted, is a mechanism, a series of 
movements which determine one another: it is that part of 
us which is inserted into nature and which coincides with 
nature; it is nature itself. . . . [passing] from consciousness 
to unconsciousness and from will to automatism. Should 
we not then imagine nature, in this form, as an obscured 
consciousness and a dormant will? Habit thus gives us the 
living demonstration of this truth, that mechanism is not 
sufficient to itself: it is, so to speak, only the fossilized 
residue of a spiritual activity.108  
The effect of this summary is to figure Ravaisson as one of Bergson’s predecessors, 
through a kind of Bloomian Apophrades. It is, like the rest of the section on Of Habit, 
characteristically short on details and specificity, lacking the comparatively deep analysis 
Bergson’s provides in his section on Ravaisson’s book on Aristotle. It maintains a dualist 
approach to habit, aligning it with “nature” in a way that implicitly excludes the rest of 
human thought from the natural world. It’s mention of nature having “obscured 
                                                 
107 For an account of Ravaisson’s philosophy and its reception, see Mark Sinclair, “Ravaisson and the Force 
of Habit” Journal of the History of Philosophy 49.1 (2011): 65-85.  
108 Bergson, The Creative Mind, 197-198. 
29 
 
consciousness,” seemingly in line with accusation of panpsychism, also appears to fold 
Ravaisson in to élan vital, anticipating Creative Evolution’s publication in 1907. Finally, 
it segues into Bergson’s usual degradation of habit, which is only the “residue” of a 
higher kind of thought.  
 This approach to habit is common in philosophy, where it is (for lack of a better 
word) habitually associated with thoughtless, mechanical behaviour, necessarily opposed 
to creativity. Similar ways of talking about habit, and the association between materiality 
and spiritual deadness, appear before Bergson and Ravaisson, in Descartes,109 Hume,110 
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Kant,111 and after them as well in Lyotard112 among others. It is not, however, the 
approach of Ravaisson, whose idea of habit instead elevates the faculty of habit from the 
mechanical “residue” of conscious activity to the very seat of creativity and free will. 
What other philosophers identify in habit as a dulling thoughtlessness, the propensity 
towards mechanical behaviour, Ravaisson identifies as a substratum of predictability 
from which one may vary, and which is a precondition for creativity rather than an 
opponent. As he argues: 
The general effect of the continuity and repetition of 
change that the living being receives from something other 
than itself is that, if the change does not destroy it, it is 
always less and less altered by that change. . . . The change 
that has come from the outside becomes more and more 
foreign to it; the change that it has brought upon itself 
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becomes more and more proper to it. Receptivity 
diminishes and spontaneity increases.113 
This process still occurs within a hierarchy, but not one based on a dualistic split between 
mind and matter. Rather, Ravaisson distinguishes between the “inorganic realm” where 
existence is deterministic and “Nature” which, because of habit, possesses spontaneity,114 
and for this reason his work has in this way been read as a precursor to the idea of brain 
plasticity.115 In practice, the division he draws is largely between different levels of 
complexity and predictability, and is somewhat similar to the philosophies of “organism” 
that Lewis critiques in Time and Western Man. The division, then, is largely a matter of 
degree between simple and complex processes, and is thus implicitly monist. He 
therefore shows a way “to conceive freedom not as opposed to nature, but rather as 
inhabiting or animating the natural body in the form of inclinations or tendencies.”116  
 Bergson’s reading of Ravaisson, which treats him as simply another dualistic 
philosopher whose ideas on free will are best read as precursors to Bergson’s own, is 
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therefore an almost complete misrepresentation. I say “almost” however because Bergson 
is in a sense correct in figuring Ravaisson as his predecessor. Ravaisson’s habit is similar 
to Bergson’s duration, in that both were proposed as ways to distinguish free action from 
simple randomness, with both fulfilling the role of “the dividing line . . . between will and 
nature.”117 Omri Moses’s observation that élan vital resembles less an impulse than “a 
plastic and malleable tendency or disposition”118 speaks in large part to the Ravaissonian 
presence in Bergson’s work. Likewise, Ravaisson’s emphasis on the distinction between 
multiplicity and homogeneity, and on the importance of time, find clear echoes in 
Bergson’s Time and Free Will.119 But while, as a commentator on Bergson wrote in 
1913, “Bergson’s philosophy bears a close genealogical relation” to Ravaisson’s,120 that 
relation does not follow the contours Bergson sketches in his essay, but rather a more 
complex pattern of disavowal and re-incorporation. And yet Bergson never acknowledges 
these similarities, and in the end seemingly tries to bury Ravaisson’s argument. While it 
is impossible to know for sure what Bergson was thinking when he produced his mis-
reading, and then allowed that mis-reading to remain in subsequent editions of the text 
after it was pointed out, one important side-effect of this Bergsonized version of 
                                                 
117 Ravaisson, Of Habit, 59. 
118 Moses, Out of Character, 53.  
119 These echoes have been noted by the translators of the English edition (Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair, 
“Editors’ Commentary,” in Of Habit [London: Continuum, 2008], 113). 
120 Arthur O. Lovejoy, “Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson: The Conception of ‘Real 
Duration,’” Mind: A Quarterly of Psychology and Philosophy 22.10 (1913): 467. 
33 
 
Ravaisson is that it removes a number of parallels between this philosophy of habit and 
the account of how consciousness works in the writing of Herbert Spencer.   
 I have not chosen Spencer arbitrarily, but rather because of his powerful early 
influence on Bergson’s thought. Like Lewis, Bergson’s philosophical development is 
marked by a powerful early attachment to a famous thinker who they later abandoned. 
And, like Lewis, Bergson’s rejection of Spencer retains a spectral presence in his 
philosophy – primarily in the form of particular philosophical images. As Bergson writes 
in a 1908 letter to William James, he was “completely steeped in the mechanistic 
theories” he found in Spencer, to which he “adhered more or less unreservedly” until the 
period of 1881-83, when he had left the École Normale and began to examine the weak 
understanding of time present in Spencer’s theories – an examination that culminated in 
his concept of duration and the composition of Time and Free Will (KW 362-63). It is in 
this rejection of Spencer that we encounter a possible origin of Bergson’s reflexive 
disparagement of mechanism and reductionist theories of consciousness.  
 Bergson’s early infatuation with Spencer is understandable given the vast breadth 
of his influence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – to a degree that is 
difficult to imagine in light of the low status currently afforded to his ideas. Michael W. 
Taylor, in his introduction to Spencer’s philosophy, provides a summary of the extent of 
Spencer’s reach.121 One particularly luminous detail is an assessment provided by the 
author Grant Allen in 1904: “his First Principles place him in line as a cosmologist with 
Newton and Laplace, his Biology as a naturalist with Cuvier and Darwin, his Psychology 
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as a mental philosophy in front of Kant and Hegel, his Sociology as the founder of a new 
and profound science before all his contemporaries.”122 Not even the most fanatical 
Bergsonists ever wrote such nonsense. Such ecstatic praise ought to indicate that Tom 
Quirk’s assessment that Bergson “was as much a popular phenomenon as he was a 
serious philosopher”123 applies equally well to Spencer, if not more so. 
 In terms of Bergson’s relation to Ravaisson, and by extension his relation to 
monism, the most notable aspect of Spencer’s thought is his philosophy of habit. First, 
Spencer believed strongly in the power of scientific reductionism, writing in his First 
Principles that “when you learn that the changes undergone by food during digestion, are 
like the changes artificially producible in the laboratory; you regard yourself as knowing 
something about the natures of these phenomena.”124 He followed not merely a 
pragmatic reductionism, in which one breaks down a process into its component parts so 
to make a highly complex system understandable, but rather what Daniel Dennett terms 
“greedy reductionism,” in which an understanding of the base components of a process is 
mistaken for the an understanding of that process in itself.125 For Spencer the most 
elemental form of thought was the reflex action,126 which had been identified earlier in 
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the century as a physical process originating in the spinal cord.127 This argument 
dovetailed with another, in which Spencer held that “life is definable as the continuous 
adjustment of internal relations to external relations” so that “even the highest 
generalizations of science consist of mental relations of co-existence and sequence.”128 
Consciousness, “inclusive of intelligence in its highest forms,”129 was thus 
understandable only in terms of a complex relationship of reflex actions that allowed the 
“internal relations” of the body to adjust to the vagrancies of the environment.  
 While Ravaisson’s theory of habit is not nearly so simplistic, but it is similar to 
Spencer in several key ways. Both implicitly place human beings in what Manuel 
DeLanda has called a “flat ontology,” a concept he defined in his book Intensive Science 
and Virtual Philosophy, and which has been recently picked up and extended by 
speculative realist philosophers like Levi Bryant and Ian Bogost. As DeLanda writes, “an 
ontology based on relations between general types and particular instances is 
hierarchical, each level representing a different ontological category . . . [while] an 
approach in terms of interacting parts and emergent wholes leads to a flat ontology” in 
which all entities share equal ontological status.130 As Bryant summarizes, “flat ontology 
signifies that the world or the universe does not exist . . . there is no super-object that 
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gathers all other objects together in a single, harmonious entity.”131 This is not to say that 
one cannot recognize quantitative differences between entities, as both Spencer and 
Ravaisson do to some extent.132 But what one cannot be while promoting a flat ontology 
is a dualist, and certainly not a vitalist, since the whole crux of dualism is to establish a 
split between mind and matter on an ontological level, usually for the purpose of exalting 
human intelligence in comparison to inanimate things. 
 In rejecting Spencer’s mechanism to the extent that he did, Bergson abandoned 
(or at least tried to abandon) the possibility of a flat ontology. While, as Deleuze 
suggests, some of Spencer’s monism remains in trace amounts through Bergson’s 
philosophy, his surface-level dualism forced him to reject the thrust of Ravaisson’s 
argument even as he incorporated a shadow of “habit” through his concept of duration. 
The rejection of flat ontology (both Spencerian and Ravaissonian), then, serves as a 
guiding image of Bergson’s thought, as reflected in Laughter. Bergson’s treatment of 
laughter as a policing mechanism to ensure that one never falls victim to the dangers of 
habitual action (L 5) elevates non-mechanistic behaviour and thought in a way that 
neither Ravaisson nor Spencer would have permitted. What Bergson does with mind – 
and what Lewis would take even further – is the inverse of what Spencer did. Comparing 
the way consciousness is treated in Laughter and First Principles, we encounter 
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examples of what Graham Harman calls “undermining” and “overmining.”133 These 
terms are related to the concept of flat ontology, in that both have to do with the elevation 
of certain kinds of entities to higher ontological status than others. Undermining in this 
sense can be seen as doing ontologically what “greedy reductionism” does 
epistemologically, in that it essentially treats the components of an object or process as 
more important or valid than the whole (as Spencer does with consciousness). 
Overmining is the opposite – disregarding or ignoring the component parts of something 
while elevating the whole (in Laughter, Lewis, and with vitalists generally).  
We can therefore see the difficulty that Bergson faced when trying to define the 
mechanisms of creative thought. The path Ravaisson charts, which comes far closer to 
escaping undermining and overmining than Spencer, was cut off when Bergson rejected 
monism. Yet, as Bergson’s disclaiming of vitalism in his letter to Floris Delattre 
indicates, he continued to search for a dualist version of this middle way until late in his 
career. What is needed is a dualism which does not overmine consciousness, and Bergson 
seems to approach that in the concept of duration, and in his emphasis on “internal 
difference” giving rise to non-determinate effects. But the dualism upon which this 
system rests is built on sand, derived, it would seem, more from Bergson’s rejection of 
Spencer than from anything necessitated by the system itself. We encounter a hint of this 
problem in Bergson’s characterization of élan vital, as a concept that “may indeed not 
explain much,” but is “at least a sort of label affixed to our ignorance, so as to remind us 
of this occasionally, while mechanism invites us to ignore that ignorance” (CE 42). This 
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admission suggests a hidden monism: that both élan vital and mechanism orbit around a 
void in our knowledge, with the élan’s only claim to superiority is its Socratic claim to 
know that it knows nothing.  
Having thus charted the ways in which Bergson’s own thought has been affected 
by his rejection of Spencer and his burial of Ravaisson, we can see more easily how 
Lewis, ever the Bergsonian, followed a very similar path. His overmining of 
consciousness, combined with his political ideas, intensifies both his reliance on an 
axiomatic dualism and the ever-present shadow of a monism very much like that which 
trailed his disavowed predecessor.  
1.4 Herod’s Children 
I think everyone who has tried to write or talk about The 
Childermass has found himself in the same hole . . . We 
don’t know – to an agonizing degree we are not allowed to 
know – what it is all about. That very ignorance may be, of 
course, what it is all about. 
— I.A. Richards134 
One of the chief presumptions that underlies a resistance to monist philosophical 
approaches to human thought is that freedom and creativity need to be inexplicable. They 
are said to gain power from their unknowability, from their agnotological function. True, 
Bergson did not subscribe to this assumption, and his idea of duration attempted to 
provide a mechanism without being mechanistic, but as far as Lewis was concerned this 
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attempt ended in failure. Bergsonism, and the other “time-philosophies” Lewis attacks, 
come under fire first and foremost for their supposed crypto-mechanism, a hidden 
monism that Lewis thought only artists could be truly free of. In terms of Lewis’s fiction, 
we can see the demands of this inexplicability most directly in The Childermass, and in 
The Childermass too we can also see its failure. As I argue in this section, the apparent 
randomness and discord of the novel’s world, and the apparently dualistic assumptions 
that it inherits from Lewis’s non-fiction, break down to reveal a shadow of its opposite. 
In many ways, then, Lewis’s intellectual trajectory mirrors that of Bergson – in his 
rejection of a famous intellectual advocating a (allegedly, in Bergson’s case) 
deterministic theory of consciousness, the adoption of a hierarchical dualism, and the 
continuing hints of a flat ontology that remain.  
In The Childermass, the mechanical processes of plot are, in Hugh Kenner’s term, 
“truncate[d]” by the erasure of narrative time, 135 creating inexplicability on the surface 
which does not extend to the depths. To see how this works we must examine the origin 
of the novel’s title. Childermas is a Christian feast day commemorating the king Herod’s 
massacre of all the children under the age of two living in the vicinity of Bethlehem, and 
usually occurs in late December. The holiday is otherwise known as the Feast of the Holy 
Innocents. The massacre of the innocents appears exclusively in the Gospel of Matthew, 
and is rendered in the King James Version thusly: 
Then Herod, when he saw that he was mocked of the wise 
men, was exceeding wroth, and sent forth, and slew all the 
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children that were in Bethlehem, and in all the coasts 
thereof, from two years old and under, according to the 
time which he had diligently enquired of the wise men.136 
Herod is, of course, in search of the infant Christ, who he believes will overthrow him, 
and also for the wise men, who have evaded capture by taking a different route home 
than the one they took to arrive. Both groups were able to escape because they had 
received a warning in a dream. The massacre is, in fact, bookended by successful 
prophecies – the birth of Christ and the warning in the passages before, and the resolution 
of a prediction by the prophet Jeremiah (who foresaw the massacre’s aftermath) in the 
passages immediately after. The passage quoted above, on the other hand, shows Herod 
going to extreme lengths to avoid a prediction, to snuff out the insurrection he believes is 
brewing in his territory. As Bergson makes clear, determinism is linked to the capacity to 
make predictions (TFW 143-44), and this attempt to escape determination not only fails – 
Herod’s quarry escapes – but would have been completely meaningless to Herod’s 
continued reign even if it had succeeded. As the narrator goes on to say, Herod dies 
completely of his own accord long before Christ was old enough to even potentially 
challenge him.  
 I include this brief interlude of Biblical exegesis in part because the second 
possible meaning of the title is far more obvious. “The massacre of the innocents” could 
work just as well as the name for World War One as it does for the story of Herod, and 
the protagonists of the novel’s first section, Pullman and Satters, appear to have died in 
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that very war. But Herod here also takes the form of a Lewisian wild body, someone 
struggling against mechanization and predictability, against the determinism implied by 
the existence of prophecy, whose inability to transcend his own mechanistic nature ends 
in disaster. He is what Lewis would later refer to as “the man-of-action” who “can neither 
understand nor feel” because “he is too busy.”137 Herod proceeds, in less than a sentence, 
from discovering he has been tricked to massacring every infant in his domain. This is 
not the sort of thoughtlessness that arises from continually repeated action (presumably 
he does not produce these massacres on a regular basis) but a thoughtlessness that comes 
from striving towards a goal, specifically the goal of exceeding his own determination.  
 It does not take much examination to see how the lost souls that populate The 
Childermass fulfill this model. The novel takes place in the afterlife, in a vast desert that 
surrounds “the magnetic city” – a paradise in “the heavenly north” (TC 5) that all of the 
dead strive unceasingly to reach (or so it seems prior to the events of the later novels). A 
huge mass of them converge on a single door guarded by the Bailiff, an embodiment of 
the “time-philosophy” that Lewis described in Time and Free Will. The gate to the 
magnetic city forms a bottleneck, and the only way in is to convince the Bailiff to let you 
by. The use of the word “magnetic” to describe the city (along with the various references 
to magnetism throughout the novel) is more on the nose than it might at first seem. The 
arrangement of people, their goal, and their enmassing in front of a single obstacle in 
front of that goal, resembles an example William James mentions in his Principles of 
Psychology, which Lewis earlier critiqued (TWM 337-39). James begins his first volume 
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by questioning whether and how one may detect the presence of mental processes in an 
object. As an example of a non-mental process, he offers the following: 
If some iron fillings be sprinkled on a table and a magnet 
brought near them, they will fly through the air . . . A 
savage seeing the phenomenon explains it as the result of 
an attraction or love between the magnet and the fillings. 
But let a card cover the poles of the magnet, and the fillings 
will press forever against its surface without it ever 
occurring to them to pass around its sides138 
What appears at a glance to be an act of volition and agency on the part of matter is to a 
closer eye an automatic process, and one can distinguish the two by paying attention to 
whether and how the object adjusts to its surroundings. Bits of iron, though they do move 
in response to the force of the magnet, make no adjustment to evade the card which 
blocks them. Their movement is thus truly mechanical: that of a dead object compelled 
by a blind force. An animal, on the other hand, would in an analogous situation search for 
a way around the obstacle. 
 In Herod we see one version of this situation. The story swaps the magnet’s 
compelling force with a divine prophecy, but the results are the same. What appears to be 
free will in action actually becomes the fulfillment of a prediction, and greater evidence 
of a (in this case divinely) determinist universe. But the key trait here is not merely a 
mechanism discovered through the possibility of prediction, but also the brief moment of 
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undecidability, where it is difficult to tell whether the thing in question is alive and able 
to adjust (as Herod, hearing that someone threatens his reign, attempts to adjust) or 
whether the iron filling and the man-of-action will simply barrel on ahead regardless (as 
when Herod’s massacre ends up fulfilling a prophecy of Jeremiah). In The Childermass, 
what appears to be inexplicable – action without origin, true free will – may always in 
fact be the result of some hidden mechanical process.  
The plain outside the magnetic city, what might perhaps be Outside Heaven, 
seems filled with these magnetic fillings, so-called “peons” drawn to the magnetism of 
the gate to paradise. It is as though they have no choice but to move, and when they see 
that the Bailiff blocks their way they simply take a seat and wait for that blockage to 
leave. Despite Satters’s first impression that “they hardly seem human” (TC 30), 
frequently throughout the journey to the Bailiff’s door the novel emphasizes that the 
peons and spectral humans are at best barely distinguishable. Only a few pages later 
Satters’s assessment changes: “I believe we only think we’re so different” (TC 43). Later, 
a peon and a ploughman are confused (TC 105). Even the Bailiff seems confused as to 
their status, at first claiming that there is “all the difference in the world” between “a 
peon and an individual” (TC 183), but then later remarking that “their [the peon’s] 
persons are sacrosanct even as my own” (TC 263). Nobody in this novel is able to tell the 
difference between mindlessness and intelligence, or embodiment and spectrality, and for 
Lewis’s dualist system that is a very big problem.  
The confusion returns us to the alternate meaning hidden the allusion to Herod. 
While a close examination of the passage reveals the importance of prophecy, 
expectation, and the difficulty in spotting the difference between one who has escaped 
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their fate and one who has not (presumably, Herod went to his grave believing that the 
“king of kings” had died in his cradle), the resonance between “the massacre of the 
innocents” and the mass-murder of the First World War is undeniable. Lewis took part in 
the war, seeing action at the Third Battle of Ypres (otherwise known as the Battle of 
Passchendaele), and spent much of his time under constant shelling from German 
artillery.139 In a letter to John Quinn, Lewis called the war experience a “sheer loss of 
time,”140 and would later represent this loss by lopping two years from his life, reporting 
his birth year as 1884. The experience seems to have had a deadening effect,141 as Lewis 
later described: “a gunner does not fight. He merely shells and is shelled.”142 Eventually, 
he was able to secure a transfer to a post as a war artist, which put him in a place of 
relative safety.  
Little has been written on the effect of the war on Lewis’s writing, but that effect 
seems to have been considerable. As he would later write, “the War for me, as a soldier, 
was an interminable nightmare.”143 One scholar to take notice is Paul Edwards, who in 
an essay writes that “what Lewis had begun to discover during the war years was a kind 
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of fissure in the surface of reality,” revealing that “reality was the product of an illusionist 
secreted in our own consciousness . . . so we were not exposed to the annihilation that a 
face-to-face encounter with the absolute would mean for us.”144 Edwards attributes this 
“fissure” and its revelations to the effects of shellshock.145 In his analysis, Edwards 
points to Lewis’s exposure to the work of W.H.R. Rivers, a psychologist working for the 
British army whose task it was to treat severely traumatized soldiers until they were able 
to return to the front. It was Rivers’s belief that what a sufferer from shellshock needed to 
overcome was “too strong a recognition of the truth,”146 and so treatment often involved 
methods of distraction – pointing out, for example, that the death of a soldier’s close 
friend had at the very least been quick and painless. As Rivers reports in his article, 
soldiers who have not received adequate treatment for their trauma often undergo a 
process of repression: 
When I find that a soldier is definitely practising repression 
I am accustomed to ask him what he thinks is likely to 
happen if one who had sedulously kept his mind from all 
thoughts of war, or from special memories of warfare, 
                                                 
144 Paul Edwards, “Wyndham Lewis and the Uses of Shellshock: Meat and Postmodernism,” in Wyndham 
Lewis and the Cultures of Modernity, eds. Andrzej Gąsiorek, Alice Reeve-Tucker, and Nathan Waddell 
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should be confronted with the reality . . . [T]he question at 
once brings home to him the futility of the course of action 
he has been pursuing. The deliberate and systematic 
repression of all thoughts and memories of war by a soldier 
can have but one result when he is again faced by the 
realities of warfare.147 
Rivers seems to describe here a habitual response to this acquisition of knowledge – an 
attempt to return to an automatic, thoughtless way of being, which might have proceeded 
successfully earlier in the war, but which has now been rendered impossible by the events 
that have led the soldiers to come under Rivers’s care. The treatment that Rivers 
describes in his article involves a careful balancing act between the demands of the 
military (to get the soldiers back to the front as soon as possible, their health and well-
being be damned) and the needs of the soldiers (to carefully work through the trauma and 
so restore a more durable version of their earlier state). Both cases treat the wound in 
reality as a problem and an obstacle. What this implies for The Childermass I will 
describe shortly, but one of Lewis’s wartime painting A Battery Shelled at the moment 
has greater explanatory potential.  
 The painting brings us back to the issue of flat ontology. It shows us, as the title 
suggests, the aftermath of a shelling of a battery – or a cluster of guns in a fortified 
artillery position – with numerous figures in the shell crater lifting away the rubble while 
others appear to be fleeing. In the foreground, three officers look on, staring serenely in 
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different directions. It is on these figures that much of the interpretation of the painting 
often turns. Alan Munton, for example, writes that “it is in the relationship between these 
three figures and the body of the painting that the meaning to be found.”148 Their calm 
detachment, and its contrast with the clear desperation of the figures in the background, 
many running for their lives, certainly speaks to the habitual deadening of the personality 
and the repression of knowledge which Rivers reported among the officers he treated. But 
there has indeed been a revelation in the bodies of the shelled soldiers in the background. 
They have not merely been rendered abstract, or incorporated into the scene, but have 
been crafted so as to resemble the shattered pieces of their bunker. Lewis drew the 
scattered beams and boxes, and even the smoke, with the same yellowish colour, and in 
the same simple geometric lines, as the soldiers, so that the humans and the world that 
they inhabit are scarcely distinguishable. The background scene has created a situation in 
which, to borrow from Levi Bryant, “humans, far from constituting a category called 
‘subject’ that is opposed to ‘object,’ are themselves one type of object among many.”149 
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Figure 1: Lewis, Wyndham. A Battery Shelled, oil on canvas, 1919 (Imperial War 
Museum, London). Printed with permission. 
 This bubble of flattened ontology, revealed by the sudden trauma of the shell, 
strips away the soldiers’ superiority to the objects that destroy them. Meanwhile the 
officers, standing outside the bubble, continue to appear as integrated aggregates, systems 
and processes whose mechanical parts are hidden beneath the façade of humanity.150 
Indeed the image’s peculiar perspective further flattens the background, so that it almost 
looks as though the officers are themselves standing in front of a painting. But as Bergson 
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says in Laughter, the claim to vitality comes with certain expectations that one will not 
act like a machine. But the war destroys these pretensions: one sees that human beings fly 
through the air according to exactly the same laws as the shells that kill them, and the 
sight of such things often induces a traumatic repetitive flashback or a process of habitual 
repression. In this sense, the imperturbability of the officers seems as fragile as that of 
Rivers’s patient. Likewise we return through them to the indeterminacy of Herod, who 
never knew how inescapable his own determination was.  
 The problem we face in The Childermass is of a similar vintage, and it is one that 
should be familiar to us from Time and Western Man: seemingly vital processes which 
are in fact mechanical, seemingly hierarchical ontologies which are in fact flat. We see 
this process, as established, in the way the novel’s characters appear. The Bailiff stands 
above the crowd while himself representing an ideology that Lewis had dismissed as 
mechanistic, while the peons are at once below, and above, and indistinguishable from 
normal human beings. And when the Bailiff and Macrob debate their relative reality – “if 
you are not so real as I am, then you cannot injure me” (TC 277) – the closest the 
discussion comes to a resolution is the Bailiff’s declaration that Macrob is “a habit . . . of 
Space-Time” (TC 282). Satters appears at the start of the novel “a lost automaton rather 
than a lost soul” (TC 7) and speaks in continuous clichés and Steinian repetitions (“most 
terribly helpful and kind” etc. [TC 50-51]), but at the end it is he who is most resistant to 
the Bailiff’s rhetoric, and Pullman who most falls in with it. Indeed, Pullman frequently 
repeats the mantras of a “man-of-action,” advising early in the novel that “it’s best to 
keep moving here” (TC 16), and then shouting to Satters on the final page, “pick up your 
feet. If you must go nowhere, step out” (TC 401). Pullman doggedly drives forth towards 
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the magnetic city, exchanging forward motion for the careful thought that Lewis argued 
was the origin of artistic creativity. The lost souls of The Childermass thus resemble their 
Biblical origin doubly: first they resemble the innocents, and then they resemble the 
killer.  
 It is not just the people of the novel whose vitality is doubtful, but also the 
landscape. The first section of the novel, which describes Pullman and Satters journeying 
towards the magnetic pull of the Bailiff’s gate, brings them through various strange and 
beautiful environs which make Jameson’s dubbing the novel “theological science 
fiction”151 well deserved. The way the land seems to change, to follow different physical 
laws than the people who inhabit it (TC 126), suggests at first blush a kind of Heraclitean 
flux, an ever-changing and panpsychic universe where nothing is predictable and 
everything may change. However, one such oddity gives lie to this assumption. After 
venturing beyond the camp where they met up, the travelers encounter what Pullman 
dubs a “panorama”: “Look at that hedge. Do you see its perspective? It’s built in a 
diminishing perspective! I believe the whole place is meant to be looked at from behind 
there, where we have just come from” (TC 123). Exploring the scene, Pullman takes a 
leaf from the “life-sized” section of the panorama and walks with it into a region where 
everything is smaller, finding to his astonishment that the leaf has shrunk (TC 125-26).  
As any painter knows, achieving lifelike perspective is a difficult task, requiring 
no small knowledge of mathematics. Indeed, the mathematical basis for perspective is 
integral to its history, with the explosion of art works making use of the technique during 
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the Renaissance deriving from Filippo Brunelleschi’s discovery of the geometric basis for 
linear perspective in the early 1400s.152 In order to resemble a panorama, the scene that 
Pullman and Satters come across must be constructed according to a strict, and clearly 
defined, set of proportions, according to immutable mathematical laws. While the 
landscape of Outside Heaven appears at times surreal and random, that variation, upon 
closer inspection, follows strict rules and pre-defined patterns. In short they are, in 
principle at least, predictable. Seeing otherwise means taking an epistemological problem 
– we never discover what most of these laws are – and elevating it into a metaphysical 
one, the very same mistake that one makes when seeing life in iron drawn to a magnet or 
lost souls drawn to paradise. That these landscapes follow patterns, that they fall into 
types, is enough to know that one could discover their laws if one wanted to. And that is 
enough to thwart Herod for good.  
William James used the image of a magnet drawing iron fillings to represent 
motion defined entirely by physical laws, and lacking any true intelligence. Bergson, in 
his essay on Ravaisson, put the image to opposite use: “as scattered particles of iron 
fillings are attracted toward the poles by the force of the magnetic bar . . . so, at the call of 
a genius it loves, the virtualities slumbering here and there in a soul awaken . . . [and] a 
personality is constituted.”153 Yet it remains unclear how one is to tell the difference 
between a mind of genius awakening to its potential and a mindless material object 
dragged about by destiny. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson says that it is the 
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role of the philosopher “to promote a certain effort, which in most men is usually fettered 
by habits of mind more useful to life,”154 but the rising genius we see in this essay 
appears more guided by the “virtualities” than guiding.  
The Childermass offers a similar conundrum. Where in Lewis’s non-fiction the 
divide between matter and mind comes out in no uncertain terms, in the fictional core of 
his Man of the World project this division comes fettered with caveats, uncertainty, and 
doubt. What lurks underneath is a flat ontology, a state of being that lacks the powerful 
hierarchies upon which Lewis’s politics so depended.155 Put into practice, allowed to 
come together in their own fictional world, these ideas appear to struggle merely to 
survive, say nothing of escaping Herod’s fate. 
1.5 “A Sort of Sleep” 
It may well be that Lewis was at his most Bergsonian when he first sat down to write 
Time and Western Man. That text’s prephilosophical rejection of a form of (arguable) 
monism embodied in the work of an extremely popular philosopher mirrors eerily the 
trajectory of Bergson’s thought, deriving as it does from his own infatuation with and 
then rejection of the explicitly mechanistic thought of Herbert Spencer. Likewise, what 
for both writers is ultimately at stake is not merely the epistemological questions of 
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whether free will is possible and whether mind and matter are two distinct entities or one, 
but also the ontological and ethical question of which form of existence should occupy 
the higher position in their respective hierarchies. That the theories of Spencer and the 
behaviourists are too greedily reductionist, and too ready to ontologically undermine 
human thought and consciousness, is hardly contestable, and the gross overreach of their 
arguments made them easy targets for Bergson and Lewis’s critiques. The temptation to 
overcorrect – to overmine consciousness, as vitalists like Hans Driesch often do – 
remains omnipresent, and despite the critiques lobbed at it, Bergson’s notion of élan vital 
represents at the very least an honest attempt to avoid that pitfall, albeit an attempt 
conducted within an axiomatically dualist system. What the debate thus ends up being 
about is the partition and distribution of ignorance among ontological processes. It is a 
fight over competing agnotologies.  
 Yet in both Lewis and Bergson, habit suffers grievously, as we see when 
comparing Bergson to Ravaisson, and later Bergson to Lewis. And their suffering ought 
to serve as a warning against too incautious a choice of black boxes. It is in habit that we 
can best see the effects of the anti-monist image of thought that hangs over these works – 
an image that demands that a hierarchy be instilled. As Lewis would write in Paleface, 
“most men wish to be machines. They want to feed and sleep – and mechanical work is a 
sort of sleep – and be told what to do, nothing more.”156 Quite simply, for Lewis one 
cannot remain truly alive, nor truly thoughtful, without constant, strenuous effort, and it 
is the artist who supposedly brings this effort to its peak. But the war, it seems, took a toll 
                                                 
156 Wyndham Lewis, Paleface: The Philosophy of the “Melting Pot” (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929), 
237. 
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on Lewis’s vision. As he writes in The Art of Being Ruled, for a soldier at the front “the 
grinding boredom you realize he must be experiencing makes a mechanical hero out of 
him” (ABR 282). Not merely the trauma, then, but also the grinding monotony between 
bouts of excitement enforces repetition, mechanization, thoughtlessness. The war, then, 
degrades all it touches, forcing all participants to reduce themselves to mere bodies. We 
see this expressed most directly in the localized flat ontology of A Battery Shelled, and 
the precarious superiority of the onlookers, but also in the endemic indecisiveness of The 
Childermass, where the unpredictable vitality of the landscape hides a clichéd repetition, 
and the degraded, mechanical peons become indistinguishable from any other type of 
person.  
 For Bergson, the abandonment Spencer’s mechanism, and the related 
abandonment of monism, entailed as well the burying of Ravaisson. What Of Habit tends 
towards is not the undermining that Spencer promotes, but rather an ontological 
flattening similar in some ways to the process philosophy of Whitehead. Consciousness 
and fee will appear in Ravaisson as emergent properties of complex systems, deriving 
from a set of mechanisms but not completely reducible to them. One of the most notable 
traits of a mechanist philosophy – determinism – disappears completely, because it is 
impossible in Ravaisson to reduce the complex interplay of habitual action and novel 
thought to a simple cause-and-effect relationship. But Bergson’s summary turns 
Ravaisson into just another dualist, swallowing him up. And even to this day scholars 
frequently define the Bergson/Ravaisson relationship in these terms, or mis-read 
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Ravaisson in the same way Bergson did.157 Habit returns to the denigrated state it 
frequently occupies in dualist philosophical systems, as evidenced especially in Laughter. 
Though Bergson’s theory of laughter can be more egalitarian that Lewis’s, it still depends 
on the same basic elements: a hierarchical ontology between mind and matter in which 
mind holds the privileged place, the identification between habitual action and 
mechanical action, and the imperative that one expend the effort that it takes to avoid 
these actions lest one come under censure. 
 It is in these demands that, for both writers, the image of their rejected monism 
remains. Most clearly it looms as a threat over Lewis’s characters, which we see manifest 
in both A Battery Shelled and The Childermass in the form of ambiguity. It would be all 
well and good if each character in the novel ultimately reduced to a purely mechanical 
existence: that on its own would pose no difficulty to Lewis’s philosophy, since 
according to him the vast majority of people occupy precisely that state. The problem 
arises when so many elements appear at first to have vitality, to have successfully raised 
themselves to a higher level, only to reveal themselves under closer inspection as nothing 
                                                 
157 A handful of examples that I gathered over the course of my research, presented in no particular order: 
G. William Barnard, Living Consciousness: The Metaphysical Vision of Henri Bergson (Albany; SUNY 
Press, 2011), 41; Mark S. Muldoon, Tricks of Time: Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur in Search of 
Time, Self, and Meaning (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2006), 69; Stanford Schwartz, “Bergson 
and the Politics of Vitalism,” in The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy, eds. 
Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 280; Gillies, Henri 
Bergson and British Modernism, 8. The error often involves treating Ravaisson like just another nineteenth 
century Spiritualist philosopher, when his work on habit actually distinguishes Ravaisson from the 
Spiritualists on numerous points.  
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but automata. For a text derived from the same larger project as Time and Western Man, 
with its emphasis on the need for a domain of art built on clear and universal 
distinctions,158 this inability to know the difference between two categories of such 
importance afflicts the argument with paradox. How can one build a philosophy on the 
hard division between living and mechanical minds when it is impossible to really know 
whether you see one or the other? It is due to this question that a flat ontology looms 
above the scene, placed there by the very act of its rejection.  
 The hierarchy between mind and matter is also the reason why panpsychism poses 
such a problem for Lewis. Though it permits the existence of free will and 
unpredictability – both traits that Lewis found desirable in a philosophical system – it 
remains a flat ontology, though one achieved by raising matter up instead of pushing 
mind down. I will analyze the particular literary and philosophical issued posed by 
panpsychism, and their relationship to Bergson, in my next chapter on Virginia Woolf, 
but suffice it to say that such a system creates a degree of unpredictability entirely 
opposed to the mechanization Lewis saw in everyday human life. For Lewis, it is the 
hierarchy that is important, far more so than dualism. So while dualism often appears at 
the center of Lewis’s system, it is quite often best read as a supplementary argument, one 
that exists largely to support Lewis’s division between higher and lower orders of 
humanity. Panpsychism, then, cannot prevail, because it holds that nothing is truly 
mechanical, and that that very same forces which govern the everyday physical world 
also give rise to creative thought. Posed as a mechanist argument, this was repugnant to 
                                                 
158 Andrzej Gąsiorek, Wyndham Lewis and Modernism (Devon: Northcote House, 2004), 36-37. 
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Lewis, so it should be no surprise that he found it repelling when achieved by different 
means.  
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Chapter 2  
The Shock of Life: 
Virginia Woolf’s Panpsychic Knowledge 
[N]othing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any 
defect in it, for Nature is always the same . . . So the way of 
understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind, 
must also be the same, namely, though the universal laws 
and rules of Nature. 
— Benedict De Spinoza, Ethics159 
 
2.1 Moments of Being Continuous 
In the first paragraphs of Virginia Woolf’s early short story “Solid Objects” we encounter 
in miniature one of the key philosophical problems with which her fictions would engage 
across much of her career, one closely tied to the role of ignorance in her writing more 
generally. The story begins with a description of “one small black spot” on a beach, a 
lone and unitary punctum far in the distance, which as it draws closer we see possesses “a 
certain tenuity in its blackness” which shows “that this spot possessed four legs; and 
moment by moment it became more unmistakable that it was composed of the persons of 
two young men.”160 These men will become the focal characters of the story, but far 
more important to the present analysis is the narrator – someone occupying space in 
                                                 
159 Benedict De Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Edwin Curley (New York: Penguin, 1996), 69. 
160 Virginia Woolf, “Solid Objects,” in The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf, ed. Susan Dick 
(New York: Harvest, 1985), 102.  
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relation to the two men, and viewing from a fixed position their movements with greater 
or lesser fidelity as they draw near. Yet this embodied narrator is present only by 
implication, never even arising to the level of a “character” in the sense of having a 
personality, desires, motives, or even a name. It is an effacement we should keep in mind 
when examining the narration’s implicit positivism – we find that the two men have an 
“unmistakable vitality,” and a “vigour” in their argumentation that, while 
“indescribable,” is “corroborated on closer view by the repeated lunging of a walking-
stick on the right-hand side.”161 One might imagine, in reading the first section of this 
story, that the text was part of some sort of scientific study, or perhaps a police report.  
 Yet the epistemological confidence is completely at odds with the story’s 
opening, which proclaims the unity of the two men’s bodies with the same faux-
objectivity and confidence as it does its subsequent observations. Likewise does it 
contrast with an observation later in the story, that “looked at again and again half 
consciously by a mind thinking of something else, any object mixes itself so profoundly 
with the stuff of thought that it loses its actual form and recomposes itself a little 
differently in an ideal shape which haunts the brain when we least expect it.”162 An 
object viewed will bend beneath the act of viewing, and repeated observations only 
worsen things. The status of an object as an object is thus a construct of perception 
infused with ignorance, and the object thus becomes an agnotological repository 
manifesting as a physical presence in the world. It is in this way that the relationship 
                                                 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid, 104. 
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between perception and epistemology becomes a problem for Woolf, one that, as I will 
show, she resolves in part through an engagement with panpsychism which provides a 
framework for understanding the black boxes that her thought contends with. But for the 
moment a more useful connection is the one between the problems of “Solid Objects” 
and Immanuel Kant’s writing on epistemology, and this passage in particular: 
Suppose that cinnabar were now red, then black, now light, 
then heavy; or that a human being were changed now into 
this and then that animal shape; or that on the longest day 
of the year the land were covered now with fruit, then with 
ice and snow. In that case my empirical imagination could 
not even get the opportunity, when presenting red colour, to 
come to think of heavy cinnabar.163  
Kant’s observation expresses in the abstract the very problem that Woolf’s story 
explores: that a lack of consistency in our observations would destabilize the whole logic 
of empiricism, and make it impossible to acquire knowledge about the physical world by 
way of perception. This dependability is also, of course, one of the basic assumptions of 
scientific experiment: if one did not believe that the universe proceeds according to 
knowable rules that are true in all places and times, very little of what scientists do would 
make any sense. But it is also a basic fact of our everyday relationship with the empirical 
world. We must proceed as though our objects are “solid” and predictable, since it is that 
assumption that makes our perceptions understandable.  
                                                 
163 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), A100-
A101. 
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 This dependability feeds directly into the logical structure of the life/non-life 
dichotomy that, as I described in my previous chapter, both Bergson and Lewis in their 
own manner adhere to. Though they differ greatly in the specifics, both of them take as 
the key indication of mechanical, thoughtless behaviour in human beings actions which 
are repeated, stereotyped, and (most importantly) predictable. “Nature follows strict, 
unchangeable laws,” we might imagine them saying, “which is why it is possible for 
science to study it, but humans are capable of creative, unpredictable behaviour, and so 
must possess some vital aspect which sets them apart from the normal, inanimate matter 
of the everyday world.” Indeed, the danger of humans falling into such automatic 
behaviour was so great that certain processes evolved specifically to prevent it from 
happening – as we see Bergson argue in Laughter. It is for this reason that Lewis and 
Bergson’s philosophies so emphatically insist on their dualism, since such an argument 
demands that one disclaim any continuity between natural physical processes and those 
which underlie creative human thought. Their vitalism (or perhaps quasi-vitalism) 
demands that we extract consciousness from the logical axioms upon which all empirical 
knowledge lies. Or so it would seem. In fact, as should gradually become clear during 
this chapter, the possibility of a flat ontology – implied to varying extents by both 
mechanist and panpsychist models of consciousness – permits us to excavate from the 
metaphysics of science the important epistemological role played by shock, surprise,164 
and discontinuity in the human perception of the physical world, a larger process of 
which science is a highly specific (and specialized) case. Shock has long been recognized 
                                                 
164 In this chapter, I employ “shock” and “surprise” interchangeably, in large part to avoid repetition in my 
writing.  
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as one of the chief stylistic tools in the work of Virginia Woolf, whose plots often turn to 
one extent or another on an epistemic break: the deaths of Jacob, Septimus, Mrs. Ramsay, 
and Percival, being but the most well-known such instances.165 Indeed, death in Woolf’s 
fiction is almost never expected – though (and this point will be important later) both we 
and the novel’s characters can often see in retrospect the chain of events that caused these 
“inexplicable” deaths to occur: Evans of Mrs Dalloway and Andrew Ramsay of To the 
Lighthouse probably never saw the shells that killed them, but, as with the shells that 
struck the battery in Lewis’s painting, or which possibly killed Pullman and Satters, their 
paths still followed the normal laws of motion, just like any other object in space. 
Objects, likewise, are of great interest in Woolf’s writing – and a subject of a good deal 
of criticism.166 This alignment between objects, knowledge, and surprise, as I will 
explain below, is in no way an accident, but rather a valuable critical lens, and indeed, 
one that proceeds according to strikingly Bergsonian terms, despite the professed dualism 
of his philosophy. 
                                                 
165 The most extensive analysis of the role of shock in Woolf is Lucio P. Ruotolo’s The Interrupted 
Moment: A View of Virginia Woolf’s Novels (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). For a more recent 
analysis, see Anna Jones Abramson’s “Beyond Modernist Shock: Virginia Woolf’s Absorbing 
Atmosphere” (Journal of Modern Literature 38.4 [2015]: 39-56).  
166 See, for example: Bill Brown, “The Secret Life of Things (Virginia Woolf and the Matter of 
Modernism)” Modernism/Modernity 6.2 (1999): 1-28; Martin Štefl, “‘A Very Remarkable Piece of Iron’: 
Towards a Theory of Material Imagination in Virginia Woolf’s ‘Solid Objects’” Prague Journal of English 
Studies 3.1 (2014): 19-34. 
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 To begin to see how this relationship might work, we might look at an 
illuminating passage in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle. At the beginning of the 
text’s second part, Freud remarks on the well-known alignment between psychological 
trauma and surprise. “After severe mechanical accidents,” he writes, “railway crashes, 
and other life-threatening incidents, there arises a condition that has long been designated 
as ‘traumatic neurosis.’ . . . [and] the weightiest element in their causation seem[s] to be 
the factor of surprise, of fright.”167 Many pages later, at the end of the sixth part, Freud 
writes that: 
 [W]e should understand clearly that the uncertainty of our 
speculation was greatly increased by the need to borrow 
from biology. Biology is truly a realm of unlimited 
possibilities. We may expect from it the most surprising 
revelations, and cannot guess what answers it may provide 
in a few decades to the questions we have posed – answers, 
perhaps, of such a kind as to blow apart our entire artificial 
structure of hypotheses.168 
It is notable that, here, Freud implicitly aligns the onset of trauma with the acquisition of 
scientific knowledge by ascribing to them the same mechanism. Surprise – and its 
siblings, shock and fright – appears in Beyond as an epistemological-temporal mechanism 
that wields a great deal of power. It is a “weighty element” of the onset of psychological 
                                                 
167 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. Todd Dufresne and Gregory C. Richter 
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2011), 55. 
168 Ibid, 96. My emphasis.  
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trauma, but also a force of knowledge, one which both transmits knowledge (“the most 
surprising revelations”) and also “blow[s] apart” long-cherished speculations. Following 
Derrida’s argument in The Post Card that Beyond the Pleasure Principle does not merely 
enact speculation as an argumentative mode, that speculation is not merely “the oblique 
object of [Freud’s] writing,” but also “the operation of his writing,”169 we may see the 
significance this power wields. The natural world, when combined with systematic study 
(“biology”), ceases to be stable. All speculation trembles at the sound of unpredictability.   
If one found a particular piece of cinnabar and saw that it was red, one would not 
likely be surprised. But if that cinnabar were to suddenly turn blue or green in one’s 
hands then surprise would be (ironically) a highly predictable reaction. Such surprise is a 
basically temporal phenomenon: the knowledge that all cinnabar is red, combined with 
the assumption that all cinnabar will continue to be red in all future encounters, is an 
instance of what Quentin Meillassoux, in After Finitude, calls the “mathematization of 
nature,” which designates “the discovery that the world possesses a power of persistence 
and permanence that is completely unaffected by our existence or inexistence.”170 It is in 
this matter that one’s experience in the present may be extended, hypothetically, into the 
distant past and future. And it is in part due to this process that Meillassoux categorizes 
materialism as a speculative philosophy, since materialism in its various forms assumes 
that it is possible to extract from our knowledge of the world the fact of our having 
                                                 
169 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), 284. 
170 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2008), 116. 
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observed it, and to thereby speculate on how that world acts without us.171 The base 
assumption of empirical knowledge systems is that what has been encountered in the past 
will be encountered in the future so long as the same circumstances are met. To “know,” 
then, is to locate oneself psychologically in the past, and to speculate then is to 
imaginatively project that knowledge into the future. It is for this reason that (as Freud 
recognized in his own speculations) the natural world may always intervene and make a 
mess of one’s well-crafted speculations, because the future, unlike the past, is never 
given. Surprise – the name we give these interjections – thereby attains its 
epistemological power through its status as a temporal phenomenon. 
It should be clear to readers of Bergson how this alignment of knowledge and 
temporality relates to questions of what constitutes “free will” and “consciousness.” As 
Vladimir Jankélévitch describes in his excellent commentary on Bergson, it is a tendency 
of those advocating deterministic, mechanist philosophies to become ensnared in an 
“illusion of retrospectivity,” where one always acts as though one’s relationship to all 
knowledge is oriented towards the past.172 As he writes, “because we place ourselves 
after the accomplished perception, it seems to us that recollection should follow it like a 
deadened echo. Freedom, mobility, finality thus are absurd or miraculous only out of 
season and retrospectivity.”173 It is for this reason that, as I pointed out in the earlier 
chapter, Bergson’s defence of free will derives from and depends upon his particular 
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172 Vladimir Jankélévitch, Henri Bergson, eds. Alexandre Lefebvre and Nils F. Schott, trans. Nils F. Schott 
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approach to temporality. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the English translation of his 
Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience demoted its highly descriptive (though 
dry) French name to a mere subtitle while providing it with the more interesting yet 
misleading name of Time and Free Will, thereby giving time the top billing in place of 
freedom. But it is precisely Bergson’s argument that one can only get to freedom by 
passing through time. The English title enacts this process, but at the cost of obscuring 
free will’s paramount importance in this text.  
One of Bergson’s main arguments in favour of free will examines a hypothetical 
situation in which a person chooses between possible actions X and Y. Ventriloquizing 
for the pro- and anti- sides of the determinism argument, Bergson describes the key 
aporia of the debate: the person arguing against determinism says that the person 
choosing action X could potentially have chosen Y, and so this choice represents an 
unpredictable free action. The person arguing for determinism argues that the choice of X 
indicates that there were forces involved which forced the choice of X, and so the 
possibility of choosing Y retrospectively disappears. From this hypothetical conversation, 
Bergson concludes that the example of the binary choice is a poor one, since its 
application leaves the terms of the debate mostly unchanged. Instead, Bergson advocates 
a third way: “All the difficulty arises from the fact that both parties [in the debate] picture 
the deliberation under the form of an oscillation in space, while it really consists in a 
dynamic progress in which the self and its motives, like real living beings, are in a 
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constant state of becoming.”174 As in the analysis of Zeno’s Paradox in the same text, the 
problem of determinism is a product not of any fact of nature but in the way nature is 
understood, described, and symbolized.  
The important point here is that the determinist position, through this error in 
representation, takes the past position and projects it into the future. In the example of the 
binary choice, the decision between X and Y has already been made and the argument is 
essentially between varying interpretations of how and why it was so. But the larger 
determinist claim that if one took stock of all matter in the universe and understood all of 
the universe’s physical laws, one could in principle predict all events with perfect 
accuracy, is speculative in the same way that Meillassoux says materialism is speculative. 
It is, in a sense, an unfulfillable promise. It claims that “if X happened Y will happen,” 
though with full knowledge that not only has X (the above mentioned total knowledge of 
the universe) never happened, but in all likelihood never will happen. The articulation of 
determinism proceeds through a counter-factual, and acts upon a world entirely alien to 
its central predictive claim. As we see with Kant, a limited form of this same prediction is 
what makes empirical knowledge possible, in that such knowledge is only 
comprehensible if it can be projected into the future (so we cannot simply say that the 
cinnabar is red, but must also say that it will always be red as well). Yet it is precisely 
because our projections are circumscribed by our ignorance that we are always open to 
                                                 
174 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F.L. 
Pogson (New York: Dover, 2001), 183. Many will recognize this discussion of free will and the future as a 
predecessor to Deleuze’s notion of “the virtual.” See the second chapter of Bergsonism for more details.   
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surprise: the deep and luminescent red of a cinnabar stone can be quite shocking to one 
who has never seen it.  
One key aspect of this process – and the means by which I will link it back to 
Woolf – is the relationship between perceived continuity and perceived discontinuity, and 
the role that ignorance plays in mediating between the two. An argument in favour of a 
mechanist view of consciousness, in which one’s thought is totally reducible to physical 
processes, essentially takes two seemingly discontinuous events (the influences on a brain 
and the thoughts that brain produces) and links them (often deterministically) by 
presuming that there is an undiscovered causal relation between them of which we are 
currently ignorant, and which is too complex to be perceptible in our everyday 
interactions. A vitalist view of consciousness, such as the one proposed by Hans Driesch, 
argues that the continuity between the two events is as imperfect as our perceptions make 
it out to be, and that there is an unobserved vital impulse – such as entelechy or the soul – 
which is the real causal agent behind the mind. Both cases involve positing some form of 
continuity that lies in place behind the veil, imperceptible at the present time but 
knowable in principle. In examining these positions, one may recall the observation that 
Baudelaire makes in his essay on “The Painter of Modern Life” regarding “people who, 
having once read Bousset and Racine, fancy that they have mastered the history of 
literature.”175 To such a reader, the works of these few canonical authors jump out sui 
genesis as singular artistic achievements. They would be, in short, surprising. But, says 
Baudelaire, if “an impartial student” were to look exhaustively at such a history (whether 
                                                 
175 Charles Baudelaire, “The Painter of Modern Life,” in The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays, 
trans. Jonathan Mayne (London: Phaidon Press, 1964), 1.   
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of literature, painting, or some other art), “he would find nothing to shock nor even 
surprise him. The transitions would be as elaborately articulated as they are in the animal 
kingdom. There would not be a single gap: and thus, not a single surprise.”176 Both the 
mechanist and the vitalist occupy the position of Baudelaire’s naive reader, familiar only 
with the canon. Their respective theories are, in effect, ways of stitching together the gap 
created by their ignorance: neither actually knows, empirically, that their speculations are 
correct. Rather, each posits an invisible bridge between the gaps. While the two 
approaches differ greatly in plausibility, one should never lose sight of their commonly 
speculative nature. 
Whether or not Baudelaire’s argument works as an approach to the history of art, 
it characterizes a key epistemological distinction between the ideally understood 
“mathematized” nature, in which, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, “there is nothing 
lacking,”177 and the world as it is subjectively experienced. It is from this split, in which 
dis-continuous experiences are overlaid upon a perfectly continuous world, that shock 
becomes possible. It is likewise in this split that surprise gains its epistemological 
usefulness, and where ignorance acquires its important mediating function. As Bruno 
Latour argues, risk and unexpectedness are key components of any meaningful scientific 
research, as it is precisely this unexpectedness that “make[s] the observer sensitive to new 
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177 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course Notes from the Collége de France, ed. Dominique Séglard, 
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types of connections.”178 For an experiment to be meaningful, it must be risky, in that 
there should be at least a small chance that the results will fly in the face of the 
researcher’s expectations. It is in this way that the metaphysical principle that makes 
scientific predictions possible – the principle of sufficient reason, which holds that 
everything which occurs must have a cause – makes it possible to acquire new 
information. While everything in the universe is presumed to be connected through 
causal relationships, the vast majority of those relationships are obscure. An experiment 
must thus be preceded by some type of speculation, in the form of a prediction. The 
experiment is thus risky to the extent that its underlying prediction exceeds in some way 
the already-known network of causal relations: it has the potential to work counter to 
expectations, and thereby indicate relationships that were hitherto unknown. The 
temporality of experimentation is thus remarkably Bergsonian,179 in that its 
meaningfulness involves the deterministic causation of the past (which informs the 
speculation) butting up against the virtual possibilities of the future. Just as, qua Bergson, 
it is only in retrospect that we can say that a given person inevitably chose X instead of 
Y, it is likewise only in retrospect that we can say that the results of a famous experiment 
could not have been otherwise. It is precisely because the future cannot be predicted – 
that the fantasies of determinism remain thwarted – that meaningful experiments are 
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possible. Experimentation, and scientific observation generally, is a process by which 
researchers use the unexpectedness of the present to mine the experiences of the past: 
irregularities in the orbit of Mercury become in retrospect the effects of relativistic 
gravity,180 peculiarities in a finch’s beak become in retrospect the effects of natural 
selection,181 – such are the fruits of risk. 
It is at this point that Woolf re-enters the conversation. While I have spent the 
chapter up to this point outlining a number of philosophical concepts seemingly unrelated 
to the writing of Virginia Woolf, I have done so largely in service of an analysis of 
Woolf’s relationship to shock and surprise, and specifically the ways in which these 
experiences take the form of epistemological breaks. While numerous critics have taken 
up the question of shock in Woolf’s writing, none so far have examined the role of shock 
as a form of knowledge production, nor has Woolf criticism dealt significantly with the 
related question of “life” as an epistemic category. And yet the alignment of the two 
notions – particularly in the case of Septimus Smith – appears scattered throughout 
Woolf’s writings. But perhaps the most overt articulation of this relation appears in her 
short autobiography “A Sketch of the Past”:  
Perhaps this is the strongest pleasure known to me. It is the 
rapture I get when in writing I seem to be discovering what 
belongs to what; making a scene come right; making a 
scene come together. From this I reach what I might call a 
                                                 
180 See: Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory, trans. Robert W. Lawson (New 
York: Three Rivers Press, 1961), 143-145. 
181 See: Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the Beagle (London: Wordsworth Editions, 1997), 360-362. 
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philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that 
behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we – I mean 
all human beings – are connected with this; that the whole 
world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art . . 
. And I see this when I have a shock.182  
In this passage we see condensed many of the issues that I have detailed so far, 
particularly in Woolf’s belief in a vast web of relationships and connections hidden 
behind the “cotton wool” of everyday experience which can be revealed at particular 
moments through shock. Though phrased in a more ethereal, possibly mystical, 
rhetoric183 (an issue I will return to later), in terms of its epistemology the above passage 
is remarkably similar to the model of scientific discovery summarized above. Indeed, as 
Claudia Olk has argued, “A Sketch of the Past can be regarded as an experiment in which 
fiction records its own processes of rendering the past and analyses them at the same 
time.”184 In Woolf, it would seem, the relationship between shock and knowledge could 
hardly be closer.  
 The open question, then, is the importance of panpsychism in this network of 
relationships. While it has taken several forms that differ in their specifics, we can 
broadly designate with the term “panpsychism” any belief system which attributes “life,” 
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“agency,” or “consciousness” (however defined) to entities traditionally believed to be 
inanimate. It therefore shares a family resemblance with vitalism, in that both forms of 
thought found themselves on models of “life” outside of those provided by mechanism 
and/or scientific realism. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, there are several 
tensions between the two systems. As Lewis noticed, panpsychism can often take the 
form of a flat ontology, in that it posits a continuous relationship between stones and 
humans along a scale of “consciousness.”185 Vitalism, meanwhile, posits a caesura 
between the living and the dead, and so often aligns itself with some form of dualism. 
(Bergson’s notion of elan vital is a peculiar case, and one that I will return to in a 
moment.) This emphasis on continuity is in large part what makes panpsychism 
interesting as an interpretive tool, particularly with regards to Woolf. Though I will argue 
that Woolf’s particular form of panpsychism owes much (though indirectly) to the 
theories of Richard Maurice Bucke, whose Cosmic Consciousness was wildly influential 
at the turn of the century and which (like Woolf) linked the perception of continuity to a 
kind of mystical experience, I would first like to address the recent vogue for varieties of 
panpsychism among proponents of Object Oriented Ontology (OOO), several of whom I 
draw on in this study.  
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Probably the most well-known version of panpsychism to arise recently is Jane 
Bennett’s “vital materiality,” which she describes in her 2010 book Vibrant Matter as “a 
theory of distributive agency.”186 Borrowing Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the 
“assemblage” – which she calls “ad hoc groupings of diverse elements . . . living, 
throbbing confederations”187 – Bennett characterizes matter as agential, and pitches her 
argument against the tendency to ascribe agency to human actors while denying such 
agency to other things. As she writes later in the book, “vital materiality better captures 
an ‘alien’ quality of our own flesh, and in so doing reminds humans of the very radical 
character of the (factitious) kinship between the human and the non-human.”188 In this 
sense, her defence of panpsychism resembles that of Graham Harman, who in his Prince 
of Networks argues that “human cognition is just a more complicated variant of relations 
already found amidst atoms and stones.”189 Likewise, Steven Shaviro, in his The 
Universe of Things, opines that “vital materialism and object-oriented ontology both 
                                                 
186
 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 
21. 
187
 Ibid, 23.  
188
 Ibid, 112 
189
 Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 
212.  
75 
 
entail some sort of panexperientialism or panpsychism.”190 While panpsychism has 
proven in several circles to be an eminent source of mockery, and while it is my purpose 
here to distance my own approach to these issues from Bennett, Harman, and the like, I 
argue that its chief conceptual flaws also make it useful in certain cases as a mode of 
inquiry. We can see this usefulness in Bennett’s defense of anthropomorphization on 
epistemic grounds – arguing that a massively and confoundingly complex artificial 
structure such as the North American electrical grid cannot be properly grasped without 
ascribing it human characteristics.191 This argument quite tellingly resembles Bergson’s 
on the neo-vitalism of his day, that “the ‘vital principle’ may indeed not explain much, 
but it is at least a sort of label affixed to our ignorance . . . while mechanism invites us to 
ignore that ignorance.”192   
It is in the question of ignorance that we see both the flaws and the usefulness of 
panpsychism. Bennett is correct that there exist structures of such complexity that no 
human mind could ever comprehend them (we should recall here my discussion of 
Asimov in the introduction), and Bergson is correct in identifying with this ignorance the 
subtle hubris of mechanism. Likewise, in other contexts Harman’s comment on the 
contiguity between human consciousness and “atoms and stones” would strike as 
boilerplate physicalism – in that both essentially argue that there is a knowable, material 
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structure “behind” consciousness which is not ontologically distinct from those processes 
found among non-human entities. What distinguishes their approaches – and what puts 
them in a similar conceptual ballpark as Woolf – is their emphasis on our ignorance of 
these processes rather than their potential knowability. Panpsychism’s key flaw is that it 
posits a metaphysical universal to solve an epistemological problem – that being the 
relationship between a fully continuous world and our discontinuous understanding of it. 
Recognizing a continuum between electro-chemical reactions in the brain and self-
consciousness raises problems that panpsychism does not solve. Replacing this ignorance 
with a universal risks stripping these complex relations of their specificity, just like if one 
were to treat elephants and E.coli bacteria as the same species simply because they share 
a common ancestor. One can recognize this continuity without sacrificing taxonomy or 
ignoring an object’s singularity.  
 In Woolf we see a different relationship. Panpsychism, in her writing, serves not 
as a universal but as a mode of knowledge. Surprise, then, emerges as a powerful tool 
that may grant life as easily as it takes that life away. In Woolf we see not an opposition 
between life and non-life, nor a simple mysticism that treats all matter the same, but a 
complex play of animacy and inanimacy193 sprawling across contested fields of ignorance 
and of the known. 
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2.2 Objective Interventions 
Objects should not touch because they are not alive. You 
use them, put them back in place, you live among them: 
they are useful, nothing more. But they touch me, it is 
unbearable. I am as afraid of being in contact with them as 
though they were living beasts.  
— Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea194 
 
Woolf would have perhaps agreed with Bennett regarding the alienness of the 
human body. As she famously writes in her essay “On Being Ill,” “all day, all night the 
body intervenes.”195 While scholars have often cited this line to argue that Woolf’s 
writing dismantles mind/body dualism,196 the use of the word “intervenes” strikes an odd 
pose. What is the nature of this intervention? And what does the body intervene upon? 
An earlier passage gives some indication: “what waste and defects of the soul a slight 
attack of influenza brings to view, what precipices and lawns sprinkled with bright 
flowers a little rise in temperature reveals, what ancient and obdurate oaks are uprooted 
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in us by the act of sickness.”197 Such effects are clearly involuntary, and the fact that 
Woolf extrapolates these processes to an intervening “body” rather than a pathogen 
indicates that this text does not produce a simple dismantling of the mind/body split. The 
body, in that it intervenes, acts distinctly from the mind – in a manner that might 
resemble agency. Likewise, this intervention is aggressive, taking no care or mind to 
anything else. The body simply acts, and simply is.  
But what does the body intervene upon? A simple dualism will not work here, 
since it is specifically the body and not the mind which is described in these terms, and 
which is given agency. A clue here can be found in the earlier passage, in which 
influenza “brings to view” the nature of the soul and a high temperature “reveals” the 
beauty of a flowered lawn. The body’s intervention, for Woolf, is a supplier of new 
knowledge: its effects are not merely pathological, but also epistemological. This 
intervention, then, resembles the disruptive effects of “biology” Freud remarked upon, 
and also the revelatory effects of a “moment of being,” which this essay clearly 
prefigures. That the body can intervene upon consciousness indicates that the two are not 
ontologically distinct. Yet the complexity of the relationship is such that they appear to 
be discontinuous, if not completely autonomous. It is this discontinuity that diseases 
bring to view: calling forth in their complexity the appearance of an agency other than 
one’s own. The etiology of a particular instance of a disease is often complex, and 
perhaps knowable only to a small level of detail – in retrospect, after one has already 
experienced symptoms. As such, at the onset of an illness one encounters an entity that is 
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both alive and dead, one located at the annex of the predictable past and the mysterious 
future.  
This split manifests in Woolf’s fiction from a very early stage. “On Being Ill” is a 
text from roughly the middle of Woolf’s career, first appearing in The Criterion in 1926. 
But we see the odd collusion of life and non-life (not the engulfing of one into the other, 
but an inability to settle once and for all on the distinction) as early as Woolf’s 1917 short 
story “The Mark on the Wall.” Indeed, “The Mark on the Wall” is one of several Woolf 
texts that ought to have earned greater attention by now from OOO philosophers (with 
the “Time Passes” section of To the Lighthouse being another obvious case). The story, 
one of Woolf’s first experiments with stream of consciousness writing, describes in detail 
the thoughts of its protagonists as she stares at a mark on her wall of unknown origin, 
coloured “black upon white.”198 Staring at the mark, refusing to get up to look at it more 
closely, the protagonist follows a complex chain of thoughts, speculations, and flights of 
fancy, some related closely to the mark and its hidden nature and some quite distant from 
the question at hand, until her husband walks in and says that the mark is a snail, ending 
the flow of thoughts. At first glance, the story seems to establish a firm distinction 
between life and non-life along the lines Bennett criticized, in which the inanimate object 
is acted upon by human agency (here in the form of the narrator’s consciousness) while 
the living thing is able to resist this agency, breaking the train of thoughts and attaining 
an independent existence. But we have already seen from “On Being Ill” that we ought to 
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be suspicious of such clear distinctions in Woolf’s writing, and close attention to the 
story shows Woolf’s disruption of this dichotomy along epistemological lines – in favour 
of a more ambiguous, unsettled relation to the perception of life.  
The story observes an odd parallelism between its beginning and its end. The 
revelation that the mark is a snail, though of crucial importance to the plot, occurs as an 
off the cuff remark from the narrator’s husband, whose dialogue is worth examining in 
detail: “it’s no good buying newspapers. . . . Nothing ever happens. Curse this war; God 
damn this war! . . . All the same, I don’t see why we should have a snail on our wall.”199 
This passage seems to prefigure what Woolf would later write in A Room of One’s Own 
while commenting on the irrational anger of upper class men, who “with the exception of 
the fog . . . [seem] to control everything.”200 Or, as William Johnsen paraphrases, “why 
are men angry . . . if they control everything except the weather?”201 The war, like the 
weather, refuses to bend to the man’s influence, refuses to change itself and respond to 
his agency (and already we can see how easily natural forces and human creations blend 
together at the level of perception). To say that “nothing ever happens” – whether in 
regards to the First World War or in general – is patently untrue, for the unchanging 
trench lines conceal constant, frenzied activity and a tremendous human cost, while the 
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narrator sitting in her chair conceals a rich and complex mental life. And likewise does 
the “mark” conceal an entity of far greater complexity than any hole or stain.  
That the revelation that the mark is a snail amounts to an “intervention” in the 
sense outlined above ought to be clear, since it clearly disrupts the ongoing chain of 
thoughts in the narrator’s head and restricts her ability to exercise her interpretive agency 
upon the mark. That this intervention – this shock – likewise involves the overlay of 
discontinuous knowledge upon a continuous reality should also be clear: the narrator’s 
speculations on the mark’s nature and origin depend on her ignorance of the snail (there 
are, in fact, several times throughout the story where she considers getting up to take a 
closer look, but decides not to). She is not only ignorant of the snail’s existence but – as a 
necessary corollary to this ignorance – does not see it clearly or completely. Given that 
she seems to perceive the mark, in a manner similar to the narrator of “Solid Objects,” as 
a homogenous blob, lacking the fine details of a snail’s shell and body, her perception 
must be very limited. Finally, the husband’s own intervention, in addition to being 
phrased as a statement of ignorance (“I don’t see why we should have a snail on our 
wall”) is prompted by his own troubled, discontinuous perception of the War. The story, 
then, is built on layers of ignorant discontinuous experience, as we see quite clearly at its 
end.  
But as I said earlier, the ending itself mirrors the beginning. And we can see how 
so by examining the moment when the narrator first notices the mark: 
[F]or I remember that I was smoking a cigarette when I 
looked up and saw the mark on the wall for the first time. I 
looked up through the smoke of my cigarette and my eye 
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lodged for a moment upon the burning coals, and that old 
fancy of the crimson flag flapping from the castle tower 
came into my mind, and I thought of the cavalcade of red 
knights riding up the side of the black rock. Rather to my 
relief the sight of the mark interrupted the fancy.202  
Though the sight of the mark began the particular chain of associations recorded in the 
story, that chain was itself an interruption of an earlier line of thought begun when the 
narrator looked at some hot coals. Furthermore, this sight of the mark does not merely 
interrupt the previous thoughts, but does so involuntarily. It is “to [her] relief” that the 
mark brings an end to the thoughts occasioned by the coals – as though she were unable 
to bring about such an interruption herself, as though her agency does not extend to her 
own stream of consciousness. The partial autonomy of body and mind are, as noted, 
implied by the later “On Being Ill,” and Bennett’s “vital materialism” represents a serious 
attempt at theorizing this autonomy. But in this early Woolf story we see an attempt at 
understanding the implications of living in a world of continuities that one can never fully 
perceive. When the narrator complains of “how very little control of our possessions we 
have,” before listing all the myriad items – bird cages, book binding tools, a coal-scuttle, 
a hand organ – that she has lost over the years,203 all of which have seemingly vanished 
from existence, we see a trace of the blurred distinction between animacy and inanimacy 
created by discontinuous perception.  
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 It is in this way that we can start to see the close affinity between Woolf’s 
“moments of being” and Bergson’s critique of Zeno. As Bergson has it, in Time and Free 
Will, the chief error underlying Zeno’s paradoxes is their attitude to representation. 
Duration, says Bergson, is homogenous and continuous, lacking completely the discrete 
instances within which an arrow might be frozen in the air, or in which Achilles may stop 
mid-stride. But our representation and description of movement and of time, and our 
fixing to these specific and discrete quantities, creates the illusion that time itself passes 
in jumps, with each moment severed from the rest. Thus, we can easily imagine a 
footrace broken down into indefinitely smaller portions, an infinity of space contained in 
even the tiniest gaps, and might then conclude from our imaginings (as the Eleatics did) 
that movement is impossible. This position would hold that space and time are essentially 
discontinuous, and that the appearance of continuity (say in the straight line of an arrow’s 
flight) is an illusion of perception. Bergson’s position is precisely the opposite: 
continuity, for him, is fundamental, and it is in our manner of perceiving and representing 
the world that divisions appear.  
What Woolf does is take this notion of hidden continuity and extend it to the 
larger web of causal relationships linking everything to everything else. Just as in the 
case of Zeno these connections are hidden from perception – yet, as we see in “The Mark 
on the Wall” they have the power to create interventions or shocks which can then make 
one at least somewhat aware of the larger network hidden just out of view. How exactly 
one interprets these shocks, though, remains an important question, for the inanimate 
world has long been denied the capacity for change, its perfect continuity taken as a form 
of perfect stasis. Thus, unexpected or apparently autonomous activity on the part of 
84 
 
inanimate matter – the result of precisely the problems of perception and representation 
that lie at the root of Zeno’s paradoxes – become coded as “alive” of “agential,” since it 
is precisely those who have life and agency that are supposed to act unexpectedly. 
Woolf’s encounter with the snail shows her, from very early in her career, attacking the 
simple divisions upon which these assumptions rest.  
2.3 The Cosmic Mind of Septimus Smith 
Whither, then, panpsychism? In Woolf, it finds its most clear embodiment in Septimus 
Smith. The First World War veteran, usually read as suffering from shell shock, has 
recently returned to London after living and marrying in Italy. As he travels through the 
city, he experiences a number of revelations on the nature of reality, such as:  
[L]eaves were alive; trees were alive. And the leaves were 
being connected by millions of fibres with his own body . . 
. when the branch stretched he, too, made that statement . . . 
Sounds made harmonies with premeditation; the spaces 
between them were as significant as the sounds. A child 
cried. Rightly far away a horn sounded. All taken together 
the birth of a new religion.204  
While it is indeed true that trees, being plants, are alive, Septimus appears to have given 
the term a greater significance – the tree is not merely a self-replicating organism, but an 
agential being capable of affecting those around it much like a person could. This 
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capacity also is not restricted to plants and animals, but apparently includes “inanimate” 
objects like horns. Indeed, in an earlier passage Septimus also ascribes life-like qualities 
to an engine, which “sounded like a pulse irregularly drumming through an entire body” 
(D 12-13).  
This vision of life embedded in the connectedness of all things – one that, for 
Septimus, is explicitly religious – seems out of place in a character so frequently read as a 
classic sufferer of war trauma. The description of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the 
DSM-V does not list messianism or mystical experience as a symptom of psychological 
trauma. And earlier accounts of war trauma likewise fail to mention the traumatized 
soldiers who wanted to go off and found religions.205 (While there is some similarity 
between what Septimus experiences and Freud’s analysis of Schreber, the key element of 
wartime trauma is absent.) Septimus’s tentative panpsychism, and its growth out of 
religious experience, simply does not fit with any model of psychological trauma, 
whether contemporary with Woolf or not. Yet we can see traces of this diagnosis in much 
of the criticism concerning this character. Several scholars, for example, have identified 
Septimus as closed off and isolationist,206 and indeed such behaviour would not be 
uncommon among sufferers of trauma. But Septimus is quite clearly and emphatically 
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not mentally closed off from the rest of the world. From his perspective, he is more 
connected to the world around him than he has been at any other point in his life – with 
sounds and sights and the sway of branches all showing him how connected he is to a 
continuous world. What disguises this connectedness is its refusal of anthropocentrism. 
For certainly Septimus has been neglectful to Rezia and has done little or nothing to 
integrate with London society. His “new religion” seems to define no hierarchy between 
the acts of people and the acts of horns and trees. Thus, his openness, precisely because it 
is so extensive, is easily mistaken for solitude – or even solipsism.  
But where Septimus sees himself in continuity with all things, we find ourselves 
stumbling over a split: if Septimus’s visions are not just another symptom of his shell 
shock, where did they come from? I propose that a possible model for Septimus’s visions 
is the philosophy of Richard Maurice Bucke, a Canadian “alienist,” mystic, and doctor, 
whose 1901 Cosmic Consciousness proved highly popular among European intellectuals. 
Though recent studies of the history of panpsychism habitually neglect him,207 Bucke’s 
work found an influential reader in William James, who in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, quotes and summarizes Bucke extensively, calling his book “a highly 
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interesting volume.”208 The Russian philosopher and theologian P.D. Ouspensky – whose 
lectures in London were attended by the likes of T. S. Eliot and Aldous Huxley,209 and 
whose work influenced a number of people in Woolf’s orbit210 – likewise dedicates the 
twenty third chapter of his Tertium Organum to a discussion of Bucke’s ideas. Bucke’s 
popularity around the turn of the century ought to, on its own, be enough to justify using 
his ideas as a lens through which to examine Woolf: in much the same way that critics 
continue to produce psychoanalytic readings of Woolf’s novels even though she claims 
never to have read Freud before 1939,211 the similarity between the ideas and the sheer 
likeliness that Woolf encountered them in some second-hand form in her time as a highly 
active intellectual and woman-of-letters212 means that the usefulness of these ideas to 
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Woolf critics is undeniable. There is also, on top of all this, at least one documented 
instance of Woolf encountering a description of Bucke and his writing.  
In 1918, writing for the Times Literary Supplement, Woolf reviewed Visits to 
Walt Whitman, a sort of biography-cum-travel narrative by J. Johnston and J.W. Wallace 
– two Englishmen who visited Whitman frequently in the 1890s.213 Bucke, who 
published an authorized biography of Whitman in 1883 and was a great admirer of his 
poetry, appears frequently in Visits, particularly in the section written by Wallace. 
Cosmic Consciousness itself is mentioned very early in the account,214 and is 
sporadically alluded to throughout. Likewise, mystical experiences and the sensations of 
universal connectedness occur at several instances in the book, such as when Wallace 
experiences “a most vivid consciousness of the presence with us of my mother, who died 
six and a half years before” while observing Bucke.215 It is this mysticism and sense of 
connectedness that Woolf picked up on in her review, which frequently emphasizes 
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Whitman’s own egalitarianism. Furthermore, the review’s final line, in which Woolf says 
that “although the authors of this book lament that they have only a trivial bunch of 
sayings to offer us, we are left with a sense of an ‘immense background or vista,’”216 
strikes many of the same notes as Woolf’s writing in “A Sketch of the Past.” While it is 
impossible to show whether or not Woolf actually read Cosmic Consciousness, reading 
Visits to Walt Whitman would have put her in contact with both Bucke himself and the 
basic notions of his philosophy. Woolf’s review, furthermore, demonstrates that she not 
only registered these ideas, but also incorporated them into her own thinking.  
But this all still leaves open the question as to what Bucke can tell us about 
Woolf’s incorporation of panpsychism into her work, and answering this question will 
require a brief summary of Bucke’s key ideas. As Bucke argues, forms of consciousness 
evolve and propagate through a species progressively over time – beginning with “simple 
consciousness,” or the mere awareness of one’s own physical body and presence in the 
world (an attribute Bucke ascribes to “the upper half of the animal kingdom”217). 
Following simple consciousness is “self-consciousness,” in which one attains the 
capacity of meta-cognition: “the animal is . . . immersed in his consciousness as a fish in 
the sea; he cannot, even in imagination, get outside of it . . . But man by virtue of self 
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consciousness [sic] can step aside, as it were, from himself.”218 The process by which a 
species transitions from one type of consciousness very loosely resembles Darwinian 
evolution.219 As Bucke describes, as humans were first gaining self-consciousness it 
“appeared at first in mid-life, here and there, in isolated cases, in the most advances 
specimens of the race, becoming more and more nearly universal . . . manifesting itself at 
an earlier and earlier age.”220 Having fully grown into self-consciousness, humanity, says 
Bucke, is currently in the process of evolving into cosmic consciousness, or an awareness 
of the presence of mind that manifests on a universal scale. The “manifestation” of a new 
kind of consciousness takes the form of an intense mystical experience, where “the 
person, suddenly, without warning, has a sense of being immersed in a flame, or rose-
colored cloud” yet “at the same instant he is, as it were, bathed in an emotion of joy, 
assurance, triumph, ‘salvation.’”221 Finally, once the experience is complete, “he does 
not come to believe merely; but sees and knows that the cosmos, which to the self 
conscious [sic] mind seems made up of dead matter, is in fact far otherwise – it is in very 
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truth a living presence.”222 What Bucke provides, then, is not merely an articulation of 
some form of panpsychic philosophy or attitude, but also a mechanism by which such an 
attitude is achieved – mystical experience. 
It is thus useful to compare the way expressions of panpsychism are framed in 
Mrs Dalloway to that of “The Mark on the Wall,” the latter which was published prior to 
Woolf’s review of Visits. “The Mark on the Wall,” as befitting a stream of consciousness 
narrative, begins abruptly, in the middle of the narrator’s thought process, just as she is 
moving her attention from one object to another. That she jumps so readily from the coals 
to the mark indicates that this is a fairly normal part of her thinking, that she regularly 
fixes on seemingly inanimate objects, and that an awareness of their latent independence 
is a normal part of her internal life. We receive no real analysis of how she came to think 
this way: it is as if the story had begun with an ellipsis, or with a fade-in (as Beckett does 
in Not I). But Septimus’s panpsychism is much more etiologically grounded. While the 
specifics are obscure, it is clear that his new awareness of the world stems from his 
experiences during the war – there exists a clear beginning. Indeed, Septimus’s own 
speculations lead to a deeper (and very Bucke-like) understanding of how his awareness 
came about. “It was the heatwave presumably,” he thinks to himself, “operating upon a 
brain made sensitive by eons of evolution” (D 58). Furthermore, his newfound 
consciousness has endowed him with a sense of purpose: to tell the Prime Minister his 
newfound revelations (D 57) and then found a new religion. The development of Woolf’s 
engagement with panpsychic ideas follows a process surprisingly similar to the jump 
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from simple to self-consciousness that Bucke describes – proceeding from a depiction 
which only shows that this awareness exists to one which also provides an image of how 
and why it came to be, and which gives a gives a notion of what its possessor was like 
prior to the initial shock.223 It is quite important, then, that Woolf locates the origin of 
Septimus’s visions in a mystical experience, if only because not doing so might mean 
denying them any origin at all. 
The religiosity of Bucke’s theory, reflected in Septimus, is demonstrated by his 
catalogue of “instances of cosmic consciousness” in the books fourth part (as well as his 
list “imperfect” and “doubtful” cases in part five), which includes several religious 
figures (the Buddha, Jesus, Mohamed) as well as several writers whose work deeply 
engaged with theology (Dante, Blake, Emerson). The pattern, as Bucke describes it, 
usually involves a deeply sensitive, intelligent person who has undertaken an extensive 
period of study and reflection. In the early stages of a new stage of consciousness – prior 
to its widespread adoption, when those who attain it often appear as prophets and 
geniuses – it is only from this highly fertile psychological ground that a new 
consciousness can spring. This type of origin story is easily adapted to the biographies of 
various religious figures, with the Buddha’s years of meditation and asceticism prior to 
attaining enlightenment being perhaps the paradigmatic example. But, as a result, cosmic 
consciousness cannot be said to belong to any particular religion, and instead can be 
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thought of as a meta-religion – a grand unified theory of mystical experience, in the face 
of which “all religions known and named to-day will be melted down.”224 As Bucke 
writes, “the better known members of this group [i.e. people with cosmic consciousness] . 
. . have created all the great modern religions, beginning with Taoism and Budhism . . . 
[and] have produced the few books which have inspired the larger number of all that have 
been written in modern times.”225 As such, Bucke’s philosophy at once embraces 
religiosity and corrodes the claims of established faiths. 
This approach allows Bucke to include people like Whitman on his list – those 
who do not unproblematically fit the label of “religious leader,” but who nevertheless 
expressed cosmic consciousness. It likewise helps Woolf incorporate mysticism into her 
work given her own lack of belief. Furthermore, garbing Septimus as a prophet raises him 
to a high level of epistemological prominence. This would not be a common way to read 
Septimus – as Christine Froula has remarked, “that [Septimus] is mad would seem 
indisputable; even sympathetic discussions cast him as a war victim and not a 
prophet.”226 But we need not make this choice. To oppose the “Septimus the prophet” to 
“Septimus the mad” implies that mental illness cannot function as a seat of knowledge. 
But taking such a position with regard to Woolf would be contradictory, given that her 
“moments of being,” though more lucidly described and lacking the overt panpsychism, 
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follow the logic of Septimus’s experience. The repetition we first saw in Freud – where 
surprise appears at first as a source of mental illness before appearing again (the return of 
the repressed!) as a source of knowledge – Woolf here uses to her advantage, conflating 
the two effects in a single character. When we encounter Septimus imagining himself 
“alone, called forth in advance of the mass of men to hear the truth” (D 57), we must in 
part recognize that Septimus’s supposedly “mad” truth appears in different guises 
throughout Woolf’s body of work. Why should we dismiss it as “madness” here if not 
elsewhere too?  
The most important of these similarities is of course between Septimus and 
Clarissa. Though Clarissa Dalloway does indeed believe in a philosophy of 
“connectedness” which resembles what we find in “A Sketch of the Past,” it does not at 
first glance seem obviously related to Bucke’s philosophy, and perhaps one might be 
tempted to read Clarissa’s as the “sane” versions of Septimus’s ideas. Yet important 
similarities remain, the key one here being her thoughts at the party, after hearing about 
the suicide, where she thinks about the  
Odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to, 
some woman on the street, some man behind a counter – 
even trees, or barns. It ended in a transcendental theory 
which, with her horror of death, allowed her to believe . . . . 
that since our apparitions, the part of us which appears, are 
so momentary compared with  . . . the unseen part of us, 
which spreads wide, the unseen might survive, be 
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recovered somehow attached to this person or that (D 129-
130 my emphasis). 
Clarissa’s “affinities,” like Septimus’s visions, extend beyond the human and include 
both plants and non-living things. Likewise, she sees people as divided between their 
“apparitions” and some sort of “wide,” “unseen” aspect – which if the structure and 
content of Mrs Dalloway is any indication, amounts to the vast network of observations 
and relationships one participates in simply as a matter of being alive. The belief that 
these connections allow one an existence after death is quintessentially Buckeian. As he 
writes early in his book, with cosmic consciousness comes “what may be called a sense 
of immortality . . . not a conviction that he [i.e. the cosmically conscious] shall have this, 
but the consciousness that he has it already.”227 What we encounter with Clarissa, then, is 
very like what we encounter through Septimus: a form of panpsychism following, in a 
very general way, the terms Bucke outlined in Cosmic Consciousness. In both cases, the 
characters’ ideas become in large part heuristics for managing their encounter with 
continuities – of physical laws, of social interaction, of people watching a plane write in 
the sky – which they are aware of but cannot fully perceive or understand. The shocks 
and surprises that result from this incomplete knowledge thereby take on, to them, the 
appearance of life, and so it is in the terms of life and living things that the characters 
understand their vibrant, discontinuous world.  
 It is in this light that we ought to read the final moments of Septimus’s life, before 
his suicide. As Dr. Holmes runs up the stairs to see him, prompting Septimus to cast out 
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for a way to kill himself, his thoughts turn to at once to the objects scattered around his 
room – the bread knife he decides not to “spoil” with his blood, the gas fire that would 
take too long to asphyxiate him, the razor blades that Rezia has already packed (D 126), 
all of which seem to exert upon him some form of agency, guiding his attention from 
point to point towards the window. We see a similar moment just before Septimus jumps: 
“Life was good. The sun hot. Only human beings? Coming down the staircase opposite 
an old man stopped and stared at him. Holmes was at the door. ‘I’ll give it you!’ he cried, 
and flung himself” (D 127). The vagueness of Septimus’s final call, and in particular the 
undefined object of the “you,” points to a conflation of the human and the not. While the 
meaning of Septimus’s final words has been much debated, there has always been an 
underlying assumption that the “you” refers to some kind of person – a tenuous 
assumption given the extent to which Septimus devotes his final thoughts to the objects 
lying about the room. If one were to ask what gift he is giving, one could do much worse 
than to say that it is the “you” – a gift of subjectivity to the “life” he finds so beautiful, a 
class not limited to “only human beings.” But while we might be privy to Septimus’s 
final thoughts, and so have some hope of reconstructing his decision, Rezia and Holmes 
do not. And so his final actions can only seem, to them, an act of madness, the care with 
which he acted smothered by the “cotton wool.” 
2.4 Agency and the Gaps of To the Lighthouse  
Someone possessing seemingly no problems with hidden continuities is Mr. Ramsay of 
To the Lighthouse, at least insofar as we can see from his actions in the novel’s first part. 
It is notable that this novel begins with an argument about the weather, given that the 
earth’s climate is one of the most complex systems that humans have regular, imminent 
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contact with. Indeed, the split between the “climate” – the global, long-term fluctuations 
of the planet’s atmosphere – and “weather” – the short-term, localized manifestation of 
climate effects – fits quite well into the division I discussed earlier between the 
discontinuous information gained through perception (weather) and the complex 
continuity that lies behind it (climate).228 That the conversation hinges not merely on the 
weather, but the prediction of the weather, is also notable, not only because of the novel’s 
general thematic concern with prediction (especially in the first section) but also because 
of what prediction means, in practical terms, when dealing with entities as grand and 
complex as climate patterns. What the weather is like at a particular time and in a 
particular place is the singular result of a complex network of relationships, the vast 
majority of which will be obscure to the average person, getting caught in the rain on the 
way home simply because of a lack of omniscience. A particular event is only 
predictable, after all, if one has comprehensive knowledge of its predicates: I can predict 
with certainty that a stone I drop will fall to the ground because I know that it is bound by 
the earth’s gravity and because I know that there are no obstacles or impediments in its 
way; if I drop the stone only for it to be caught by someone else before it hits the ground, 
then my prediction failed because my knowledge was incomplete (I didn’t see the person 
hiding behind me, waiting for a chance to spoil things). None of the Ramsays possess 
anything close to comprehensive knowledge of their local weather conditions, so it would 
be absurd for them to express absolute confidence in their predictions – at the very least, 
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a tentative statement like Mrs. Ramsay’s “it may be fine”229 would be more appropriate. 
And yet Mr. Ramsay’s prediction is unequivocal: the rain will come. Frustratingly, he 
ends up being correct.  
 The argument about the weather in To the Lighthouse ought to remind us of 
Woolf’s criticism in A Room of One’s Own of the furious man, blind to his own power, 
whose agency yet fails to extend to nature itself. It should also recall a prediction made 
by Terence, of Woolf’s The Voyage Out, just after the death of his beloved Rachel: “look 
at the moon. There’s a halo round the moon. We shall have rain to-morrow.”230 And that 
evening, the rain does indeed arrive.231 In both of these cases, Woolf identifies the 
weather with a domain outside of a particular man’s control. To see how this works 
regarding Terence, we can compare his actions to what Woolf says later in the same 
passage of A Room, where she diagnoses the anger of misogynist men: “is anger, I 
wondered, somehow, the familiar, the attendant sprite on power? Rich people, for 
example, are often angry because they suspect that the poor want to seize their wealth. . . 
. Possibly when the professor insisted a little too emphatically upon the inferiority of 
women, he was concerned not with their inferiority, but with his own superiority.”232 The 
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exertion of power and certainty, then, becomes a way of supplementing a perceived 
personal weakness. Terence, then, upon encountering his own limitations through his 
inability to save Rachel, casts about for some other external entity that he can act upon. 
Spotting the “halo” around the moon, he latches on to it and makes a prediction, and is 
fortuitous enough to see that prediction come true.  
 What then is Mr. Ramsay insecure about? The clear answer seems to be his own 
philosophical development, which seems to have stalled out. Having secluded himself 
from his family, Mr. Ramsay begins to think about his progress as a philosopher. 
Tellingly, the harsh assessment of his own intellectual limitations begins with his claim to 
have “a splendid mind” (TTL 37). “If thought,” he thinks, “. . . like the alphabet is ranged 
in twenty-six letters all in order, then his splendid mind had no difficulty in running over 
those letters one by one . . . until it had reached, say, the letter Q. He reached Q. Very few 
people in the whole of England ever reach Q” (TTL 37). But at Q he remains stuck. As he 
struggles to reach the next letter, R, he finds that he has run up permanently against his 
limits. This is a problem not merely of intellectual pride, but also for his self-image as the 
family’s patriarch. As his thoughts transition from reaching Q to searching for R, Mr. 
Ramsay briefly glimpses his family through a window: “he perceived, his wife and son, 
together . . . They needed his protection; he gave it to them” (TTL 37). Because he is a 
philosophy professor, his ability to think, and to develop new concepts, is central to his 
self-identified role as “protector.” Thus, when later Mr. Ramsay cedes defeat to R, and 
hears “in that flash of darkness . . . people saying – he was a failure – that R was beyond 
him” (TTL 37), we can begin to see the immense emotional toll that his intellectual 
stagnation has put on him.  
100 
 
 Mr. Ramsay responds to this stagnation with, not merely a prediction, but one he 
declares repeatedly, chauvinistically, until he is sure that James’s dream of seeing the 
lighthouse has been completely abandoned. As Patrick Whiteley observes, “although 
[Mr. Ramsay’s] predictions turn out to be right, his reactions . . . have an intensity 
disproportionate to the issue at hand, which encourages us to suspect an underlying 
emotional need that he will not acknowledge.”233 And we can determine what these 
needs might be by returning to the structure of his alphabet metaphor for the process of 
thought. It is a clear example of what Bergson identified as the spatialization of thought, 
where thought processes are described in terms of physical objects or sequences, 
allowing them to be lined up in a row and quantified. As he writes, “as soon as we try to 
give an account of a conscious state . . . this state, which is above all personal, will be 
resolved into impersonal elements external to one another, each of which calls up a genus 
and is expressed by a word.”234 This is the mistake we make if we believe, like Zeno did, 
in a motionless Achilles, forever trapped by the infinite number of discrete points that lie 
between any two locations. As Bergson has it, Zeno’s paradox fails to take into account 
the difference between an object passing through successive locations in space and the 
synthesis between those locations. The mind perceiving motion performs a kind of 
mathematical integration, stringing together the points through which the object passes to 
form a line. That, according to Bergson, is what the perception of motion is, and as a 
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process that occurs entirely within consciousness it is indivisible. But in representing this 
perception, we invariably treat it as though it occurs in physical space, which then renders 
it subject to space’s divisibility.  
 In conceiving of his progress as a philosopher in terms of the alphabet, Mr. 
Ramsay might well be playing Zeno to his own thought – convincing himself of his own 
immobility by improperly applying spatial concepts to conscious states. He fails as a 
philosopher, then, because he has been robbed of his ability to synthesize, to integrate his 
discrete points of thought into a continuity. Reeling with a sense of failure, Mr. Ramsay 
looks outwards for something to synthesize, and comes upon the weather. His prediction 
that it will not permit a trip to the lighthouse depends on very little information – 
Tansley’s observation that the wind is blowing in the wrong direction (TTL 9) and also a 
falling barometer (TTL 35) being some of the only meteorological data reported to us. 
Mr. Ramsay is working with very little information, a few choice local observations 
made without any knowledge of the broader weather conditions at play, but he 
synthesizes these points into a definite conclusion. He has, essentially, made his earlier 
mistake in reverse, taking processes occurring in space (which can be divided into 
discrete points) and synthesizing them as easily as if they were the products of his 
consciousness: having lost a sense of continuity in his own thoughts, Mr. Ramsay went 
out looking for continuity in the natural world, and then tricked himself into thinking that 
he had found it.   
 That Mr. Ramsay would find solace for the limitations of his thinking in his 
ability to predict the natural world is quite ironic, given that it flies in the face of his own 
philosophy. We do not get much specific information regarding his thought, much less 
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any particular concepts he has developed or arguments he has made. But it is possible to 
glean the broad strokes. When Lily Briscoe thinks about Mr. Ramsay, she remembers 
Andrew saying that the work has to do with “subject and object and the nature of reality,” 
and he asks her to think “of a kitchen table . . . when you’re not there” (TTL 26). This 
passage, at the very least, defines Mr. Ramsay as some kind of philosophical realist. 
Furthermore, his attentiveness to the table “when you’re not there” sounds almost like a 
summary of object oriented ontology, at least insofar as in indicates an interest in 
physical objects as they exist independently of perception. In any case, it is a basic 
assumption of realism that objects have an existence outside of human perception – that 
they act and are acted upon in myriad ways that our senses simply fail to account for. 
That knowledge alone ought to make Mr. Ramsay more careful with bandying about 
predictions. But he has instead confused the continuity of the natural world with his 
discontinuous perception of it. He therefore makes his predictions with a completely 
unwarranted level of confidence.  
 And he is not the only one to do so – in fact, “The Window” is absolutely full of 
predictions, most of which turn out to be not nearly so successful as Mr. Ramsay’s 
weather forecast. “Andrew,” thinks Mr. Ramsay, “would be a better man than he had 
been. Prue would be a beauty, her mother said” (TTL 72) (in fact, neither character 
survives “Time Passes”). Elsewhere, Tansley predicts that “James will have to write his 
dissertation one of these days” (TTL 35), and who could forget Mr. Ramsay’s prediction 
that “the very stone one kicks with one’s book will outlast Shakespeare” – which he 
immediately follows up with another: “his own little light would shine, not very brightly, 
for a year or two, and would then be merged in some bigger light, and that in a bigger 
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still” (TTL 39). On the very first page we are told that James Ramsay “belong[s] . . . to 
that great clan which cannot keep this feeling separate from that, but must let future 
prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand” (TTL 7), and it 
would seem that this “clan” includes most of the book’s principle characters. All 
throughout “The Window” we see people making and arguing about predictions, and the 
predictions are often quite confident, often quite certain. Mrs. Ramsay’s hedging and 
qualification when suggesting that James might be able to visit the lighthouse is an 
exceptional case: most of the time the declarations come closer to those of Mr. Ramsay – 
“It will rain.”  
 It is in this way that we can begin to see the importance of “Time Passes” in the 
structure of To the Lighthouse.” Often neglected in criticism of the novel,235 “Time 
Passes” here appears as an antidote to the certainty of the previous section. “We must 
wait,” says Mr. Banks in the section’s opening line, “for the future to show” (TTL 129), 
and in its own austere fashion the section enacts this showing. “Time Passes” is an 
exploration of what goes on “behind” human experience – the vast array of non-human 
events and actions so often hidden from view, though occasionally peeking in as 
“moments of being” or dalliances with panpsychism. The section brings us back to the 
distinction I discussed at the beginning of the chapter between characterizations of nature 
as unchanging and predictable and characterizations which hold nature to be 
unpredictable and surprising, with these surprises functioning as sources of knowledge. 
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The repeated shocks that the Ramsay family suffer through the ten years the section 
covers – including the deaths of Mrs. Ramsay, Andrew, and Prue – amount to an 
intervening of the wider world upon the characters. Their predictions, it turns out, were 
based on too little information, far beyond their vision lay forces of war and disease that 
robbed them of their futures.  
The structure of this section enacts this discontinuity in a number of ways, with 
the most notable being the seeming inexplicability of the parenthetical asides. For 
example, in one we go from a description of the onset of spring to, suddenly, the 
marriage of Prue Ramsay (TTL 135). We are not told who the husband is, nor how they 
met, or anything about what the two are like together, and it is only a page later that we 
are told that Prue had died in childbirth. That there is so little information, and that this 
information comes to us in the form of interruptions in the primary narrative, emphasizes 
the fact that, though the Ramsays have left the narrative eye, their lives are continuing 
beyond our gaze. Ten years pass between “The Window” and “The Lighthouse,” and the 
characters live every moment of those years without close narratological observation. So 
then no wonder all manner of strange discontinuities occur – characters turning up 
suddenly dead or married without so much as a warning. But the process also functions in 
reverse, in that reading “Time Passes” allows us to encounter the continuous changes and 
events that occur inside the empty house which, to the returning Ramsays of part three, 
are invisible.  
The world without the Ramsays is one of constant motion and change. As the 
narrator describes in the third part of “Time Passes”: “the nights now are full of wind and 
destruction; the trees plunge and bend and their leaves fly helter skelter until the lawn is 
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plastered with them and they lie packed in gutters and choke rain-pipes and scatter damp 
paths” (TTL 132). This passage, full of frenzied activity, is notable also for how it 
ascribes grammatical agency. “The trees plunge” – they act, insofar as the grammar is 
concerned, under their own agency. Though we might infer that the plunging, bending 
trees are being acted upon by the “wind and destruction” of the previous clause, this 
connection occurs only at the level of implication. Next the leaves, which “fly helter 
skelter,” again seemingly under their own motivation, bring us to the first passive verb 
with “the lawn is plastered with them.” This passivity simply emphasizes the active 
quality of the leaves, which clog gutters and pipes and spread seemingly everywhere. The 
passivity of the lawn effectively gives the leaves an object upon which to intervene.  
This intervention is still, of course, motivated by the wind from the beginning of 
the sentence. But by separating the cause from its effects with a semicolon, Woolf enacts 
the same kind of discontinuities that give the appearance of agency to inanimate objects. 
The active voice, here, hides information, occluding the events behind the bending tree 
and flying leaves so to make these objects appear agential. We see the reverse occur near 
the end of the section, when the repairs on the house are nearly finished and the Ramsays 
are preparing to return: “dusters were flicked from the windows, the windows were shut 
to, keys were turned all over the house; the front door was banged; it was finished” (TTL 
145). Again the voice here hides information, in this case keeping back details of who is 
doing all of these repairs. This phrasing does, however, maintain focus on the objects 
themselves, in this case emphasizing their capacity to be acted upon. But far from simply 
emphasizing the objects’ fall into passivity, the use of a list here emphasizes the sheer 
quantity of things that have to be done in order to erase all sign of the activity of the past 
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ten years. This work, which has involved “days of labour” (TTL 145), is essentially anti-
entropic, in that it seeks to undo all of the changes affected on the house through a great 
exertion of energy. What we see in this passage is simply how much work it takes to 
cover up the accumulated actions of the inanimate world with a veneer of human agency.  
What kind of house, then, do the Ramsays and Lily Briscoe return to? It is in part 
an illusion of stability and continuity – exactly the same illusions that lead to their many 
confident, erroneous predictions ten years ago. And we see them attempt to exploit this 
continuity to return to finish what they started in “The Window,” with James and Mr. 
Ramsay taking their trip up to the lighthouse, and Lily finishing her portrait by sitting in 
the exact same spot she had ten years earlier. But the changes of the previous decade 
have extended even to the way they perceive the landscape. James, for example, 
remembers seeing the lighthouse as “a silvery, misty-looking tower with a yellow eye,” 
but now when he looks sees it “stark and straight . . . barred with black and white . . . 
[with] washing spread on the rocks to dry” (TTL 189). In this context, Lily’s painting 
becomes very interesting. Though the second sitting supposedly captures the same scene 
as the first, the intervening time would have irrevocably altered the landscape in 
thousands of subtle ways that Lily would be unlikely to even notice. And though the 
scene in “The Window” and the scene in “The Lighthouse” are linked, continuously, by a 
decade of natural changes, these changes have all happened out of Lily’s sight. She 
therefore perceives these two scenes discontinuously, and must then merge them into 
each other, integrating the two distinct points into a single continuity. The painting, then, 
is an enactment of the post-war nostalgia that pervades this final section. The attempt to 
“return,” both to the old house and to the abandoned desires of an earlier time (visiting 
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the lighthouse, finishing the pointing), is an attempt to stitch these two discontinuous 
moments into a single unity that hides the painful decade lying between them.  
We should therefore pay close attention to the manner in which Lily finishes her 
painting, which in many ways resembles the act of artistic creation as Bergson describes 
it in Creative Evolution. She sees it, nearly finished, “with all its greens and blues, its 
lines running up and across, its attempt at something” (TTL 211), and initially dismisses 
it, imagining that it would end up abandoned in an attic somewhere. The painting, 
meanwhile, is not really being described – rather, we are told of the painting’s 
components, its lines and colours, and not the larger whole that these elements ought to 
make up. Then Lily seems to notice something: “with a sudden intensity, as if she saw it 
clear for a second, she drew a line there, in the centre. It was done; it was finished. Yes, 
she thought . . . I have had my vision” (TTL 211). What Lily seems to have done in this 
brief flash of insight is glimpse some underlying continuity “behind” the image before 
her eyes. Indeed, this final passage seems to follow exactly the pattern of a “moment of 
being,” occurring as it does in a moment of artistic production (remember that Woolf 
would associate her own moments with her writing) and involving a sudden, surprising 
flash of insight which illuminates for a moment some greater scheme behind the “cotton” 
of the everyday. This moment, which transforms the painting in Lily’s eyes from 
disposable to a “vision,” is perhaps the kind of flash of inspiration James and Mr. 
Ramsay sought as they visited the lighthouse – a sudden glimpse of the continuous world 
that they once believed they had.  
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2.5 The Stuff of Life 
“Woolf’s problem,” writes Mads Thomsen,  
is that she experiences a high level of coherence in the 
phenomena of the world that are of a character and beauty 
that might lead one to imagine that a higher power, a 
collective will, or at least some kind of artistic intention 
underlies them. She also clearly states that she cannot 
believe . . . [in] any such agency in the world, least of all a 
god.236 
Panpsychism seems to have been a solution to this problem. In its various shapes and 
guises – including the mysticism of Mrs Dalloway and the more subtle embrace of 
physical animacy in To the Lighthouse – panpsychism has served her stories not so much 
as a metaphysical backdrop as a way of knowing the world. The problem begins in 
perception, in that Woolf’s characters encounter the world discontinuously, witnessing 
effects cut off from their causes, perceiving relationships far too complex to be fully 
teased out. In the case of some characters, like Mr. Ramsay, the tendency is to take the 
part for the whole, or at the very least to presume that the part is sufficient, and to then 
crudely integrate these discontinuous scraps of perception into a single image. This 
image, mistaken for the real physical world, is attributed all of that world’s qualities, 
namely is continuity and, by extension, its capacity to be subject to prediction. Mr. 
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Ramsay then makes the old determinist’s mistake of moving the frame of reference from 
the present, with its indeterminacy, to the past, in which every act is set. The future seems 
spoken for, as the speculations extend across it, blinkering its latent possibilities.  
 For Mr. Ramsay, as with so many of Woolf’s other characters, the antidote to this 
total integration is a shock, an event completely unforeseen which disrupts the prior 
expectations. As I established at the beginning of this chapter with my discussion of 
surprise and science, the unexpected is an important epistemological force, not merely 
through its ability to dismantle previously-held, erroneous ideas, but also by allowing the 
inanimate world to introduce new information – to intervene upon the observer with 
inexplicable actions that cry out for explanation. It is at this junction that panpsychism 
can function, in certain cases, as a heuristic tool, in that it offers a label for the observer’s 
ignorance, designating the occluded causal relations behind the shock with the label 
“agency” or “life,” linking the unexpectedness of the event analogically to the 
unexpectedness thought to distinguish the living from the not. Clearly, as a tool of 
scientific investigation, this would be an unsuitable way to resolve the question. But in 
Woolf’s writing what we encounter are not the carefully curated shocks of a laboratory 
experiment, where the variables are controlled and limited to make the results as easily 
interpreted as possible, but rather the myriad, irresolvable discontinuities of everyday 
existence.  
 Ignorance, it seems, is a common thread linking these analyses of perception 
together. The narrator of “The Mark on the Wall” is, of course, unaware that the mark is a 
snail for most of the story, and the first part of To the Lighthouse draws much dramatic 
irony from the fact that none of the characters can foresee the First World War. And Mrs 
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Dalloway – perhaps Woolf’s most extended fictional engagement with continuity – is full 
of instances in which those continuities go unperceived, such as the famous scene with 
the sky-writer, where Clarissa and Septimus (and a number of other passers-by) are 
linked through their mutual observation of this spectacle, and yet never realize it. 
Furthermore, as James Harker characterizes, Woolf’s “rhetorical reliance on 
misperception” is “a central theme in her fiction.”237 And so, for example, in “Solid 
Objects,” we see the remarkable narration of a single black spot splitting into two distinct 
men238 – yet another instance in Woolf where ignorance, so often acting as a divisive 
force that splits continuities apart, appears to also have great synthetic power, bringing 
together disparate entities to form unexpected wholes. It is this process too that allows 
Lily Briscoe to sit in her old panting spot and see the “same” scene that she had a decade 
earlier, and it is precisely because she doesn’t know about the millions of tiny events that 
have happened in that spot during her absence that she is able to complete the painting 
and her vision – because the vision itself is the product of Lily breaking through this 
presumed sameness.   
 These characters are performing a kind of everyday speculation, transforming the 
forever incomplete data of perception into a common-sense notion of how things are 
supposed to work. It is perhaps this common-sense formation that Woolf has in mind 
during “A Sketch of the Past” where she described the “nondescript cotton wool” in 
which most of human experience is wrapped (and which one only breaks through after a 
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shock, during a moment of being). As Woolf writes, “a great part of every day is not 
lived consciously. One walks, eats . . . deals with what has to be done” but one rarely 
remembers these countless, mundane events.239 As we might recall, it is precisely 
“behind” this “cotton wool” that the larger “pattern” of existence lies, waiting to be 
discovered in a moment of being. The shock that precipitates these moments, and the 
sense of all-connectedness that results, is essentially the breaching of the bubble of 
discontinuous experience in which the subject lives. So, for example, when Woolf 
describes an early experience of hers in which she “was looking at a plant with a spread 
of leaves; and it seemed suddenly plain that the flower itself was a part of the earth,”240 
she says something that is at once both quite obvious and quite fascinating. Virtually 
everyone knows that plants are integrated into the earth – they are embedded in it, they 
gather nutrients from it, they fertilize it when they die. Yet these processes of integration 
so often happen outside the scope of human perception (unless, perhaps, you are a 
botanist) that it is often simply easier to perceive the flower and the soil and completely 
distinct entities without ever pondering the complex relationships that link them. And so 
Woolf’s sudden encounter with this continuity comes as a surprise, and takes on the 
feeling of a mystical experience.  
 That these moments of being derive from moments of shock has a lot to do with 
why they lead to versions of panpsychism rather than, say, determinism, which likewise 
posits a perfect continuity between all entities in existence. This divergence brings us 
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back to the discussion of Kant at the beginning of the chapter, and the common 
materialist understanding of nature as changeless and predictable (which we see reflected, 
for example, in Mr. Ramsay’s line about Shakespeare and the stone). Despite this 
presumption that the universe follows the same rules in all places and at all times – a 
presumption that makes prediction possible – it is surprise, the failure of prediction, that 
serves as a key tool for gaining new information about the world. Philosophers have also 
commonly identified unpredictability as a trait of consciousness and agency, and it is 
indeed upon matter’s ability to act in unexpected and perplexing ways that defenders of 
panpsychism have built their arguments. By identifying unexpectedness with agency, 
then, Woolf allows these shocks to have an integrative force, giving one a glimpse of a 
grander, more complex web of relationships, mediated through the notion of “life” – as 
opposed to the dis-integrative role that shock plays for more decidedly materialist 
thinkers like Mr. Ramsay, for whom the many shocks of “Time Passes” did not point 
towards cohesion, but rather destroyed it. By grasping shock and using it to break down 
the division between human beings and other kinds of matter, panpsychism grants Woolf 
a way to find unity and coherence in an unstable world. It is therefore of little surprise 
that Woolf’s most straightforward representation of panpsychism results from Septimus’s 
war trauma, since the cohesion he finds “behind the cotton wool” can serve as a potential 
replacement for the cohesion that he has lost in his everyday life.  
 Panpsychism does not appear in Woolf, it would seem, as a metaphysical or 
ontological tenet, but rather as an epistemological mode and as a strategy for engaging 
with perception. It is, in effect, a product of her agnotology, in which Woolf takes the 
multitudinous interconnectedness of which she is aware but cannot fully understand and 
113 
 
transposes it into a quality (“life”) that is present in the objects themselves rather than 
emergent from the relations between them, a change which therefore makes it possible to 
think the objects in isolation. Panpsychism is in that sense a rather ingenious solution to a 
difficult problem. Woolf’s characters (and occasionally her narrative voice) modulate the 
play of discontinuous impressions and habitual speculation by strategically endowing 
inanimate objects with agency and intelligence of their own. It is precisely because Woolf 
knows that there is not some higher intelligence guiding these processes that she employs 
the tropes and language of mysticism and mystical experience, since it is in this way that 
she can express the great web of relationships she knows connects everything even 
though she can never actually show that web in her fiction. Panpsychism, then, becomes 
a way of interacting with the world and of allowing the world to act back – endowing her 
fiction with a liveliness it would have otherwise lost.  
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Chapter 3  
Winds that Turn the Arrow: 
The Ecological Imperative of Ezra Pound 
Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal 
Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood 
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good 
Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel. 
— Percy Shelley, “Mont Blanc”241 
 
3.1 “The whole tribe is from one man’s body”242 
Already we have seen the importance of prediction, and of prophecy, in modernist 
authors’ relationship to epistemology, agnotology, and to the unknown. For Bergson and 
Lewis, successful prophecy always threatens to reduce human beings to deterministic 
automata (as we see, for instance, in Lewis’s engagement with the story of Herod), and 
have seen in detail the importance occupied by shock and surprise in the implicit 
metaphysics of Woolf’s fiction and their relation to ignorance. It is with these 
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relationships in mind that we should turn to the following passage from Ezra Pound’s 
1954 translation of Sophokles’s243 Women of Trachis:  
HERAKLES:  My father told me long ago 
that no living man should kill me, 
but that someone from hell would, and 
that brute Centaur has done it.  
. . . 
I thought it meant life in comfort. 
It doesn’t. It means that I die. 
For amid the dead there is no work in service. 
Come at it that way, my boy, what 
 
SPLENDOUR, 
                          IT ALL COHERES.244  
Herakles is dying. A centaur, Nessus, has tricked his wife into poisoning him, and he is 
lying in front of his son in agony begging in the name of “Filial Obedience”245 to be 
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dragged up a hill and burned in sacrifice so that he might be put out of his misery. And 
yet in this agony, and in the completion of Zeus’s dire predictions, he does not despair, 
but rather gasps at the “splendour” of the transcendental coherence that the prophecy 
reveals to him. But the exclamation (which Pound takes the trouble of emphasizing with 
capital letters) should reveal to those familiar with Pound’s writing a further coherence, 
this time with a far better known passage from Canto CXVI, in his Drafts and 
Fragments: 
      But the beauty is not the madness 
Tho’ my errors and wrecks lie about me. 
And I am not a demigod, 
I cannot make it cohere. 
(C CXVI/815-16) 
 There are many similarities between these two passages,246 and likewise between 
Herakles’s fall and the situation Pound found himself in as he wrote the Drafts and 
Fragments – the collapse of both his fascist politics and the poetic goals of The Cantos 
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here taking the place of Herakles’s impending demise. Indeed, Pound’s recognition that 
he is not a “demigod” seems like a fairly direct allusion to the half-god tragic hero, and 
Pound’s own estimation of the exclamation’s importance (he calls it “the key phrase, for 
which the play exists” in one of his few footnotes247) makes it unsurprising that the line 
would appear later among his epic’s many allusions. But the purpose of this chapter is not 
simply to gesture towards a subject rhyme, or to excavate a series of classical allusions. 
Rather, I begin the chapter with these passages to provide an avenue into an underlying 
tendency in Pound’s thought – what I call, for reasons that will become clear, his 
imperative logic – that provides a fulcrum between his aesthetics and his politics, and 
which may likewise serve as an access point for scholars interested in studying Pound 
through eco-criticism.  
 What are we to make of Herakles’s cohesion? As with Herod before, it comes at 
the behest of a divine prophecy and is experienced as one would experience a law of 
nature. Much like how a physicist, if cognizant of the relevant forces, can predict the 
motion of an object in space, Zeus in his omniscience has predicted the fate of his most 
famous son. In both cases the success of these predictions gives evidence of an 
underlying order to the universe, though the nature of those orders differ considerably. 
But Herakles does not begin his speech with the phrase “Zeus predicted,” but rather with 
“my father predicted,” a turn of phrase that aligns the fulfillment of the prophecy with the 
later invocation of filial piety. By dying in the manner that he is, Herakles has fulfilled 
the will of his father, which here takes on the force of a natural law. He then turns to his 
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son Hyllos and asks him to swear that he do the same “by the head of Zeus.”248 And 
Hyllos, like his father, comes through – dragging Herakles to the place of sacrifice, 
lighting his body ablaze: 
 HYLLOS:  Hoist him up, fellows 
 And for me a great tolerance,  
matching the gods’ great unreason. 
They see things being done,  
calamities looked at, 
sons to honor their fathers, 
. . . 
wrecks many, such as have not been suffered before. 
And all of this is from Zeus.249 
Though he, unlike his father, is blind to the larger system, he obeys his father’s order 
anyway, and keeps his promise, attributing as he does so the mass of events to the will of 
Zeus, his grandfather and his god. This higher order is, as should be clear by now, not 
merely one of physical laws and the procession of nature, but also of ethical and political 
duty. Herakles’s status as a demigod thus makes him useful vehicle for Pound’s 
exploration of the alignment between natural and cultural forces, and to the 
epistemological-agnotological relation that those have with each other. He is a hybrid in 
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the Latourian sense,250 drawing together those two domains often thought to be 
ontologically separate.  
 It is in this way that we can begin to see a way towards an ecological reading of 
Pound – though it is admittedly one that we must enter sneakily, through a side-door, 
rather than through the main entrance as one would with ecological critiques of Percy 
Shelley or Marianne Moore. That we must do so ought to be surprising, given the sheer 
quantity of nature metaphors and similar asides to the non-human world that one finds 
scattered throughout Pound’s poetry. Indeed, as far back as 1976 we can read C. David 
Heymann opine that “everything considered, Pound is, in a real sense, a nature poet.”251 
And yet, despite the recent vogue in eco-criticism among modernist scholars, one finds 
almost no analysis of Pound in ecological terms.252 I do not here claim to have solved the 
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many complexities that have no doubt given would-be Poundian eco-critics such a 
difficult time. Rather, I wish here to gesture towards how in Pound a particular notion of 
what “nature” is and how it works is baked into his other theories of politics, economics, 
and poetics.  
The issue turns in part on a problem that Timothy Morton describes across his two 
books Ecology Without Nature and The Ecological Thought. Drawing from Latour and 
more recent work in Object Oriented Ontology (OOO), Morton establishes an important 
taxonomy of approaches to thinking about the natural world, one that distinguishes 
between thinking in terms of “nature” and thinking in terms of “ecology.” As Morton 
describes, “Nature was always ‘over yonder,’ alien and alienated. Just like a reflection, 
we can never actually reach it and belong to it. Nature was an ideal image, a self-
contained form suspended afar, shimmering and naked behind glass like an expensive 
painting,”253 whereas “the ecological thought is interconnectedness in the fullest and 
deepest sense. . . . The ecological thought insists that we’re deeply connected even when 
we say we’re not.”254 This split between ecological thought and natural thought – 
between integration and division – is one of the primary tensions spanning over Pound’s 
poetic project. We see it, for example, in the death of Herakles, who despite invoking 
familial bonds to coerce his son had spent much of the play cheating on his wife with 
another woman, and who (by his own admission) thought that the prophecies of his death 
meant that he would never be killed at all. Despite the seemingly “ecological” 
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connectedness implied by his death, the rest of the play reveals Herakles to be profoundly 
detached from his family, a detachment that we see continuing in the Hyllos’s 
incomprehension at what he has been asked to do. Likewise Pound, who set out to write a 
poem “containing history,”255 instead found himself contained by history – knowing that 
“it coheres alright / even if my notes do not cohere” (C CXVI/817) yet unable to express 
that knowledge in his epic’s structure.  
The nature of these tensions between integration and division ought to come out 
over the duration of the chapter, but we can begin to see how they arise by looking to the 
importance of familial relationships in the play’s alignment of natural and cultural forces. 
It is not immediately obvious that the dissolution of the nature/culture divide should 
begin at the individual’s relationship with the family, yet Women of Trachis is not the 
first time that Pound implied this relationship. In Canto XIII – the first to deal directly 
with Confucius (Kung, as the name is rendered here) – we see the following anecdotes: 
And they [Kung’s students] said: If a man commit murder 
 Should his father protect him, and hide him?  
And Kung said: 
 He should hide him.  
 
And Kung gave his daughter to Kong-Tch’ang 
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 Although Kong-Tch’ang was in prison.  
And he gave his niece to Nan-Young 
 although Nan-Young was out of office. 
(C XIII/59) 
To begin with the second half, though the canto does not explain who Kong-Tch’ang and 
Nan-Young are, a look to Confucius’s Analects reveals both of them to have been 
unjustly punished, the latter by a government that Confucius thought was run in defiance 
of “right reason.”256 The first half of the passage is likewise a paraphrase of The 
Analects:  
The Duke of Sheh said to Kung-tze: There are 
honest characters in my village, if a man steals a sheep his 
son will bear witness to it.  
Kung-tze said: There are honest men in my village 
with this difference; a father will conceal his son’s doing, 
and a son his father’s. There’s honesty (straight seeing) in 
that, too.257  
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It is from passages like these that we can see why Pound tended to view Confucianism as 
a “libertarian discourse” the ethics of which “opposes any intrusion into the sphere within 
the ‘outline’ of a person’s personality.”258  
What we encounter in the two anecdotes from canto XIII are cases of individual 
ethical proscriptions operating in opposition to the law. Familial bonds trump legal 
commands (to the point that lying to protect one’s child can be considered a form of 
honesty), and a good person can still be recognized as such even after being thrown in jail 
(or, as Pound would write much later, “the greatest is charity / to be found among those 
who have not observed / regulations” [C LXXIV/454] – an observation he makes after a 
guard in his Pisan prison camp gives him, in violation of the rules, an old crate on which 
to write). Yet elsewhere in both Confucius generally and in Pound’s appropriation thereof 
we encounter signs that Pound’s support for the fidelity of the individual does not take 
the form of a simplistic opposition between the individual and the state. Rather, the 
opposite is true: in both Pound and Confucius the proper functioning of the state depends 
entirely on the characters of individual people. As we see in The Great Digest: “wanting 
good government in their states, they [the “men of old”] first established order in their 
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own families; wanting order in the home, they first disciplined themselves.”259 Or as 
Pound relates in canto XIII: 
 If a man have not order within him 
He cannot spread order about him; 
And if a man have not order within him 
His family will not act with due order; 
 And if the prince have not order within him 
He cannot put order in his dominions. 
(C XIII/59) 
As Confucius goes on to claim, “one humane family can humanize a whole state . . . 
[and] one grasping and perverse man can drive a nation to chaos.”260 Time and again in 
Pound the success or failure of any grand enterprise always ties back to the character of 
the person undertaking it – one need only look at the China cantos and their neat 
equations of prosperity with “good” emperors for confirmation.  
It seems that Pound, in taking Confucianism as a “totalizing philosophy rooted in 
the objective reality of organic nature,”261 saw in it the possibility of approaching the 
machinery of government ecologically (in Morton’s sense) without sacrificing his 
individualism. In Confucius, the microcosm of the individual and the family scale 
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smoothly and linearly upward to the macrocosm of society and the state. This hierarchy 
permits a kind of integration – to such an extent that one can easily attribute the functions 
of a government to the personality of its leader – but at the cost of making that influence 
mostly unidirectional. While the subordination of the whole to its parts permits the 
flouting of unjust laws, it also means that the “order within,” the presence or absence of 
which shall determine the fate of the empire, is seemingly without origin. An individual 
person becomes not merely a unit of population, but rather like the theme in a set of 
musical variations which, once established, provides the basis for what follows. Or, as 
Pound writes in an essay on Confucianism, “you can’t know a canzone, which is a 
structure of strophes, until you know strophes.”262 Yet the opposite would not seem to 
hold true. 
It is in this way that an individual person’s character can become aligned with the 
fate of a whole society without it being subordinated to that society, and it is likewise in 
this manner that we can begin to align Pound’s Confucianism with the earlier analysis of 
Women of Trachis and canto CXVI. A society for Pound in a certain sense becomes its 
leader, who in ordering both their own mind, character, and family structure, create the 
first iteration of a pattern that repeats with variations across all regions under that leader’s 
influence. Such is the power of this influence that “if theft be the main motive in 
government / in a large way / there will certainly be minor purloinments” (C 
LXXVII/502) – i.e. the influence will proceed inexorably, automatically, as though it 
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were a law of nature. Yet this system does not create a perfect hybrid; there is no 
Herakles, no demigod, to permanently link the social and the natural together. The very 
act of marking out the attainment of “order within” as a virtue, and of establishing it as a 
goal that must be pursued by all, separates individual human beings from their natural 
environment, and re-introduces human personality to what was once a Confucian state of 
nature. The fulfillment of Pound’s politics is conditional in a way that the prophecies of 
Zeus are not, since while Herakles was always fated to die in the way that he did, the 
automatic repetition of individual and family structure can end in any number of ways 
depending on the constituent parts that one begins with. The problem for Pound is that in 
politics and in economy failure is always an option, and it is the possibility of this failure 
that establishes in Pound’s writing a larger, subtler ethics of ecology.  
3.2 Political Ecology 
Earlier I wrote that one could see in Pound’s alignment of politics, aesthetics, and 
ecology the operation of an imperative logic, but I have not yet explained what exactly 
that means. I take my definition of the word “imperative” from the phenomenologist 
Alphonso Lingis, who himself derives the term from the categorical imperative of 
Immanuel Kant. As Lingis writes: 
Kant takes the species’ trait of thought, which distinguishes 
humans from other natural species but which constitutes 
itself into a separate agency in conflict with the human 
sensory-motor vitality, not as a sign that the human 
psychophysical organism is destined, by an imperative 
external to the inner works of nature, to an extranatural or 
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supernatural status, but as an index that a human must, of 
his own thoughtful initiative, make himself natural, make 
himself into the integrated nature he is not naturally.263 
I should state upfront that I am not proposing to do a Kantian reading of Pound – indeed, 
as will be clear soon, their ethical conclusions diverge quite considerably. Rather, I offer 
the categorical imperative (and Lingis’s interpretation thereof) as a model for a particular 
structure of thought that both Kant and Pound share, and which can be accessed most 
easily through analogizing one with the other. In this case, we can see already how 
Lingis’s description of the categorical imperative’s ecological presumptions contains 
many of the conflicts that we found already in Pound’s Confucianism.  
 Imperative logic can be seen as essentially a middle ground between the poles of 
natural and ecological thinking sketched out with Morton above. Humans are 
“distinguished from other natural species,” yes, but the very humanness which 
distinguishes them also makes it possible for them to integrate themselves by “thoughtful 
initiative” with the very same natural world that they have been divided from. One must 
remember that for Kant, the famous rule that one should “act only according to that 
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”264 
is not merely a restatement of that old rhetorical question, “what if everyone acted like 
that?” It ties instead with an important distinction that Kant draws quite early in his 
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Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals between “laws of nature and laws of 
freedom.”265 As Kant elaborates in his second critique, ethical maxims should be 
regarded as “universal law[s] of nature.”266  
 The implications of this position become clear when if we turn, not to the Critique 
of Practical Reason, but rather to Kant’s essay “On the Supposed Right to Lie because of 
Philanthropic Concerns,” where he (in)famously argues that it would be unethical to lie in 
order to protect one’s friend from murder. This position, as we can see by comparison to 
Canto XIII, differs greatly from the Poundian-Confucian position which holds that 
familial bonds (and, presumably, bonds of friendship) are sacred enough that one can be 
permitted to, essentially, lie in the name of honesty. Yet both positions, though they 
arrive at different places, get there by the same means. In justifying his argument, Kant 
points out that, in the example he sketches, one cannot be fully cognizant of all the 
potential consequences of one’s actions, and it is quite possible that the lie you tell could 
inadvertently send your friend into the murderer’s clutches – which would make you 
ethically culpable for that friend’s death. But if you tell the truth, then regardless of your 
friend’s fate “public justice cannot lay a hand on you,” for “truthfulness is a duty.”267 
Thus, because the maxim against lying should be followed as inexorably as the law of 
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gravity, nobody can be blamed for following it. Whereas Pound’s imperative is 
essentially bottom-up, privileging the individual parts of the larger mesh which create 
society through self-replication, Kant’s imperative is top-down, privileging the abstract 
maxims to which all rational beings must pledge themselves (or, as Lingis puts it, for 
Kant “thought is obedience. Freedom of thought makes this obedience possible”268).  
The result of this position is that Kantian ethics requires a continuous 
subordination of the personal will, which manifests not (as in Pound) a virtue to be 
cultivated but rather as a problem to be solved. One must be indifferent to the procession 
of ethical laws just as one would be towards the laws of physics, finding no more 
emotional investment in one’s maxims than one would in the laws of thermodynamics. 
(Or as the Kantian scholar Scott M. Roulier puts it, for Kant “virtue necessarily 
presupposes apathy.”269) Thus, one’s decision to tell the murderer where one’s friend is 
hiding carries no risk of reprobation because it ought not to have been a decision in the 
first place. Kant’s gestures to unintended consequences are therefore a red herring, since 
a liar in his system is already guilty regardless of its results. The fact that we are ignorant 
of the connection between one’s decision to lie or tell the truth and the fate of their friend 
is elided in favour of a black box labeled “natural laws.” But though imperative logic 
prizes the integration of “nature” (laws of physics) and “culture” (ethics), it is not fully 
ecological, since it takes as its starting premise that human will and ethical failings leave 
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humanity separate from nature, pushing it “over there” into a world of fixed laws that we 
can only dream of one day occupying.  
To see how this problem manifests in Pound, I would like to turn from Confucius 
and Kant now to Pound’s obsession with usury. In particular, to Pound’s condemnation 
thereof in Canto XLV: 
Usura rusteth the chisel 
It rusteth the craft and the craftsman 
It gnaweth the thread in the loom 
. . . 
Usura slayeth the child in the womb 
It stayeth the young man’s courting 
It hath brought palsey to bed, lyeth 
Between the young bride and her bridegroom 
          CONTRA NATURAM 
They have brought whores for Eleusis 
Corpses are set to banquet 
At behest of usura. 
(C XLV/230) 
The condemnation “contra naturam” (“against nature”) which sits so prominently in this 
passage needs some explaining. Many of the things that usury prevents, after all, are 
themselves products of human action – since stonework, courtship rituals, banquets, and 
the Eleusinian Mysteries seem all to fall squarely on the “culture” side of the line. 
Likewise, the rusting of a chisel seems like a natural process, being a simple chemical 
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reaction. Yet the canto aligns all of the former firmly with nature and against usury’s 
unnaturalness. The canto, then, raises the question of what exactly is “nature” as Pound 
defines it, and we can see an answer to that question in one of Pound’s early influences – 
C.H. Douglas, who mid-way through his Social Credit provides a definition.270 “The test 
of a natural law,” he writes,” is that it is automatic and inexorable” – with the 
empowerment of “the individual,” as he immediately makes clear, being a necessary 
consequence of natural laws.271  
Douglas’s equation of the natural with the automatic, and the subsequent embrace 
of individualism under that banner, at least partially explains his embrace of anti-Semitic 
conspiracy theories like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. 272 It also sheds light on his 
dismissive assessment of the labour movement, and in particular the calls for workers’ 
control of industry, which he regarded as “crude credit-distribution societies” and 
“against the nature of things.”273 What we see in Douglas’s text a development of an 
economic paranoia that would blossom forth in Pound, who would go on to identify “in 
alliance with Usura . . . the rulers of Europe and betrayers of America; the bankers, 
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munitions dealers, professors, men of commerce, and even men of letters who either 
openly or tacitly serve Usura.”274 One need only glance at Pound’s Guide to Kulchur, for 
example, to see him speaking of a “secret history” consisting of “the secret corruptions, 
the personal lusts, avarices etc. that scoundrels keep hidden.”275 By elevating the myriad 
injustices of global finance to the level of a conspiracy, and by conflating under that 
conspiracy a vast number of diverse groups and interests (many of which actively oppose 
one another276), Pound is able to equate any kind of active, systematic intervention in the 
economy and the financial system with an abrogation of the laws of nature. But, as 
Confucius writes in The Analects, a properly-run government ought not involve such 
interventions, since “when a prince’s character is properly formed, he governs without 
giving orders” while “if his character is twisty he can give orders, but they won’t be 
carried out.”277 Nature is automatic, and a good government is one that aligns with nature 
– it therefore follows that a good government is one that functions automatically. 
Societies which follow nature therefore overcome the messy question of how individual 
actions translate into society-wide effects – the relation “just works,” in the same way 
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that Bruno Latour’s super-computer “just works.” A natural society is a society 
constructed upon a black box, a society structured by political agnotology. A finance 
system in thrall to an international conspiracy, that is a system entirely unmoored from 
automatic systems, would thus be a worst-case scenario.   
Yet while Pound’s economic theories did lead him to embrace a conspiratorial 
worldview, it is not only at the level of grand alternate histories that imperative logic 
takes hold. Pound’s belief that the personal character of individual leaders could directly 
affect larger global processes – that one could be ecologically enmeshed in a global chain 
of cause-and-effect while still separate enough from nature to be intelligible in purely 
individualistic terms – means that the very shape of the landscape can often turn on the 
personality of a specific person, as we see in his early poem “Sestina: Altaforte,” which 
though predating his encounters with Douglas and Confucius enacts many of the patterns 
of thought that Pound would develop and expand upon as he encountered his later 
obsessions. As Pound writes in its headnote, the poem’s speaker, the troubadour Bertrans 
de Born, was placed in hell by Dante for being “a stirrer up of strife.”278 He appears in 
Inferno Canto XXVIII, presenting himself to Dante and Virgil holding his severed head 
in his hands, an ironic punishment for his crimes: 
I made father and son rebel against each other: 
Achitophel did no worse by Absalom 
And David, with his incitements to harm.  
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Because I separated persons so close, 
I carry my brain separated, alas, 
From its beginning, which is in this trunk.279 
The specific incident referred to here is the role that de Born allegedly had in the revolt of 
Henry the Young King against his father, Henry II of England, in 1173. Dante here 
compares de Born’s role to that of Achitophel in the Biblical story of Absalom’s revolt 
on his father King David. Thus, de Born appears in Dante as almost an inverse of 
Herakles in Women of Trachis – one who, in defiling the bonds of filial piety, honours the 
joining of nature and culture in the breach rather than in the observance. By placing de 
Born in hell and identifying the 1173 revolt with Absalom’s revolt on King David, Dante 
elevates this particular familial relationship to a degree of cosmic importance comparable 
to the merging of paternal command and divine prophecy that we see in the death of 
Herakles.   
 Pound carries forward Dante’s enframing of de Born’s crime by projecting the 
troubadour’s warlike personality across the French countryside surrounding his castle. As 
the poem begins: “Damn it all! All this our South stinks peace. / . . . I have no life save 
when the swords clash.”280 And as we see de Born continue in the poem’s second stanza:  
In hot summer have I great rejoicing 
When the tempests kill the earth’s foul peace, 
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And the lightnings from black heav’n flash crimson, 
And the fierce thunders roar me their music 
And the winds shriek through the clouds mad, opposing, 
And through all the riven skies God’s swords clash.281  
De Born’s love of war is undeniable, and so strong that he begins to project it onto the 
landscape, imagining violent summer storms more in tune with his personality. But the 
force of this image should not cause us to forget that outside his window he does not see 
storms, but rather a calm and temperate climate. Peace, not war, is the “automatic” state 
of things, and the violent landscapes of the second stanza and after are an artificial 
imposition, where de Born unleashes his violent desires by reshaping the landscape into 
his own image. His monologue is therefore a re-enactment of the very crime that found 
him cast into Dante’s hell. But what for Dante is a crime against God – one best 
understood by analogy to a story from the Bible – for Pound instead first manifests as a 
crime against nature, which then takes on the religious import of the source material: 
“Hell grant soon we hear again the swords clash! / Hell blot back for always the thought 
‘Peace!’”282 Even as de Born strives to exert his will over the landscape, the form of the 
poem resists him. Three years after writing “Alteforte,” Pound would remark in A 
Walking Tour of Southern France that the undulating hills and trees on the road to Celles 
are “indeed a sort of sestina” in that both the poetic form and the hills expressed the 
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“recurrence in nature.”283 The form of the sestina, with its initial set of six end-words that 
are then repeated with variations, imitates the productive regularity of nature, which like 
a sestina is “automatic” and predictable (in that the order of the repetitions is determined 
by its fixed form in combination with the text of the initial stanza) yet still productive.  
For Pound the form of nature is reoccurrence – and it is therefore notable that de 
Born in this poem expresses his desire for war in the same breath as his desire for 
summer. While this alignment of war and summer might strike at first as an imperative-
bound alignment of human activity with a natural process, de Born’s declaration is not 
merely a benign preference, but a rejection of the flow of seasons itself: it is the summer 
that he may ride out to war, and he would rather have “one hour’s stour than a year’s 
peace.”284 But we might compare this declaration to another group of soldiers from 
Pound’s oeuvre – those we meet in his version of the poem “Song of the Bowmen of 
Shu” in Cathay.285 The speaker of the poem, one of the eponymous bowmen, does not 
                                                 
283
 Ezra Pound, A Walking Tour of Southern France, ed. Richard Sieburth (New York: New Directions, 
1992), 15. For further analysis of this comparison, see: Daniel Albright, “Early Cantos I-XLI,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Ezra Pound, ed. Ira B. Nadel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
81-83. 
284
 “Sestina: Alteforte,” 8.  
285
 Like most of the poems in Cathay, “Song of the Bowmen of Shu” differs in several important ways 
from its original, and bears a far greater mark of Pound’s own poetic craftsmanship than what one would 
normally expect from a translation. The final lines in particular contain many stylistic elements not found in 
the Chinese version. For a summary of these issues, see: Zhaoming Qian, Orientalism and Modernism: The 
Legacy of China in Pound and Williams (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 73-76. 
137 
 
rejoice in war, and neither do his fellow soldiers (as he remarks early on “when anyone 
says ‘Return,’ the others are full of sorrow. / Sorrowful minds, sorrow is strong, we are 
hungry and thirsty”286). They have been away from home for a long time, and seem to 
have been worn down by the hardships and monotony of regular soldiering. Notably, they 
are not “stirrers up of strife,” but rather shy away from combat, associating the “three 
battles a month” the Mongols thrust upon them287 with the general exhaustion they 
experience on the field. Hanging over the whole poem is the question of when they will 
return home, and it is in the final lines that they do: 
When we set out, the willows were drooping with spring, 
We come back in the snow, 
We go slowly, we are hungry and thirsty, 
Our mind is full of sorrow, who will know of our grief?288 
Certainly the de Born of “Alteforte” would not know their grief, but rather despise them 
as pacifists who flee from war. Yet their term of service evidences a far greater alignment 
with the flows and patterns of nature than the presumptuous warmongering of de Born. 
Unlike their French counterparts, they have fought for a whole year and during all four 
seasons, and their attitude towards war is not marked by joy but by resignation and 
acceptance. They are wary of the Mongols, but they still fight their three battles a month, 
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just as they also take what peace comes their way in between. Finally, it is nature itself 
that witnesses their grief: for just as they return home “full of sorrow,” they find the 
landscape also laden with snow.  
 In Pound’s 1911 collection Canzoni we find another indication that the eternal 
summer of the warlike mind is not in keeping with the fecund repetitions of nature. In 
“Canzon: The Yearly Slain,” taken from that collection, Pound pursues an extended 
metaphor that equates the waxing and waning of love to the yearly seasonal procession: 
Love that is born in Time and comes and goes! 
Love that doth hold all noble hearts in fief! 
As red leaves follow where the wind hath flown, 
So all men follow Love when Love is dead.289 
As he does quite frequently in The Cantos and elsewhere, Pound is here equating love 
with a natural process that proceeds automatically, and which if embraced allows one to 
be better aligned with nature. Looking forward to Pound’s later writing, we can see how 
the alignment of productive desire with nature would later feed into his economic 
theories. As Alec Marsh observes, much of Pound’s objection to usury is based on the 
way it contravenes automatic, naturally productive processes like the procession of the 
seasons in favour of the creation of artificial wealth. As he describes, “the usury system 
forces natural values and production – for example, a given quantity of wheat – to 
measure up prior to monetary debts. . . . If the harvest is bad, the interest must still be 
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paid in money or the farmer must forfeit real property. . . . [thus] foreclosure is the 
destruction of real values to prop up artificial percentages on paper.”290 Marsh’s 
summary draws this particular example from one of Pound’s speeches on Rome Radio, 
but we can Pound’s association between the automatic flow of the seasons and the 
growing and shrinking of productive desire in these much earlier poems.  
The growth and fallow periods that contour farmers’ lives – which allow them to 
produce food precisely because they are hard-coded into nature – are in Pound’s view 
overwritten by usury in the name of artificial profit in much the same way that de Born 
overwrites the seasons in the name of war. Those like the bowmen of Shu who align 
themselves with the natural world are ultimately exulted by Pound as the true producers 
of value and the enemies of usury. “The true base of credit,” as Pound would write in 
Canto LII, “is / the abundance of nature” (C LII/257), and in formulating his imperative 
logic in terms of individual actions that set patterns repeating through society (the 
strophes that become a canzone, or the warlike de Born who turns sons against their 
father) Pound is able to avoid defining his ethics in terms of abstract Kantian maxims, 
instead putting forth specific examples that ought to set his preferred pattern forth. And 
we can see one such instance in Canto VIII, which begins with a letter by Sigismundo 
Malatesta to a son of Cosimo de Medici: 
And tell the Maestro di pentore [master of painting] 
That there can be no question of 
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His painting the walls for the moment, 
As the mortar is not yet dry 
And it wd. be merely work chucked away 
(C VIII/28)  
In this moment, in this seemingly mundane instruction regarding the painting of a wall, 
we see what Pound would dub, in his multi-part essay “I Gather the Limbs of Osiris,” a 
“luminous detail” – small facts or anecdotes “which govern[] knowledge as the 
switchboard the electric circuit.”291 Such details are “luminous,” that is, not because of 
their relative historical importance, but rather because of how they define the intersection 
of an array of diverse processes and thereby allow them to be understood. Such is what 
we see in the detail of Malatesta and the paint: an intelligent figure, attuned to the 
automatic procession of nature (the rate at which mortar dries), using that attunement to 
ensure that work being done is genuinely valuable (i.e. not wasteful), all while giving 
commands to a member of the most powerful banking family in all of Italy. Collapsed 
into this moment, in this letter by one of the early heroes of Pound’s epic, is precisely his 
imperative logic at work, marrying the natural world with the careful temperament of an 
individual human being.  
3.3 Poundian Metaphor and Imperative Poetics  
Given the importance in Pound’s artistic and political project of individual units that 
repeat and vary themselves to produce more complex schemas, it seems a good idea to 
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embrace particularity (at least for the time being) to give attention to a specific poem and 
the network of relations it illuminates. Any scholar of modernist poetry will be familiar 
with Pound’s “In a Station of the Metro,” but just to be thorough I shall quote it anyway: 
The apparition of these faces in the crowd; 
Petals on a wet, black bough.292 
A number of the poem’s features make it understandable in terms of Pound’s imperative, 
the most obvious of those being the way it directly overlays a human activity on a feature 
of the natural world. But a much more intricate (and interesting) facet of the poem’s 
imperative is the manner in which uses metaphor.  
In 1913 – the same year Pound first published “Metro” in Poetry – Pound 
encountered the writings of Ernest Fenollosa and began work editing the mass of notes 
that the late sinologist had left behind, a process that resulted in Cathay, a collection of 
translated Noh plays, and (most importantly for my analysis here) Fenollosa’s essay “The 
Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry.” It is from this work that Pound’s 
interest in China (and his use of Chinese ideograms in his writing) springs, and in this 
essay we find the following observation: 
A true noun, an isolated thing, does not exist in nature. 
Things are only the terminal points, or rather the meeting 
points of actions . . . Neither can a pure verb, an abstract 
motion, be possible. The eye sees noun and verb as one: 
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things in motion, motion in things, and so the Chinese 
conception tends to represent them.293 
Here we see the Chinese ideogram being the tool that aligns, not merely poetry, but all of 
writing with natural processes as they actually occur in the world, forming a contiguous 
ecology of signs.294 Phonetic writing systems, on the other hand, create needless 
abstractions – pure nouns and verbs that posit relationless objects and motion unattached 
to any definite thing, which though useful concepts for coordinating parts of speech 
detach that speech from the world that it describes. This embrace of abstraction is 
something Pound would himself criticize, such as in his ABC of Reading where he 
complains that “in Europe, if you ask a man to define anything, his definition always 
moves away from the simple things that he knows perfectly well . . . [towards] 
progressively remoter abstraction.”295 But we see an even earlier (pre-Fenollossa) interest 
in a linguistic fidelity to nature in his essay “A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste,” which not 
only advised poets to “go in fear of abstractions,”296 but also not to “mess up the 
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perception of one sense by trying to define it in terms of another. This is usually only the 
result of being too lazy to find the exact word.”297 This advice – consistent with F.S. 
Flint’s injunction, in the same issue of Poetry, that imagism concerned the “direct 
treatment of the ‘thing,’ whether subjective or objective”298 – aligns with an interest in 
the exactness of poetic description (the “exact word”) with a rectitude of description that 
for Pound as for Fenollosa precludes the messy abstractions common in everyday speech. 
That is to say, both imagist poetry and Chinese ideograms are, for Pound, defined by a 
Flaubertian search for le mot juste extended to its logical extreme.  
 I bring up the similarities between the main stylistic tenants of Pound’s imagism 
and Fenollosa’s interpretation of Chinese writing in large part to demonstrate how the 
imperative logic of the latter did not create in Pound a set of literary preoccupations that 
did not exist prior, but rather described systematically a number of different notions that 
Pound was already exploring in his earlier work.299 Though his version of “The Chinese 
Written Character” would not appear until 1918, Pound had been putting its central 
tenants into action since before the Great War. Thus, when looking at the way “In a 
Station of the Metro” enacts a particular attitude towards representing nature, we should 
keep in mind the importance that Fenollosa placed in the essentially metaphoric nature of 
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the Chinese ideogram and the way that metaphor (in his view) proceeded along a type of 
imperative:  
Metaphor, the revealer of nature, is the very substance of 
poetry. The known interprets the obscure, the universe is 
alive with myth. . . . It is a mistake to suppose, with some 
philosophers of aesthetics, that art and poetry are to deal 
with the general and the abstract. . . . Art and poetry deal 
with the concrete of nature.300 
Metaphors, for Fenollosa, are deeply immanent with nature, being a reflection of the 
interconnectedness that all particular elements of the world enact in every moment of 
time. Art, for him, is the expression of these concrete relations, and the ideogram, being 
built on metaphor, inscribes this poetic imperative in the very basis of the Chinese 
writing system. The key to the underlying imperative logic of “In a Station of the Metro” 
therefore lies in its enactment of a metaphoric relation between the faces in the crowd and 
the petals on the bough.  
 At least one critic has, however, contested the reading of this relation in terms of 
metaphor, and the nature of the objection ought to help elucidate the precise way this 
poem fits into the larger architecture of Pound’s nature poetics. In Modernist Form, John 
Steven Childs argues that the form of “In a Station of the Metro” is better understood as 
metonymic. As he argues, the relation between the two objects is not such that one could 
substitute a submerged “like” between them – that is, the second line does not emerge as 
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a simple substitution of the first. Rather, the juxtaposition of the two images gestures 
towards a higher unity to which the two particular objects are subordinate, being the 
“parts,” or the particular instances, that stand in for the whole.301 This reading can be 
quite convincing, especially since it is consistent with Pound’s interest in Neoplatonism – 
the higher order meaning of the poem here being its “Form,” of which the specific objects 
are mere shadows.302 Pound himself, in fact, seems to encourage this kind of reading in 
his Vorticism essay where, only a page after offering up “Metro” as an exemplum, and 
after defining Vorticism as an “intensive art,” pound attempts to explain what he means 
with recourse to the Pythagorean Theorem: 
There are four different intensities of mathematical 
expression known to the ordinarily intelligent 
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undergraduate, namely: the arithmetical, the algebraic, the 
geometrical, and that of analytical geometry. 
. . . [I]t is true that 
32 + 42 = 52, 62 + 82 = 102, 92 + 122 = 152, 392 + 522 = 652.  
 . . . [But] one expresses their “algebraic relation” as 
a2 + b2 = c2. 
 That is the language of philosophy.303 
The invocation of Pythagoras, and his mathematical idealism,304 seems to suggest that 
Pound is viewing the juxtaposition used in his poetry in very much the terms Childs 
describes, where the individual objects are merely parts of a larger whole to which they 
are subsidiary, just like any particular drawing of a triangle can only suggest or gesture 
towards and ideal perfect triangle which can only be accurately represented in the 
abstract through the use of equations. Yet this reading would go against every other 
dominant tendency in Pound’s poetics, and in particular his vehement rejection of top-
down systems of organization.  
 Pound’s use of mathematics in “Vorticism,” luckily enough, provides us with a 
solution to this conflict – one which shall also give us an answer to Childs’s metonymic 
reading of the poem. It happens that Pound had used the exact same comparison several 
years prior to publishing his essay, invoking it in The Spirit of Romance as a way to 
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describe Dante’s Divine Comedy, and the “four senses” in which it can be read: “the 
literal, the allegorical, the analogical, and the ethical.”305 It should be easy to see the 
similarities here between these four “senses” and the “four different intensities of 
mathematical expression” to which Pound compares his notion of “intensity” in 
Vorticism, and in the passage he even introduces the equation in the same way – 
beginning with the same examples (32 + 42 = 52, 62 + 82 = 102, and so on) before 
identifying them as merely different instances of a2 + b2 = c2. Yet Pound’s use of this 
analogy, as well as his discussion of Dante in The Spirit of Romance generally, resists the 
urge to read Dante’s poetry in terms of pure abstraction, holding instead that his “so-
called personifications are real and not artificial” and that (in a text that pre-dates 
“Imagisme” by three years) “Dante’s precision . . . comes from the attempt to reproduce 
exactly the thing which has been clearly seen.”306 But if Dante is not idealizing – and if, 
by extension, Pound is not idealizing either – then what exactly is the invocation of the 
Pythagorean Theorem supposed to tell us?  
 The answer to that question is clearest in light of Childs’s metonymic reading. 
Metonymy, most simply defined, involves taking a part of something for the whole – as 
when one, for instance, uses a picture of the Mona Lisa to stand-in for “Early Modern 
painting” generally. The relationship between the signifier and signified in such a case is 
hierarchical, for while in this example the image of the Mona Lisa is what we encounter, 
its semantic role in that act of signification is to be purely subsumed by the larger 
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category it represents. While we encounter the painting, what we see is a larger history 
that ultimately overwrites it. Metonymic writing, though it appears to deal in the 
concrete, is really concerned with abstractions.307 Pound, in his writing on poetics, firmly 
rejects such subordination, and this rejection comes through in his analysis of Dante. 
Following his invocation of the Pythagorean Theorem and its comparison to the “four 
senses” of the Divine Comedy, Pound explains the comparison thusly: 
[T]he Commedia is, in the literal sense, a description of 
Dante’s vision of a journey through the realms inhabited by 
the spirits of men after death; in a further sense it is the 
journey of Dante’s intelligence though the states of mind 
wherein dwell all sorts and conditions of men before death; 
beyond this, Dante or Dante’s intelligence may come to 
mean “Everyman” or “Mankind” . . . In a fourth sense, the 
Commedia is an expression of the laws of eternal justice . . 
. or the law of Karma, if we are to use an Oriental term.308 
Though it is likely a coincidence, the frequent use of semicolons in this passage is telling 
given the importance of the semicolon in “In a Station of the Metro.” For while Pound 
does move systematically in his description from the specific, literal meaning of a text 
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towards greater abstractions, at no point does Pound subordinate one set of meanings to 
another. Rather, he simply places the different “senses” on top of each other without any 
overt invocation of hierarchy between them. Dante, then, is “Everyman,” but in becoming 
“Everyman” he nevertheless remains irrevocably himself, just as he continues to remain 
himself even as his literal journey through the underworld becomes a figurative journey 
through the abstract “laws of eternal justice.” It is thus that we can see what Pound means 
when he writes that “the image is not an idea. It is a radiant node or cluster . . . a 
VORTEX, from which, and through which, and into which, ideas are constantly 
rushing.”309 “From which,” “through which,” and “into which,” all happening at once – 
such is not the formula for metonymy. Though this “vortex” relates to an abstract 
meaning that arises from its constituent parts, those parts can no more be subordinated to 
that abstraction than a river can subordinate the water that runs through it. The ontology 
of a vortex is flat – part and whole exist in perfect unison.310  
 None of the foregoing is to say that Pound’s poetics is straightforwardly 
metaphorical, but rather that the ethics of his ecological imperative express themselves in 
the form of a striving towards metaphoricity, a striving we see expressed quite clearly in 
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his “Metro” poem. I think a useful heuristic here is Lacan’s alignment of metaphor and 
metonym with (respectively) Freud’s concepts of condensation and displacement,311 
particularly in comparing Pound’s imperative with Kant’s. The ecological linguistics (for 
lack of a better term) of Kant’s categorical imperative is freely metonymic, in that it 
displaces human beings from nature by way of free will. But Pound will accept nothing 
less than a perfect condensation of the two domains – the faces in the crowd and the 
leaves on the bough must become one, must be perfectly overlapped, must perfectly 
become each other, in the mind’s-eye of the reader if not on the page. (It is in this manner 
that I align Pound with Morton.) But, as will become clear shortly, this condensation is 
unstable, not only because of the pragmatic necessity of placing poetic lines side-by-side 
(that is, displacing them) but also because of Pound’s rejection of usury and everything 
he associated with it. What Pound seems to want is a system in which all of human action 
is perfectly condensed with the natural world except for one or two special cases, cases 
which he tries to displace. These difficulties leave Pound with what we might call a 
metaphorical utopianism, in which an ideal of perfect condensation does constant battle 
with the forces (internal and external) of metonymy and displacement. “In a Station of 
the Metro,” then, is not only a paradigmatic example of Pound’s Imagist reductionism, 
but also of how his political and ethical ideas became integrated with his aesthetic 
practices.  
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 The “Metro” poem’s status as an expression of the relationship between metaphor 
and nature arrives not merely though a comparison to Fenollosa (enlightening though the 
comparison is) but also through the poem’s origin in Pound’s reading of haiku, which 
Pound explicitly points to in “Vorticism” when he compares “In a Station of the Metro” 
to a well-known poem by the haiku master Arakida Moritake as well as another haiku 
related to Pound by his associate Victor Plarr.312 Though the essay gives no indication of 
where Pound first encountered haiku poetry, Yoshinobu Hakutani, in his Haiku and 
Modernist Poetics, argues convincingly that the encounter came through the Japanese-
American poet and literary scholar Yone Noguchi, who published an essay on haiku in a 
1913 issue of the little magazine Rhythm, and who began a correspondence with Pound n 
1911.313 Noguchi’s essay, “What is a Hokku Poem?,” clearly frames the form as a kind 
of nature poetry founded in the specificity of its language: “this ‘hokku’ poem in whose 
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gem-small form of utterance our Japanese poets were able to express their understanding 
of Nature, better than that, to sing or chant their longing or wonder or adoration toward 
Mother Nature . . . [it] is distinctly clear-cut like a diamond or star, never mystified by 
any cloud or mist like Truth or Beauty of Keats’ understanding.”314 
 The importance of the haiku-form’s imperative function was such that it seems to 
have affected the way Pound arranged the English examples that he quotes in his essay. 
While English readers of Haiku poems commonly understand the form to be made of 
three poetic lines with the syllables 5-7-5, in Japanese haikus are most commonly written 
as a single line with the tripartite structure being formed by kireji, or “cutting words,” 
which break the line into formal units.315 It is these units within the one-line Japanese 
haiku that become the three lines of the English haiku, both in translations from the 
Japanese and in the semi-independent tradition of haiku poetry in English, to which 
Pound is a key contributor. But in addition to this three-part structure, there frequently is 
also buried in the single Japanese line a two-part structure where “either the first two 
lines or the last two lines are one unit, and the first line or the last line is another unit.”316 
While the three-line arrangement is now established as the primary way that haikus are 
written in English, the equally valid two-line arrangement that Pound favoured, and in 
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which we can see the origin of the two-line form of “In a Station of the Metro,” has many 
advantages. In addition to making it easier for Pound to emphasize the method of “super-
position” he employed in his poem317 (and emphasizing as well the poem’s similarity to a 
mathematical equation, with the split between the lines taking the place of the equals 
sign318), the use of the haiku’s two-part structure as the basis of its lineation emphasizes 
the poem’s conceptual units at the expense of its formal qualities (whereas the three-line 
arrangement does the opposite).  
 In order to demonstrate the importance of this decision, it would be useful to 
compare “In a Station of the Metro” to another haiku written by the seventeenth-century 
master Matsuo Bashō. While Pound does not seem to have read much of Bashō, his 
eminent status in the history of Japanese poetry – comparable to Dante in Italian and 
Shakespeare in English – makes him a useful exemplum.319 The haiku in question is thus: 
Full moon 
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Walking around the pond 
All night320 
Like “In a Station of the Metro,” this haiku engages in a form of “super-position,” in 
which one image is overlaid directly on the other to create a third image out of the 
combination (with the first line being one unit and the second two being another). But the 
images that Bashō presents are not merely juxtaposed, but have further relations: the 
image of the full moon is doubly reflected both in its reflection on the pond and in the 
speaker’s circular walk, which is thus defined both by the pond’s perimeter and by the 
image of the moon. What the poem therefore achieves is a unity of self and nature very 
much like what Pound sought, where one does not simply pay fealty to an ideal natural 
law (as with Kant) but rather where one achieves a more ecological relation with the 
world. As the poem’s translator observes, its ambiguous syntax (present also in the 
Japanese) means that it “can be read with the idea that the moon ‘walks’ around the pond 
as it seems to go from east to west or that the author walked around the pond the whole 
night enjoying the full moon.”321 Bashō’s haiku therefore reflects one of “In a Station of 
the Metro’s” most important features – its flat ontology. Though the poems present 
multiple images, and though some images arise from others, no entity in either poem is 
hierarchically above or below another. For Bashō, we can see this “flat” relation in the 
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way that the lake brings the moon down to earth, letting it stride around the lake just as 
the speaker does, so that both entities (by virtue of haiku’s ambiguous syntax) can 
effectively walk around the lake as one. For Pound, the flatness comes in the poem’s 
presentation of multiple “intensities” present in the varying levels of abstraction that 
Pound permits to stand beside each other in a relation of equals.  
3.4 Denaturing the Image 
Pound, as should be clear by now, saw metaphor not only as a kind of ornament, but as a 
means of acquiring knowledge about the world. His embrace of figurative writing is also 
an embrace of objective knowledge – as evidenced by his likening of “In a Station of the 
Metro” to a mathematical formula, and of his later embrace of Fenollosa, who explicitly 
declared metaphor to be a “revealer of nature.” Pound’s use of metaphor is therefore 
essential to the larger imperative logic of his poetics, and in particular to his attempt to 
marry the breadth and repetitiveness of his Confucian-inspired historiography with his 
strong sense of individualism. Indeed, as Chet Lisiecki has recently argued, “the 
imagists’ attempt to revitalize metaphor” is in keeping with a trend towards representing 
in poetry “the pre-linguistic image and one’s emotional experience of it” that can be 
traced back to Nietzsche.322 But the particular kind of metaphor that Pound uses in his 
“Metro” poem is fairly unusual – not at all conforming to the common “tenor-vehicle” 
model that most metaphors follow. If, as I.A. Richards defines it, “we can describe or 
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qualify the tenor by describing the vehicle,”323 then the super-position of “In a Station of 
the Metro” would hardly seem like a metaphor at all.  
The problem is that Richards’s definition turns metaphor into a basically 
hierarchical relationship – something like the inverse of the problem we encountered with 
metonymy. When, for example, Shakespeare has Romeo declare “But soft! What light 
through yonder window breaks? / It is the east, and Juliet is the sun”324 a clear hierarchy 
appears: the point and focus of this metaphor is Juliet, who beauty makes her appearance 
at the window resemble the sun rising in the east. We are expected to understand what a 
sunrise looks like, and Shakespeare only invokes that image so that we may better 
understand Juliet. The passage is not really “about” the sun at all. Such is the problem 
with Richards’s definition: a vehicle can carry, but cannot itself be carried, which is to 
say that the definition is only useful when applied to metaphors that only work in one 
direction. But “In a Station of the Metro” is basically reversible, in that one can compare 
the petals on the bough to the faces in the crowd just as effectively as the inverse. The 
image created from their super-position is an independent entity, a third object that arises 
from the first two but remains equal to them. The poem, then, is much more similar to the 
kind of “proportional metaphor” that Aristotle describes in his Rhetoric, which “must 
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always apply reciprocally to either of its co-ordinate terms.”325 The example that 
Aristotle gives here is a metaphor that equates the shield of Ares to the drinking bowl of 
Dionysus, where both objects (in addition to physically resembling each other) are 
heavily associated with their respective deities. Thus, one can say that the shield 
functions for Ares in the same way that the bowl does for Dionysus, or one can say the 
reverse, and in both cases the comparisons would be equivalent. While on the other hand, 
though Shakespeare wrote that “Juliet is the sun,” and one could conceivably write that 
“the sun is Juliet,” the two comparisons suggest completely different things.326  
While “In a Station of the Metro” is a particularly extreme example, this kind of 
“flat” metaphor, with its interchangeable and ontologically independent parts, are fairly 
common in Pound’s writing. We can see another example in “The River Song” of 
Cathay, which ends: “For the gardens at Jo-run are full of new nightingales, / Their sound 
is mixed in this flute, / Their voice is in the twelve pipes here.”327 The movement in these 
lines from the sound of the nightingales to the sound of the flutes – proceeding so that 
neither sound outdoes the other, so that both instead play in harmony – allows for one to 
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be compared to the other without one overpowering the other. It is a type of transition 
that we see most famously in H.D.’s “Oread,” another major imagist work, which 
achieves an effect quite similar to that in “The River Song”: 
Whirl up, sea– 
whirl your pointed pines, 
splash your great pines 
on our rocks, 
hurl your green over us, 
cover us with your pools of fir.328  
The key difference here between these poems and “In a Station of the Metro” is that the 
super-position of the images does not occur in a single momentary flash but is rather 
worked up to over the course of several lines. As the passage develops, one objects 
slowly bleeds into another until they form a third, composite image, while nevertheless 
retaining their respective separateness. The firs and the sea, the faces and the petals, the 
nightingales and the flutes – all continue to be themselves even as their proximity creates 
something new, just as the moon in Bashō remains in the sky even as it dances with the 
speaker around the lake. 
 We can see other manifestations of this process in Pound’s early poetry – it is the 
central conceit, for example, in “Portrait d’une Femme” (which ends, tellingly, “No! 
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there is nothing! In the whole world and all, / Nothing that’s quite your own. / Yet this is 
you”329), and likewise of his earlier “Histrion”: 
 [T]he souls of all men great 
At times pass through us, 
And we are melted into them, and are not 
Save reflexions [sic] of their souls. 
Thus am I Dante for a space and am 
One François Villon, ballad-lord and thief 
. . . 
This for an instant and the flame is gone.330 
Though the speaker is “melted into” previous authors, this combination is only 
momentary, which forces him to drift from author to author, unable to fully “become” 
someone else. In the later poem, this transience becomes equated with the gathering of 
junk and refuse in the gyre of the eponymous sea, created by the nearby currents. Though 
the junk and flotsam are what make the Sargasso Sea distinctive, these various objects 
remain clearly and obviously independent of the region – their colour contrasting with the 
famous clear blue of the waters. Likewise, the poem’s subject, as a repository of rumour 
and conversation, becomes herself through the adoption and ventriloquization of other 
people’s speech, which remains distinct from her (and she from it) despite forming part 
of her personality. Though not “images” in the sense that we encounter in the “Metro” 
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poem, these works demonstrate a preoccupation in Pound’s early poems with balancing 
the super-position of different entities with those entities’ continued ontological 
independence. It is a preoccupation that we see extend into his later work with his use of 
“subject-rhymes” – which remain a constant throughout all the cantos.  
These rhymes – in which, as Hugh Kenner summarizes, “snow fills ten lines of 
Iliad XII to rhyme (alike, yet different) with hurtling missiles, and the reader of the 
snowfall passage at the end of Joyce’s ‘The Dead’ may detect rhyme with the Iliad”331 – 
though seemingly estranged from Pound’s particular use of metaphor in “In a Station of 
the Metro” are nevertheless of the same lineage. Indeed, it is still fairly easy to see in 
Kenner’s example of the “hurtling missiles” that resemble falling snow an echo of both 
the metaphoric logic of Fenollosa’s Chinese ideograms and of the snow that greets the 
bowmen of Shu and reflects their sorrow-laden hearts. The subject-rhyme is very much 
the narrativization of Pound’s earlier method of Imagist super-position, retaining the non-
hierarchical metaphoric logic of “In a Station of the Metro” while also incorporating the 
“repeat in nature”332 that he saw in the sestina-like hills of southern France and while he 
explicitly set out to capture in his Cantos. When, for example, Pound in Canto LXII 
creates a subject rhyme between the American and English constitutions – first in 
describing the latter English constitution “without appeal to higher powers unwritten” (C 
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LXII/343) and then later having John Adams name “a love of science and letters / [and] a 
desire to encourage schools and academies” as the “only means to preserve our 
Constitution” (C LXII/349) – he finds (in his equation of good governance with a well-
educated population) a repeat in history that is directly related to the repetition found in 
nature.333 In these cases, then, the use of metaphor ceases to be simply a matter of 
ornamentation, or of finding an effective way to explain one thing by analogy to another, 
and instead becomes an effective means of analyzing the natural world, and a source of 
knowledge in its own right.334  
Thus, before moving on from this extended engagement with the development of 
Pound’s metaphors, it is important to make a final comparison between Pound’s writing 
and the place that metaphor holds in the philosophy of Graham Harman, whose ideas 
have been implicit in much of my analysis thus far. While Harman’s excursions into 
literary theory have been rather disappointing,335 his writing on the role of metaphor in 
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OOO gestures to Pound as an unsung predecessor. Metaphors, for Harman, function as an 
access point to each object’s inherent strangeness. An object in a metaphorical relation 
becomes both “an image sparkling with diverse features” while still retaining a “strange 
concealed integrity of individual images.”336 Of particular interest to Harman is a little-
cited essay by the Spanish phenomenologist José Ortega y Gasset called “An Essay on 
Esthetics by way of a Preface” – originally published as a preface to a collection of 
poems by Moreno Villa. The essay contains an extended meditation on the function of 
metaphor: 
A Valencian poet, López Picó, writes that the cypress “is 
like the ghost of a dead flame.” This is a suggestive 
metaphor. But what is the metaphorical object here? It is 
neither the cypress, nor the flame, nor the ghost: all these 
belong to the realm of real images. The new object that 
confronts us is a “cypress-ghost of a flame.” Notice, 
however, that this cypress is not a cypress, nor this ghost a 
ghost, nor this flame a flame.337 
The image that Ortega cites from Picó thus falls into a dialectic of combination and 
distinction that should by now be familiar. It is not only the flame, the ghost, and the 
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cypress which are distinct objects, but the bizarre combinatory image that flashes out 
from their metaphorical relation. Far from the explanatory metaphors of I.A. Richards, 
metaphor for Ortega and Harman becomes a process of opacity and occlusion rather than 
a means of access.  
As Ortega goes on to write, “we are to see the image of a cypress through the 
image of a flame; we see it as a flame, and vice versa. But each excludes the other; they 
are mutually opaque. . . . We simply sense an identity, we live executantly this being, the 
cypress-flame.”338 Harman – for whom withdrawal and hiddenness are essential aspects 
of object relations339 – this approach to understanding metaphor turns it into a way, not 
of accessing the underlying nature of objects, but of perceiving more readily their 
withdrawal: “since the two images are unable actually to melt together instantly by way 
of their truly minimal common qualities, [their] cryptic essences . . . remain before me in 
a kind of permanent collision.”340 There is no mixing between these objects, nor any 
subjugation between tenor and vehicle. What does this tell us about Pound? First, the 
similarities between Ortega’s analysis of the Picó simile and the implicit ontology of “In 
a Station of the Metro” is notable in itself, given how infrequently the two writers have 
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been analyzed together.341 But the relationship becomes more complex in light of 
Harman’s uptake of Ortega. Harman, like Pound, sees metaphor as a means of acquiring 
new information about the world as we encounter it. The relationship between the cypress 
and the flame is not, for him, a matter of explanation or decoration, but rather of 
revelation – the making visible of a fundamental ontological fact. Yet there are important 
differences in Pound and Harman’s approach to the epistemology of metaphor. Pound 
considers the revelations of his metaphors to be actual objective knowledge about the 
material world,342 essential for the fidelity to “the thing which has been clearly seen.” 
Such knowledge is necessary if his “automatic” imperative logic is to genuinely bring the 
closeness to nature upon which Pound has built his ethics.  
Throughout Pound’s prose writing we encounter exhortations to his readers 
calling on them to acquire better, more precise definitions of words – much like how his 
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poetics calls for a precision in the presentation of images. One can look, for instance, to 
the short anecdote about the zoologist Louis Agassiz, which he includes near the start of 
his ABC of Reading. Pound offers up the story as a way to show that “the proper 
METHOD for studying poetry and good letters is the method of contemporary biologists, 
that is, the careful first-hand examination of the matter.343 The anecdote itself describes a 
student working under Agassiz who is asked to describe a sunfish. The student begins by 
providing the fish’s taxonomic designation (“Ichthus Heliodiplodokus, or whatever term 
is used to conceal the common sunfish from vulgar knowledge,” as Pound describes 
it344), which soon proves insufficient. The student then writes a short essay on the 
subject, which likewise fails. Then Agassiz “told him to look at the fish. At the end of 
three weeks the fish was in an advanced state of decomposition, but the student knew 
something about it.”345 As Pound would write, in reference to this story, in a later essay, 
“any teacher of biology would tell you that knowledge can NOT be transmitted by 
general statement without knowledge of particulars,” and he advocates a similar program 
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for the teaching of literature.346 This attitude is well in line with what I have already 
described throughout this chapter – such as Pound’s preference for the specific over the 
general and his desire for greater fidelity in representation. Likewise, as Bob Perelman 
has analyzed, the anecdote is also consistent with Pound’s approach to both 
Confucianism and his readings of Chinese Ideograms.347 The anecdote also illustrates the 
importance of particularity – and the exhaustive knowledge of particulars – in the natural 
and automatic arrival of generalizations. If, as Pound writes elsewhere, “all knowledge is 
built up from a rain of factual atoms,”348 then one must attain an exhaustive knowledge 
of those “atoms” in order to arrive at generalizations one can trust.  
Consider the student, who begins in the received abstractions of a jargon which – 
though useful to an expert – simply serves to obscure from them the gaps in their 
particular knowledge of the fish. (One might recall here Canto XIII, where Kung muses 
that “even I can remember / A day when the historians left blanks in their writings, / I 
mean for things they didn’t know” [C XIII/60]) Their knowledge, being top-down, is 
incomplete, and over-privileges broad taxonomies above the brute haecceity of the 
specimen before their eyes. The student’s responsibility to the object is great, and yet this 
story has a happy ending: though it takes three weeks of work and examination, and 
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though in the process the specimen is destroyed, by the end the student actually knows 
something, and has therefore moved upwards from the particular into an early, tentative 
generality. Pound is, then, quite opposed to what Harman has called “overmining,” or the 
privileging of groups and collectives of objects to their constituent parts – as in where 
one considers a table “more real” or perhaps “more important” than the atoms that 
construct it.349 His opposition to beginning with the ideal and the general does not 
amount to an abandonment of generalities per se, but rather – as we saw with “In a 
Station of the Metro” and elsewhere – the creation of an even, horizontal relationship 
between composite images, such as the music of the flutes and nightingales, and their 
constituent parts.  
This all sounds like an approach well in keeping with Harman’s philosophical 
project, to the point where one might be tempted to dub Pound’s writing an “Object 
Oriented Poetics.” But it would be a mistake to do so, since the two differ quite sharply 
on a key axiom: whether or not it is possible to “move up” between different levels of 
generalities by analyzing the “atoms” exhaustively. Pound clearly believes that one can, 
whereas Harman holds precisely the opposite. Instead Harman essentially generalizes the 
object withdrawal found in Heidegger’s famous tool analysis to all forms of object 
relations, a position that renders Pound’s implicit ontology explicitly impossible. If no 
object cannot be exhausted by its relations then one can never know everything about it, 
since the acquisition of knowledge invariably requires some form of relation to it. The 
comparison to Harman, then, demonstrates a possible fissure in Pound’s imperative logic, 
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one that begins (appropriately enough) at the bottom and works its way up. It is a 
problem that will dog any philosophy that predicates itself in one way or another on 
“getting back to nature” – that being the unspoken assumption that “nature” is something 
that one can get back to. For Pound, whose imperative arises from the combination of 
miniscule attentiveness and automatic repetition, the danger that the images which set the 
pattern might themselves be flawed and over-generalized – that this over-generalization 
may in fact be a basic axiom of object relations – is an unspoken threat throughout his 
writing, one that only comes to the foreground late in his body of work. 
3.5 Demigod Ecology 
A working country is hardly ever a landscape. The very 
idea of a landscape implies separation and observation. 
— Raymond Williams, The Country and the City350 
Let us enact again the “repeat in history” by turning back to that image of the 
dying Herakles and its echo in the final fragments of Pound’s epic work. Herakles’s death 
was clearly automatic in the sense that Douglas uses the term, in that it was inexorable 
and not created by any presumptive higher-order manipulations. No value has been 
created from nowhere; no life has been declared by fiat in the face of nature. And because 
Herakles is a demigod – the literal son of Zeus – this natural process is also an ethical 
one, connected both to Herakles’s social role as a son and (in his commands to Hyllos) as 
a father. The relationship “just works;” it is natural, proceeding automatically, a perfectly 
functioning agnotology. Here is the coherence: the resolution of a cryptic prophecy 
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through the workings of natural law, which creates in Herakles’s death a genuine 
ecological integration. Herakles’s godhood therefore manifests as a kind of perception, in 
his ability to see the condensation that others cannot. But Pound is not a demigod, and his 
failure to conjure in his cantos the final unity he had for so long pursued has by now 
become part of his personal legend, the fragmentary final verses and the near-
speechlessness that defined the last years of his life standing as testament to the complete 
collapse of his ideals, a collapse that we can easily (perhaps too easily) see as a subject 
rhyme to the collapse of the fascist regimes he pledged his loyalty to. 
Yet unlike the destruction of those regimes, the elliptical ending of The Cantos 
can at least be seen as a noble failure, one that expresses, in the refusal to swerve even in 
the face of total collapse, an unshakable devotion to the ideals that animated the project to 
begin with. There is no outline to The Cantos, nor anything like the Gilbert and Linati 
schemas which gave much-appreciated critical toe-holds to early readers of Joyce’s 
Ulysses. What scholars have instead is a mountain of Pound’s non-fiction writing, 
comprising letters, essays, lectures, monographs, prefaces, speeches, epigrams, sayings, 
and manifestoes, some of which appear in multiple forms and contexts – like the parts of 
F.S. Flint’s “A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste” which reappear in Pound’s “Vorticism” – all 
of which is of potential relevance to The Cantos, and none of which was pursued with 
anything like a systematic program of philosophical development.351 Rather, what holds 
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Pound’s work together is a set of deeply held philosophical obsessions which that go on 
to manifest in a panoply of diverse interests. Yet while Pound expected, in the optimistic 
early days of his epic-writing career, a final display of the revelatory “magic moment,” 
and epiphany (or perhaps what Woolf would call a “moment of being”) in which it all 
makes sense in the end, the absence of this moment should not blind us to the underlying 
system which made that expectation possible. Pound’s poetics in The Cantos, his 
technique of arranging individual “luminous details” in carefully layered webs of 
metaphorical relations to recreate in his text the network of self-replicating “atoms” that 
will form a society in tune with the imperative of the world, is as much an expression of 
his politics as any essay he might have written. Pound writes how Confucius says an 
emperor should rule: by putting his words in order, by putting himself in order, and then 
expanding outwards across the layers of complexity until this unity encompasses the 
world. It is a poetics built from productive ignorance, where the perfection of the system 
allows the whole to emerge naturally from its parts. 
It is for this reason that I have continued to say that Pound sought to be in tune 
with “nature” despite my earlier invocation of Morton’s definition of “ecology” in The 
Ecological Thought. As I suggested briefly during my discussion of Kant, imperative 
thinking is not ecological thinking, nor is it properly natural thinking, but is instead an 
unhappy compromise between the two poles. Simply stated, the belief that one should be 
connected to the natural world (however that world is conceived) implies that one is not, 
but it also implies that the division between nature and culture is also not an essential 
ontological division, since if that were the case the imperative would be doomed to 
failure to begin with. For Morton, the prime example of ecological thinking is Darwinian 
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evolution, which recognises no essential division between human beings and other 
animals, and recognizes humans, sunfish, and wet, black boughs as simply different 
nodes on an enormous web of relations – abandoning entirely the Aristotelian “great 
chain of being” that so ruthlessly hierarchicalizes the natural world.352 So while Pound 
seems to value ecological thinking above all else, his mode of thought continues to figure 
the natural world as an eternal “away” to which we must venture, a key characteristic of 
Morton’s “nature.”  
Let us look, for instance, at this moment in Canto LXXXI: 
Learn of the green world what can be thy place 
In scaled invention or true artistry,  
Pull down thy vanity, 
 Paquin pull down! 
The green casque has outdone your elegance. 
 
“Master thyself, then others shall thee beare” 
 Pull down thy vanity 
Thou art a beaten dog beneath the hail 
A swollen magpie in a fitful sun,  
Half black half white 
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Nor knowst’ou wing from tail 
Pull down thy vanity 
  How mean thy hates 
Fostered in falsity 
(C LXXXI/541) 
The central line in this long passage – “master thyself, then others shall thee beare,” an 
echo of a similar line from Chaucer’s “Ballade of Good Council”353 – combines Pound’s 
Confucianism with his pedagogical theories, aligning (through the surrounding passage) 
the attainment of education through the study of specific specimens (whether a sunfish or 
a line from Chaucer) with the self-mastery expected of any “good” Confucian emperor. 
The attainment of self-knowledge, here taking the form of a kind of zoology (“knowst’ou 
wing from tail”), becomes linked to a drive toward the natural “green world,” the distance 
of which has filled the addressee with “falsity” and has given a meanness to their hates. 
Such is the problem with ethics, as Kant well knew – free will exists, and so ethical laws 
will always lack the gravity of an inexorable fiat of the universe.  
Though the above passage suggests an automatic progression from ignorance and 
meanness towards the knowledge of particulars and the pulling down of vanity, 
elsewhere in the later cantos Pound appears to recognize the position of separateness that 
his ethics have placed him in. As he writes in the Pisan Cantos, “the wind is part of the 
process / the rain is part of the process” (C LXXIV/455) – and this after the wind and rain 
had tortured him in his open air cage in the Pisan prison camp. Then later, in the Drafts 
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and Fragments, the wind appears again, where Pound implores “do not move / let the 
wind speak / that is paradise,” which comes right after the admission that “I lost my 
center / fighting the world” (C CXVII/822). That Pound twice, in the face of failure, 
conjures stillness and the autonomy of the wind, keeps his project (even as it collapses) in 
tune with his Confucian ethics. The vital passage in this regard is as follows:  
Le Paradis n’est pas artificeal 
nor does the martin against the tempest 
fly as in the calm air 
“like an arrow, and under bad government 
   like an arrow” 
“Missing the bull’s eye seeks the cause in himself” 
(C LXXVII/488) 
The final line in this quote is a quite direct paraphrase of a passage from Confucius, 
which holds that “there is an analogy between the man of breed and the archer. The 
archer who misses the bulls-eye turns and seeks the cause of his failure in himself.”354 
Coming as this passage does well into the Pisan Cantos, one obvious reading of this line 
is that the archer here is Pound, looking inwards to correct the failure that has placed him 
in such peril. Yet the context of the line suggests that we can take the reading even 
further. The echo of Douglas’s definition of the natural – “le Paradis n’est pas artificial” – 
and the image of the martin adjusting itself to the different kinds of wind together 
embody the paradoxes of an imperative like Pound’s.  
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The archer is not detached from nature, their shot is as subject to the wind, and its 
paradisal coherence, as any other entity. Yet the failure of the shot still remains the 
archer’s own, for like the martin they were expected to be in tune with nature, to sense 
the speed and the direction of the wind, and tilt their bow accordingly. Pound, as he 
would recognize, was not a demigod, and so could not bridge the gap between his politics 
and the natural world. He knows that this cohesion exists, and claims to be aware of it, 
but his attempts to represent this system in his poetry only end up embodying its 
contradictions: he knows the wind is there, and he pays attention to its force, but when his 
arrow turns from the target he is unable to incorporate its actions with the breeze. We 
may be reminded here of an observation from Emmanuel Levinas that seems to have 
prefigured Harman’s work on metaphor. “Things,” he writes, “refer to an inwardness as 
parts of the given world . . . caught up in the current of practice where their alterity is 
hardly noticeable. Art makes them stand out from the world and thus extracts them from 
this belongingness to a subject.”355  
To represent an object, Levinas holds, is to remove it from the world it occupied, 
disentangling it from its relations. As with Harman and Ortega’s metaphors, then, it is the 
very act of holding an object up, alone, for detailed scrutiny that serves to mystify it. But 
whereas for Harman this detachment arrives from the impossibility of exhausting an 
object via its relations, for Levinas it is precisely because of the relationality of objects 
that representation occludes them. These are, in a sense, natural and ecological 
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approaches to the ontology of representation – with Harman figuring objects as forever 
“away,” and withdrawn from knowledge, and Levinas reading them as highly integrated 
into their environments to the point that they become unknowable. Pound, following the 
logic of his imperative, finds himself in the middle of these two drives. In his distinct 
images he flirts with the possibility of their withdrawal, while in his flat and integrative 
politics he continues to valorize the individual and so remove his heroes from the very 
natural world to which their art and politics supposedly align. “No wind,” as he writes in 
Canto IV, “is the king’s wind” (C IV/16), invoking the wind-bag of Aeolus, which in the 
Odyssey so famously taunts Odysseus with his homecoming before blowing it all away. 
Such are the dangers of too quickly joining a force of nature with political might: too 
often, as you step up to the gates of paradise, its gales will blow and throw them shut 
across your nose.  
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Chapter 4  
The Semantic Ontology of Finnegans Wake: 
Reading as De-Mediation 
It depends upon what the meaning of the word “is” is. 
— Bill Clinton 
 
4.1 What “Is” is Not 
In a very important sense, there are no words in Finnegans Wake. What this “sense” 
amounts to will be the central topic of the present chapter, but provisionally I will say 
that the way in which Wake criticism and interpretation divides the symbols of the text 
(implicitly or, less often, explicitly) into both “words” and what Gabriel Renggli has 
appropriately called “non-words”356 is unfounded. The narrative and textual ontology of 
Finnegans Wake is flat, populated with non-words as far as the eye can read. The claim 
that “Finnegans Wake contains no words” might be somewhat surprising, since though 
the text is famously obscure and difficult even a perusal of the first lines reveals the 
presence of entities that seem like words: “riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s, from swerve 
of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth 
Castle and Environs.”357 Before even getting to the close analysis of the word/non-word 
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division and what its relation is to ontology, it ought to be clear at a glance that the line 
above, for all of its obscurity, does indeed contain words as the term is commonly 
understood. Indeed, these appear to be English words placed in the sentence as they 
would be in common English grammar: past, from, swerve, of, shore, to, bend . . . There 
are even recognizable names (Eve and Adam) and a place name that should be familiar to 
anyone who has visited Dublin (Howth Castle).  
 Other words, of course, are not so easily categorized – “riverrun,” for example – 
and so it can appear that the signifiers of the Wake can be split generally into the two 
categories, “words” and “non-words.” A word in Finnegans Wake does not generally call 
for special resolution. While of course scholars are attentive to its place in the larger 
patterns of signification in which each word participates (such as the way “Howth Castle 
and Environs” produces an instance of the HCE acronym) words in the Wake are seldom 
decomposed in the way that non-word portmanteaus tend to be. A word like “is” rarely 
receives the sort of attention that, for example, Umberto Eco lavishes on “sansglorians” 
(FW 4.7) in The Aesthetics of Chaosmos, which he resolves into the equation 
“sang+sans+glorians+sanglot+riant,”358 or like Derek Attridge gives “shuit” (FW 
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620.4), which he breaks down into “suit,” “shirt,” “shit,” and “chute,” among other 
things.359 This is also an attitude that we see in the much earlier work of Clive Hart, who 
writes that “the essential value of the pun or portmanteau-word in Finnegans Wake lies 
not in its elusive and suggestive qualities but in its capacity to compress much meaning 
into little space.”360 Indeed, this kind of analysis goes straight back to the coining of 
“portmanteau,” and perhaps its most famous example, in the poem “Jabberwocky” which 
Humpty Dumpty recites to Alice in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, and 
which begins: 
Twas brillig, and the slithy toves 
   Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: 
All mimsy were the borogoves, 
   And the mome raths outgrabe.361 
Humpty Dumpty glosses these “hard words” in much the same way that Joyceans have 
tended to gloss the non-words of Finnegans Wake: “Well, ‘slithy’ means ‘lithe and 
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slimy.’ ‘Lithe’ is the same as ‘active.’ You see it’s like a portmanteau – there are two 
meanings packed up into one word.”362 For Humpty Dumpty (as with, it seems, many 
Joyceans), non-words decompose into the words that form their primary elements, their 
strangeness resolving into clarity.  
 But while one can often see this scene offered as a clear definition of 
“portmanteau,” its larger context indicates that we should take care to use it suspiciously. 
As Humpty Dumpty says two pages earlier, “when I use a word . . . it means just what I 
choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”363 This declaration should be a red flag for 
Wake critics for a number of reasons, the most obvious being its brash declaration of the 
insuperability of authorial intent (a shaky ground at the best of times, and especially 
given the somewhat aleatoric nature of the Wake’s composition), and the way it plays 
into the larger HCE/Finn meta-myth of a patriarch’s rise and fall (in which Humpty 
Dumpty already participates in multiple ways). But the larger scene itself seems to 
undermine the portmanteau’s supposed unity. As Humpty Dumpty continues to explain 
the first verse of “Jabberwocky,” he is interrupted by Alice at the word “wabe”: 
“And ‘the wabe’ is the grass-plot round a sun-dial, I 
suppose?” said Alice, surprised at her own ingenuity. 
 “Of course it is. It’s called ‘wabe,’ you know, 
because it goes along way before it, and a long way behind 
it—” 
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 “And a long way on each side,” Alice added. 
 “Exactly so.”364 
The definition of “wabe” is not so much a combination of disparate words as it is a riddle. 
Alice is able to figure out its third characteristic because she notices that the first two can 
be expressed as “way before” and “way behind” and so makes the leap to “way 
beyond”365 (which suggests that Humpty Dumpty’s pronunciation of “wabe” resembles 
“way-be” rather than, say, “wade” or “wave”). That Alice is able to do this, however, 
destabilizes Humpty Dumpty’s authority, because it roots the definition of “wabe” in a 
signifying structure that can operate independently of him. A clever reader can not only 
figure out the riddle and the three senses that Humpty Dumpty had considered, but also 
develop further iterations that he seems not to have considered – like “way between” or 
“way beside.” “Wabe,” then, is not the sum of a limited set of linguistic elements, a 
knowable object that can be exhausted by a sufficiently close analysis, but rather a 
particular node in a network of relationships that exceeds and defies any individual 
reader’s attempt at exhaustiveness.  
In his analysis of the non-word “mardred,” from the phrase “the author, in fact, 
was mardred” (FW 517.11), Renggli comes to a very similar conclusion. After first 
marking the obvious connection to “murdered,” he asks: “How do we know that a murder 
has taken place? . . . we do not in fact know it. . . . the constellation of letters that form 
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‘mardred,’ is not a word, at least not in any readily recognizable language.”366 Renggli’s 
conclusion very much resembles that of Attridge following his reading of “shuit,” where 
he says that to call the term a “word” is “of course misleading, since it is precisely 
because it is not a word of the English language that it functions in the way that it 
does.”367 Thus, for the sake of our heuristic, temporary taxonomy of Wakeian terms, we 
can treat as an essential element of the non-word that of the potential for reducibility, of 
being dis-integrated into a set of lexical elements – a potential signaled by its status as a 
problem, or as a stoppage in the flow of interpretation. The trait of reducibility seems to 
arise from a given term’s relation to a pre-existing human language, much like how 
Humpty Dumpty’s portmanteaus all seem to reduce to words in modern English. 
Finnegans Wake is likewise closely related to English, though in a much more complex 
way. As Sam Slote has remarked, “in terms of basic critical orientation, the Wake is 
certainly not written in English . . . Perhaps it would be safer to say that it is written from 
English,”368 and Attridge has likewise observed that “a fundamental property of 
[Finnegans Wake is] its being more than one language at once.”369 But the English-ness 
of a particular word likely matters less than its being related to any language whatsoever.  
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The division between word and non-word therefore seems to be fairly 
straightforward. A non-word is something which does not exist in any linguistic system 
outside of the Wake, and which can by one means or another be resolved into a set of 
words. I use the word “resolve” deliberately, because in a certain kind of reading (Eco’s, 
for example) it is the function of analysis to explain and to “explain away” the non-word 
by essentially transforming it into a short-form for the combination of words that it 
“really” represents. The critic becomes like Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, listing the basic 
components of a non-word so to define its meaning once and for all. But as Renggli and 
Attridge make clear, it is Alice one ought to resemble instead – taking the non-word not 
as a mystery to explain, but rather as an invitation to explore the ways and contours of the 
Wakeian language game. Yet even this openness leaves the basic word/non-word split in 
place, since it recognizes this exegetic potential in only the “problematic” non-words not 
clearly part of any external language system. What I wish to attack here is the unspoken 
assumption that if one can gloss a given word as simply a term from English, French, 
Mandarin, Latin, Arabic, Romansch, Somali, Frisian, Cree, Korean, Basque, or what have 
you, then the kind of analysis we see granted to “sansglorians,” shuit,” and “mardred”370 
is either needless or unlikely to be fruitful.  
This issue brings us back to the book’s first lines, and in particular the phrase 
“commodius vicus.” “Commodius” both is and is not a “word” in the sense that I have 
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been using the term. To begin with, the recent corrected edition of Finnegans Wake 
released by Danis Rose and John O’Hanlon indicates that it is mis-spelled, with their 
edition presenting it as “commodious.”371 However, as the OED indicates, both of these 
are correct English words – and are in fact different variations of the same word, which 
means “advantageous, beneficial, profitable, of use” and also simply “convenient.” (And 
is, in keeping with Joyce’s “cloacal obsession,”372 related also to the word “commode.”) 
The -ius spelling that we see in the first edition is rarer, but it has still seen definite 
use.373 It is perhaps a fortuitous coincidence that the variation between these two versions 
of the term have no effect on its pronunciation, meaning that (in a manner similar to the 
word-play behind Derrida’s coinage, “différance”) the variation is purely textual. This 
silence contrasts with the doubling of the word “vicus,” which many readers quite 
logically take as an allusion to Giambattista Vico, whose historiographic philosophy is an 
important structuring element in the Wake. However, “vicus” is also a word in its own 
right – a Latin one, which the Oxford Latin Dictionary defines as “a group of dwellings” 
and “a block of houses, street, group of streets, etc., in a town, often forming a social or 
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administrative unit,” and which originates in the Greek “oikos” (“οἶκος”). (This 
connection to municipal units likely also connects the word to the “Vico Road, Dalkey” 
we encounter in the “Nestor” episode of Ulysses [U 2.25].) And, since “vicus” is a Latin 
word, it makes sense that we should read it with Latin pronunciation, which the 
dictionary provides as “uīcus.” The term’s status as a Latin word thus splits it, giving it a 
textual resemblance to “Vico” but not an auditory one. Given the importance of the 
sounds of words in Finnegans Wake, the common advice to read a section aloud if one 
finds it impenetrable, and the importance of sound and pronunciation to many of the 
Wake’s allusive patterns, this is not a division that we should take lightly. While one 
could argue that an etymological relation between “uīcus” (a spelling I will retain to 
indicate its pronunciation) and “Vico” would allow us to bring the philosopher in again 
through the back door, this still does not remove the division between text and sound, nor 
does it restore the obviousness that the allusion seems to have if we ignore the Latin 
pronunciation. In fact, it seems that to read the word at all we will have to ignore at least 
one of its signifying relations. 
But let us return to “commodi(o)us,” with which we have not yet finished. I add 
the O in brackets because, though I do not doubt that the alteration is well supported by 
the avant-texte, I question whether the existence of the word’s second version in the 
manuscripts ought to permanently remove the first version from the field of 
consideration. Consider, for instance, the term’s allusion to the Roman Emperor 
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Commodus, which Roland McHugh points out in his annotations.374 If it were the case 
that we were deriving this allusion from the textual resemblance alone, then the –ious 
spelling the new edition adopts would certainly weaken it. Yet the allusion clearly 
remains in the (unchanged) pronunciation of the word, as it does with the term’s wider 
context. As we see from the larger line, the “commodi(o)us vicus of recirculation” sends 
us “back to Howth Castle and Environs” – an instance of the HCE acronym with which 
Joyce identifies the presence of the book’s continually rising and falling patriarch, who 
manifests both in this lexical tag and in the appearance of any similar figure (Parnell, 
Moses, Napoleon, etc.). Commodus’s identity as an emperor assassinated by 
strangulation while taking a bath in CE 192 fits the model fairly well, but what clinches 
the association is his appearance later in the Wake, where he provides the acronym’s C: 
“Heliogobbleus and Commodus and Enobarbarus” (FW 157. 26-27). Of the several 
possible ways to read this section (for brevity’s sake I will not subject every passage of 
the Wake I analyze this kind of minute critique) we can see how “Heliogobbleus” 
resembles “Heliogabalus,” an alternate name for the Roman emperor Elagabalus, who 
ruled between CE 218 and 222. “Enobarbarus” can also refer to Lucius Domitius 
Ahenobarbus, more popularly known as the emperor Nero.375 All three emperors died by 
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assassination, which suggests that, in the “rise and fall” pattern of the HCE arc, this 
particular instance places its emphasis on the latter.  
We can already begin to see how these two “words,” when placed under close 
scrutiny, take on many of the traits of the Wake’s non-word portmanteaus, particularly in 
the way that portmanteaus resist “the impression of a carefully arranged context or of a 
successfully engineered verbal coincidence [as in a pun].”376 What is troubling here is 
not that these words can be read in multiple ways, or that their meanings split off in 
multiple directions, but that their multiple readings seem to oppose each other. We are 
tempted in equal measure to resolve “commodius” as “Commodus,” as befitting the 
allusion, and as “commodious,” as befitting the textual history, but doing so means 
deliberately privileging one layer of signification over the other. A similar problem 
occurs with “vicus” – which links up to “Vico” either closely or tenuously depending on 
whether we privilege its textual or auditory components, which itself partially depends on 
whether we consider it to be a word at all. None of this even gets to the issue of how we 
ought to read the words in conjunction. Shall we gloss it as “commodious uīcus” (a 
village that is homely and comfortable), “Commodus’s uīcus” (Commodus’s hometown), 
“commodious Vico” (reflecting the philosopher’s usefulness to Joyce’s project), or 
perhaps as something else entirely? To choose any one reading means deciding to 
privilege one set of relations over another, and more importantly means ignoring the 
specific form of the terms as we encounter them on the page. The Wake’s “vicus” does 
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not “really” mean “Vico,” or “uīcus,” or any of the other glosses we may supply it. 
Likewise, even my earlier point about “commodius” being an English word ignores its 
complex and historically specific usage history, and likewise the fact that, given 
Finnegans Wake’s vast historical and linguistic range, we ought to be attentive to the 
multiple forms of English that have existed over time.377 
The central issue of the word/non-word division thus seems to be that the 
wordiness of a Wakeian word dissolves under a sufficient degree of scrutiny. Words in 
Finnegans Wake are as withdrawn and inexhaustible as non-words, and for this reason 
the division between them is not actually meaningful. In few places do we see this 
problem better than in the word “is.” The present tense of the verb “to be” is one of the 
most common words in the English language, and it is so small and so simple as to be 
seemingly atomic, indivisible, and thus exhaustible by analysis. But the language of the 
Wake contains no atoms, as we can see in two related instances of “is,” in “even when 
Oldsire is Dead to the World” (FW 105.29) and “the citye of Is is issuant” (FW 601.5). A 
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scan of these two lines reveals two odd but still readable phrases, with “Oldsire” and “Is” 
functioning as proper nouns operating as normal (and with “Oldsire” – i.e. “old father” – 
alluding to the “old father, old artificer” Stephen Dedalus apostrophizes at the end of A 
Portrait378). In both of these lines, the “is” functions as it does in standard English, and 
one can generate perfectly coherent and interesting readings which treat the “is” at face 
value.  
The complexity arrives by a similar means as it did with “commodius vicus,” by 
way of the same problem, that being how, as Derrida writes, “the distinction between 
grapheme and the empirical body of the corresponding graphic sign separates an inside of 
phenomenological consciousness and the outside of the world.”379 There is a split 
between the “empirical” form of a given sign and its “ideal” – one that we might be 
tempted to see as between what a word “looks like” and what it “is.” It is precisely the 
same mistake that leads us to say that “vicus” is “supposed to be” “Vico” or “uīcus” or 
something else, while at the same time ignoring the specificity of the sign on the page. 
Thus, we might also be tempted to read “Oldsire is” and “Is is” as, respectively, the 
Egyptian gods “Osiris” and “Isis,” and we would do so with as much ease and 
justification as we earlier read “Oldsire” as “old father.” But to do either would be to 
reduce the meaning of the “is” to conform to a single network of signification, to choose 
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either its graphic form or its audible one and set that particular construction above the 
rest. It is in this sense that we can see how the Wake “simultaneously makes both possible 
and impossible the search for truth understood as proximal presence in the text.”380  
Thus, the phrase “there are no words in Finnegans Wake” is best understood as a 
maxim enjoining against the elision of any given sign’s empirical and contextual 
specificity. All signs in Finnegans Wake are basically undecidable, in that the act of 
reading them causes the condensation of one particular set of relations into a calcified 
interpretation that, if one is not careful, may come to masquerade as the true and final 
reading of a word. Nowhere is this sort of reading more dangerous than with what we 
might commonly take to be words, simply because the obviousness of the reading. These 
different readings are not only multiple, but irreconcilable, meaning that a given sign 
cannot simply be disintegrated into its component parts, as we see Eco try to do. To 
produce a reading is invariably to decide which lines of connection shall take precedence 
over the others, a decision that ultimately arises from the act of reading rather than 
anything in the text.  
4.2 What’s What when Everything is Something Else? 
[I]f Being is being-with, then it is, in its being-with, the 
“with” that constitutes Being; the with is not simply an 
addition. 
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— Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural381 
A fair question at this point would be what all this discussion of words and non-words is 
leading to. After all, am I not dangerously close to the problem articulated (though not 
endorsed) by Fritz Senn, in which one “stop[s] at every word and worrie[s] at its 
philological justification . . . [so that one can] never even envisage such a thing as 
Finnegans Wake, much more than the sum of its mysterious pars”?382 It is in avoiding 
this trap and linking my word-level analysis to broader critical questions of what “such a 
thing as Finnegans Wake” amounts to that I will approach what is the key issue of this 
chapter, that being to what extent and in what way anything can be said to exist within 
the structure of the Wake. The above section should be seen as a necessary prologue to 
this deeper analysis. While anyone well-read in Joyce criticism will be aware of how 
Finnegans Wake enacts and intensifies the processes of semantic displacement 
underlying signification generally,383 the point that I have been trying to emphasize is 
that what we are dealing with is not simply a single layer of relations that, once 
sufficiently enumerated, can be “understood,” but rather several contradictory, 
intersecting layers that cannot be reconciled with each other. Importantly, these sets of 
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relations extend throughout the book, incorporating both larger thematic patterns and 
repeated words (as we saw with the allusion to Commodus) as well as the immediate 
semantic context of the sign.  
 This undecidability leads to several problems with even referring to the characters 
and events that would form the basis of a more macroscopic reading of the text. Indeed, 
as Finn Fordham has written, the Wake’s characters “are carriers of Joyce’s exercises in 
style, rather than self-consistent entities.”384 Finnegans Wake’s radical undermining of 
character has in this manner largely been understood and articulated as a kind of 
dissolution, in which the fixed form of a fictional character disintegrates upon contact 
with the text, being pulled along without form or character like so much silt in the Liffey. 
I do not necessarily consider this description inaccurate so much as incomplete. While it 
acknowledges the breakdown of character as we normally understand it, the dissolution 
metaphor does not provide us with direction towards describing what the Wake actually 
does – and something similar could be said for our understanding of what Finnegans 
Wake does with other basic narratological structures, like plot. I began this chapter with 
my analysis of the non-word because it shows the problem in miniature. The basic 
problems, in all of these cases, includes the failure to treat the macrocosm and the 
microcosm on equal terms, along with the related failure to remain cognizant of the 
specificity of a given sign while still attending to the larger patterns of signification in 
which it participates.  
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 How does one approach Finnegans Wake in this way? My point of access comes 
in the form of three related figures: Giordano Bruno, Nicholas Cusanus (AKA Nicholas 
of Cusa), and Graham Harman. Bruno and Cusanus’s connections to the Wake are 
already well-known while Harman’s usefulness here requires explanation, so I will begin 
with him. At the very end of Tool-Being, the text in which he introduced his Object 
Oriented Ontology, Harman alluded to a problem that could have disastrous effects for 
his burgeoning metaphysics: after spending his book describing a world of objects 
circumscribed by their own mutual withdrawal, the impoverishment of their interactions 
with other entities implied by Harman’s generalization of Heidegger’s tool analysis to all 
object relations, Harman reached the conclusion that his system if taken to its logical 
conclusions would proscribe any direct inter-object collisions. “The world,” as he writes, 
“has been said to contain no relations – nothing other than entities. But entities are always 
primarily withdrawn tool-beings, and as such, they are sealed away in a vacuum devoid 
of all relation. . . . Any contact between distinct entities would seem impossible.”385 An 
object, for Harman, is anything that withdraws. So the human subject and the hammer are 
objects, but so is the human-hammer synthesis, as well as the synthesis of the hammer’s 
handle and its head. Every relation is, for Harman, actually an object – a definition that 
proceeds along an infinite regress. At this point, OOO seems at risk of invoking a kind of 
Zeno’s paradox against itself, permanently foreclosing any relations between objects, just 
as Zeno foreclosed their motion.  
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 To remedy this problem, Harman makes a strange gambit, introducing 
occasionalism into his system. The use of this term was possibly a mistake, since (as 
Harman points out) his is not the theistic occasionalism of Al-Ghazali or Malebranche. 
Whereas their occasionalist philosophies posited an omnipotent god whose infinite power 
subsumes all causation within itself, so that “the states of bodies and minds are only so-
called secondary causes which ‘occasion’ or incite the primary cause, God, to act,”386 
Harman’s occasionalism was far more limited and “local.”387 Tool-Being does not fully 
explore the concept, but instead simply drops it in on the final pages to function like a 
metaphysical cheat code to nullify a formerly intractable problem. The development 
would come later, in Guerilla Metaphysics and in several subsequent essays, at which 
point he sensibly adopted the more accurate name “vicarious causation.” Harman’s key 
point is that all relations must occur though some form of mediation, that these 
mediations themselves constitute objects, and that since objects are supposed to be 
inexhaustible these mediations themselves require further mediations, a state that (in the 
absence of the je ne sais quoi of vicarious cause) would imply that all relation was 
impossible. In the later book, vicarious causation re-appears as OOO’s “most pivotal 
issue,”388 not only because it introduces into Harman’s metaphysics a question not unlike 
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the one Hume posed in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (the Kantian 
aftermath of which,389 fittingly, Harman has long attempted to overcome) but also 
because the problem extends to the composition of objects themselves. As Harman 
explains in a later essay, “relations never encounter the autonomous reality of their 
components,”390 and since all relations, for Harman, themselves create new objects, and 
since his system excludes any kind of “atomic” object that would be invisible and fully 
apprehensible by others, then all objects are themselves constructed out of smaller objects 
whose relations are just as questionable as any other. Objects cannot touch, cannot 
combine, cannot form themselves in any coherent way – and yet Harman’s system can 
only work if they somehow do.  
 Harman has never provided a coherent, plausible explanation of what vicarious 
cause is, what it does, how it works, or where it comes from – and as much as he denies 
it, the deus ex machina quality of the interjection is inescapable. In Guerilla Metaphysics, 
he attempts to offer this mystery up as a site for future philosophical speculation and 
research, but he has not yet foreclosed the possibility that vicarious cause simply indexes 
a fatal contradiction in his system. However, though I have not come here to praise 
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Harman, neither have I come to bury him.391 OOO is interesting not because it provides a 
fully coherent and exhaustive metaphysical system that one can “apply” to Finnegans 
Wake (or any other literary work) but because the contours of its flaws and limitations 
open up several fascinating critical and philosophical questions. For example, in an essay 
from 2010, Harman explains how vicarious causation might work with the following 
comparison:  
There needs to be some way for objects to relate without 
relating. This might sound impossible, but analogous 
situations already exist in other spheres. Consider the case 
of language. Here we are not just able to say something 
openly or not say it at all – there is also the third option of 
alluding to it . . . One can call someone an Olympic victor 
without quite saying so, simply by saying that he had been 
three times crowned with a wreath.392 
The particular allusion to which Harman alludes comes from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where 
it is used to show that familiar propositions do not need to be described in their full 
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detail: “to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, it 
is enough to say ‘For he has been victor in the Olympic games.’”393 
 Harman’s purpose in this particular essay is not merely to describe what vicarious 
causation is, but also to show that it can be unidirectional – or, as he puts it, “causation is 
never reciprocal except by accident.”394 Unfortunately, the nature of the example is such 
that it immediately undermines his point. After all, in Aristotle’s day the wreath was the 
normal and standard award given to Olympic athletes, but for the modern Olympics gold 
medals have been the norm since the 1904 games in St. Louis. Thus, if we look to the 
audience of the (as of this writing) most recent games in Pyeongchang, we can be 
confident that not a single person among them would have any memory of an Olympic 
winner receiving a wreath. Certainly there are many who know the history of the games 
well enough to be aware of the old prizes, but the information is by no means widespread 
enough today for “she won an Olympic event” to be reliably synonymous with “she 
received a wreath.” The example suggests that relations by allusion are symmetrical, in 
that the categories of “Olympian” and “has won a wreath” become linked through the 
repeated invocation of their overlap, and that this symmetricity only becomes apparent 
over time, and is not visible at the level of an instant. This example, first of all, points to 
one possible way that OOO could save itself: that being the development of a more 
rigorous conception of temporality. Harman’s discussions of time tend to be fairly 
schematic, and occur mostly in the context of his attempts to re-consider Heidegger’s 
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notion of the fourfold.395 His summaries of inter-object relations, however, all seem to 
occur within instants, focusing on the moment of contact to the exclusion of all else. 
Since this limitation seems to largely extend from a lack of consideration rather than any 
constituent a-temporality within the system, it is possible that further development would 
permit OOO to dig itself out of its hole.  
 The reciprocity of relation, and the absence of purely instantaneous relations, also 
points to the manner in which vicarious causation – and in particular its emphasis on 
mediation – becomes useful for my analysis of the Wake. So I may explain how, let us 
imagine two speeding cars colliding head-on in the middle of an otherwise empty 
intersection. It is not merely the case that (if we follow Harman) the two car-objects will 
themselves, at the moment of collision, form a larger object from their instantaneous 
interaction (however it may be mediated), but rather that they will continue during every 
point of time to disassemble and reassemble a vast number of other relational objects as 
their internal components shift and change their relations. The back window of Car A 
ceases to exist as its components shatter into pieces, which themselves will form a new 
object consisting of a set of falling glass shards. Those shards will remain connected 
vicariously to both Car A, from which they fell, and Car B, without which the crash 
would not have occurred. But – importantly – the object Car A-Car B-shards remains for 
Harman completely distinct from, say, the object Car A-Car B-dented bumper, despite 
the fact that both of these relational objects themselves form part of the larger object that 
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is the car crash. And I say “both” of these objects, despite the overlap between them, 
because according to OOO they would still withdraw from each other even though they 
share many of the same components. It would seem then that in addition to an infinite 
regress, OOO also has to deal with an infinite dispersal, as the sheer vastness of the 
relations occurring in any complex physical event would lead to the formation of an 
unfathomable number of relational objects, spread out across the full mass the event-
object and incorporating every smaller object within it many times over. This dispersal 
would also continuously re-occur over time – with the relational object of the car crash at 
T1, T2, and T3
396 actually amounting to three completely unique and distinct objects 
(whose relation across time would itself constitute another object).  
 Though Harman is quite clear about his desire to avoid a purely relational 
ontology like the one he sees in Latour,397 the centrality of vicarious cause in OOO as, it 
seems, the prime unknown of the system, means that thinking with OOO invariably 
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becomes a matter of thinking with and through relations. Furthermore, it is not despite, 
but because of the closed-off nature of Harman’s objects, that relation takes the form of 
interpenetration, where two objects relate by sharing components. While in the example 
above Car A is present in both objects, in each relation Car A is apprehended by its co-
actors in a different manner, withdrawing in a configuration unique to every touch. It is 
therefore multiple, taking on a unique relational existence across every larger object in 
which it is a part (something that would also be true of each of its components, 
downwards to infinity). Since the objects “internal” to a larger object are likewise 
independent entities, they too can enter into relations which would themselves form new 
objects and that would therefore enter into an interpenetrative relationship with the 
above-mentioned larger object.398 What we end up with is an ontological system roughly 
(though by no means exactly) comparable to Leibniz’s monadology, but with the location 
and nature of the hidden elements externalized. While for Leibniz, all objects are 
identical monads whose essential sameness is hidden behind the accidental qualities 
visible to our impoverished perception – i.e. the similarities are hidden “within” the 
object and are only perceivable by an omniscient God – Harman’s system implies a state 
in which every object is continually intersecting with every other through a complex web 
of causal relations, most of which is invisible. The individual hammer I hold in my hand 
thus appears to be independent, singular, and coherent because of the poverty of my 
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perception, and the breaking of the hammer reveals to me the existence of interior 
relations that intersect with the surrounding world in ways previously unknown.  
It is in this way that the breakdown of vicarious cause into a relational ontology 
can allow us to understand how the linguistic and narrative entities of the Wake function. 
As we have seen above, the non-words of the Wake likewise interpenetrate each other, 
with each one being part of multiple and contradictory sets of relations that permit 
mutually-exclusive interpretations. Despite his frequent criticisms of Derrida, when the 
implications of Harman’s system are properly teased out, they clearly resemble an 
ontologized form of the linguistic play of différance. Whereas for Derrida, “every 
concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other 
concepts, by means of the systemic play of differences,”399 in OOO all objects become 
engaged with other objects in a network of inter-object relations that ultimately obscure 
the original object’s self-identity. So too in the Wake, where (as I will describe in more 
detail below) every entity can only be encountered through mediation with another entity, 
in which no particular instance of mediation exhausts the entities involved, and in which 
the sum total of the medial relations creates contradictory but internally consistent images 
that cannot be resolved to a single essential presence. While Harman is emphatic that he 
believes that all objects have an “autonomous essence”400 – one of the many ways in 
which his system resembles that of Aristotle – given the problems caused by vicarious 
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causation, I fail to see how these essences would actually arise, save for perhaps in a 
completely inaccessible (and dare I say “noumenal”?) object-in-itself that Harman’s 
ontology explicitly forecloses from relation. Instead, it is more useful and instructive to 
understand any given object (like any given non-word) as multiply-present, in that it has 
several independently-operating “phenomenal” existences created by the inability of each 
interaction to exhaust it – much like how I “perceive” a hammer quite differently than 
does the nail it strikes.  
Returning now to Finnegans Wake, while this critique of Harman’s ontology does 
point to how we might generalize the earlier word-level analysis of the Wake into a 
conception of its abstract structure and its treatment of plot and character, it does not 
show how we might discern the relationship between different related narrative objects. 
A naive OOO reading of, for example, the relationship between Parnell and HCE might 
direct us towards metaphors of building blocks and containment. That is, while Parnell 
and HCE are, in Finnegans Wake, independent objects just like any other, HCE is 
“bigger,” being “made of” not only Parnell, but all the similar figures who populate the 
book. Though there is not yet any significant literature on OOO and Joyce, we do see 
readings that come to similar conclusions in, for example, Harry Burrell’s Narrative 
Design in Finnegans Wake, which holds that “to understand Finnegans Wake readers 
must maintain a mindset that what they are apprehending is fundamentally nothing but 
the [Biblical] Fall story with all the other levels of meaning and reference grafted onto 
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and embellishing it.”401 But metaphors of containment can be misleading, since they risk 
the implication that the parts can be determined by the whole, just as metaphors of 
construction can result in the equally misleading notion that it is the whole that 
determines the parts. While it is perfectly reasonable to see in the 
“commodi(o)us”/Commodus relationship (for example) the appearance of an HCE-like 
figure, we cannot let this connection blot out the sign’s other relations. We must 
understand the relationship between different, interpenetrative levels of signification in 
such a way that we can appreciate the wide-scale networks of relations that crisscross the 
text while also paying due attention to the specificity and singularity402 of the individual 
sign before our eyes. And it is Bruno who shall show us how this can be done.  
Bruno’s place in Joyce scholarship has tended to be spotty and non-committal. 
While he appears in Samuel Beckett’s highly influential essay “Dante... Bruno. Vico.. 
Joyce,”403 he serves as far more of a bit player than his position in the title would suggest 
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– most of the essay concerns Joyce’s relationship to Vico, while only a small portion of it 
directly discusses Dante and Bruno.404 Joyce scholarship has tended to follow a similar 
pattern: of the three writers whose names precede Joyce in the essay’s title, it is Vico by 
far whose relationship to the Wake has received the most attention. Likewise, when Joyce 
scholarship talks about Nicholas Cusanus at all, it is almost always in relation to Bruno, 
with the relationship summarized in terms of a direct line of influence. For example, 
Donald Phillip Verene writes that “Bruno’s conception of the infinite as well as his 
principle of the coincidence of contraries have their origin in Cusanus’s famous little 
treatise, De docta ignorantia [On Learned Ignorance].”405 Similarly, as Ingrid D. 
Rowland writes in her biography of Bruno, the Nolan “clearly drew his belief in infinite 
worlds, and a good deal else, from . . . Nicholas of Cusa.”406 While neither of these 
summaries are, strictly speaking, inaccurate, they gloss over an important way in which 
Bruno and Cusanus conceptualized the relationship between infinity and the coincidence 
of contraries.  
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In On Learned Ignorance, Cusanus articulates a philosophical position that would 
later be known as pantheism – one that would receive its most thorough and systematic 
articulation in Spinoza’s Ethics (which clearly bears the mark of Bruno’s influence407). 
Pantheism is a theology that treats the divine as fully immanent to the natural world.408 It 
is a position we see, for example, in Spinoza’s formulation of “God, or Nature,” which 
treats the two entities as logically equivalent.409 But Cusanus’s pantheism is more 
fraught, oscillating at times between a pantheism like Spinoza’s, in which there is no real 
distinction between nature and the divine, and one in which God can still be conceived as 
an independent entity, one that cannot simply be derived from the natural world.410 As 
Eugene Thacker writes, Cusanus “is caught between a fully immanent pantheism – a pure 
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immanence of supernatural and natural, God and world – and a tempered, transcendental 
pantheism . . . in which God, as absolute maximum, transcends the world by its very 
encompassing.”411 For Cusanus, as with Bruno, contrary terms can be coincident as a 
result of their encompassing within an infinite entity, the “one absolutely maximum” 
which “exists in itself as eternally, equally, and unchangeably the same.”412 For Bruno, 
who in following (and advancing beyond) the work of Copernicus was able to imagine 
that the universe was itself infinite, no higher transcendence is necessary for this 
coincidence within the infinite to be possible.413  
Bruno’s more immanent, materialist pantheism is more similar to what we 
encounter in Finnegans Wake for quite a few reasons. We of course counter his famous 
decentering of the universe, such as the kind we see in The Ash Wednesday Supper, 
where Bruno extends Copernicus’s critique of geocentrism to claim not only that the 
Earth is not at the center of the universe, but that the universe in fact has no center, and 
that there are multiple Earth-like planets besides.414 But, in a manner not unlike what we 
see in Harman, this immanence leads to an obsession with mediation. As we see in 
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Cause, Principle, and Unity, the argument that an unchanging divinity is present in all 
things leads to the question of how change and alteration is possible. Whereas in OOO 
the flattening of ontological relations leads to an implied stasis by cutting off all objects 
from each other so to make causal connections impossible, the pantheistic flattening that 
Bruno embraces instead squashes change by subsuming disparity and difference into an 
omnipresent infinity. But Bruno has a solution: 
[M]utation is not striving for another being, but for another 
mode of being. And this is the difference between the 
universe and the things of the universe: for the universe 
contains all beings and all modes of being, while each thing 
of the universe possesses all being but not all modes of 
being. Each thing cannot possess, in all act, all particulars 
and accidents . . . outside each one of them there exits an 
infinity of other things. . . . Understand, therefore, that each 
single thing is one, but not in the same way.415 
That is to say, though every entity is permeated by the infinite, each remains a singular 
finite thing that cannot itself express the boundlessness to which it is linked. Thus, 
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entities can vary in their particular expressions of being, as seen through their interactions 
with other things.416  
 This relationship between infinite being and finite expression leads Bruno to an 
obsession with mediation and interposition. Everything that interacts seems to do so 
through an intermediary, and every cause must be multiple, heterogeneous, branching off 
into byways of whys and hows and wherefores. We see this medial obsession, for 
example, in his essay “On Magic,” where Bruno combines his cosmology with his 
interest in occultism, alchemy, and Hermeticism. In the process of arguing that celestial 
events are able to influence events on Earth  – an argument that rests on the claim that 
“there is a descent from God through the world to animals, and an ascent from animals 
through the world to God”417 – Bruno traces a ladder stretching from God through 
planets and stars, elements, compounds, the senses, the soul, and finally the body 
itself.418 Bruno’s ontology requires this linkage because for him, as with Harman, 
causation as we normally understand it is impossible, since (as we saw earlier) the fact 
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that objects are “limited and circumscribed by their surface” (i.e. are finite) means that 
they cannot act directly on each other, meaning that instead “all action comes from 
quality and form and ultimately from soul.”419 Thus, for Bruno (and unlike Cusanus), 
God does not take the form of a super-entity that can be conceived of independently of 
the world it occupies, but rather “reaches each object through its center” and “governs it 
from the inside” without transcending it.420 
 It is important to emphasize the everydayness of these relations, the fact that 
despite involving what might seem like grand, transcendent events, it is ultimately in the 
mundane that this ontology manifests. It is this mundanity that we encounter in Bruno’s 
dialogue The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, during a brief dalliance with 
occasionalism where we see Mercury executing a command from Jove. An occasionalist 
god, Jove must dictate every event down to the most minute, and as befitting a work by 
Bruno these commands come through the mediation of a messenger. The list of 
Mercury’s tasks – which is quite lengthy – is notable for its mundane details, like the 
decree that “Vasta, the wife of Albenzio, while she tries to curl the hair on her temples, 
shall burn fifty-seven of them because she overheated her iron,”421 that “two hundred 
fifty-two maggots be born out of the dung of Albenzio’s ox; that of these, fourteen be 
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trampled upon and killed by Albenzio’s foot; that twenty-six of them die from being 
turned upside down; [and] that twenty-two live in a cavern,”422 and that “the cuckoo 
should be heard singing from Starza, and that he must ‘cuckoo’ neither more nor less than 
twelve times.”423 As the long, humorous, almost Joycean list goes on, we should at no 
point forget that each of these events is the manifestation of a singular and infinite divine 
will, which arises from “one simple and singular act, [with which Jove] creates all of the 
past, present, and future.”424 Thus, mundanity, for Bruno, is not the opposite of the 
divine, but rather the surest means of encountering it.  
 As we turn back to Joyce and to Finnegans Wake, it is this relationship between 
interpenetration and the coincidence of the macroscopic with the microscopic that we 
should keep in mind. As Donald Phillip Verene sees in his analysis of Bruno’s role in the 
Wake, with the opposing brothers Shem and Shaun we see “a dialectic that coincides at 
the human level, unlike the opposites of Cusanus that can be reconciled only at the level 
of divine being, they are a twone [sic] that is wholly accessible to us.”425 It is the greater 
immanence of his philosophy that makes Bruno key to understanding the role of the 
coincidence of contraries in the linguistic and ontological structure of Finnegans Wake, 
and it is likewise this immanence that makes Bruno an erstwhile predecessor to Harman. 
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It is notable that both philosophers posit that objects possess an inaccessible “inside” that 
cannot be exhausted by their relations – for Harman because of the implications of 
Heidegger’s tool analysis, and for Bruno because each object takes part in the infinity of 
the universe despite also being bounded and finite. Likewise, in the work of both 
philosophers boundedness and inexhaustibility come paired with multiplication and 
interpenetrability. In Harman, the distinctness of each object as it is apprehended by other 
nearby objects – an apprehension that leads to the creation of larger objects (which I have 
been distinguishing from their components with the term “relational,” though it is not 
Harman’s) – means that an object’s role and apprehension will be different in every 
larger relational object in which it participates. Likewise, the infinite regress of mediation 
that vicarious causation implies means not only that every object has a boundless number 
of components, but also (because these components are themselves objects) that each one 
of them may enter into relations independently of the object of which they are a part. 
Thus, every object, through its components, is criss-crossed by other relational objects 
that take part in one or more of its components. For Bruno, the multiplication and 
interpenetration is far simpler. Since every entity contains within it the infinity of the 
universe, and because this infinity is such that it comprehends all aspects of existence, 
including (as with Cusanus) opposing ones, then each entity plays a part in the other’s 
existence by way of its role in the universe’s immanent pantheism. It is for this reason 
that Bruno takes alchemy and astrology seriously (as he does in “On Magic”), since both 
systems depend on a basic linkage between “higher” and “lower” cosmological entities.  
 It is also for these reasons that, when understanding character in Finnegans Wake, 
we avoid the employment of transcendent categories, such as what we encounter in 
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readings of the Wake in terms of Biblical typology,426 in which the particulars of a given 
story are subsumed into larger narrative patterns that explain and ultimately supersede the 
original specificity. “Howth Castle and Environs” may appear to be a “type” of HCE, but 
to read it in that framework ignores the trajectory that the opening line takes us from 
Adam and Eve’s church in central Dublin to Howth Castle on its outskirts – indicating 
that the “rivverrun” of the tidal river Liffey is at that moment washing outwards to the 
sea, bringing full circle the water that had earlier been carried inwards on the previous 
tide, and so implying at the first line the “recirculation” that would characterize the entire 
book. It is not the case that a Brunonian, interpenetrative reading of this line would 
privilege the river over the type, but rather that such a reading would recognize the 
intersection of both sets of relations at the sign of “Howth Castle and Environs,” one 
which renders them both immanent to that sign and thus on an equal narrative and lexical 
footing with smaller-scale relations, such as that between the phrase and the basic syntax 
of the sentence.  
4.3 Brown, Nolan, and The Nolan 
My earlier argument, and my alignment of OOO’s implications with the Brunonian 
ontology structuring much of the Wake, implies a complex and difficult relationship 
between a phrase or non-word in Finnegans Wake and the larger networks that, like any 
word, lend it its meaning and significance. To read Finnegans Wake is to pay attention to 
reversals, and nowhere is Bruno’s contribution more misunderstood than in his role in the 
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reversal between categories and the elements that make them. Let us consider, for 
example, Bruno’s preferred moniker, “The Nolan” (after his birthplace Nola, a city near 
Naples). In his early essay “The Day of the Rabblement,” Joyce picked up on this usage, 
as indicated by the opening line: “no man, said the Nolan, can be a lover of the true and 
the good unless he abhors the multitude.”427 This usage would in Finnegans Wake evolve 
into a common pattern of alluding to Bruno of Nola by way of the Dublin bookseller 
Brown and Nolan. To list a few instances, we see such variations as “O’Bruin’s 
polerpasse at Noolan” (FW 128.25-26), “B. Rohan meets N. Ohlan” (FW 251.33-34), and 
“Browne yet Noland” (FW 599.23). The “yet” in the last example points to an important 
effect of Joyce deferring “Bruno of Nola” off to “Brown and Nolan” – splitting supposed 
unity of Bruno’s identity into two parts, which may then be placed in opposition despite 
ostensibly being different elements of the same person. It is an effect we see, for instance, 
in III.3, where we encounter the “dearly beloved brethren: Bruno and Nola” – here 
playing the parts of Shem and Shaun, who, as the “dearly beloved” implies, may also be 
married – who are “equal and opposite brunoipso, id est, eternally provoking alio 
opposite equally as provoked as Bruno at being eternally opposed by Nola” (FW 488.4-
11). Bruno, then, is the Nolan, Brown and Nolan, Bruno of Nola, both Shem and Shaun, 
and also a huge number of minutely different yet clearly distinguishable manifestations 
besides. No wonder Joyce has him at war with himself!  
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 It is clear then that by adopting Bruno’s use of “The Nolan,” Joyce was able, first, 
to grant Bruno a doubled and incomplete presence in the Wake, one which renders the 
common signifier “Bruno” incapable of pointing to its usual referent unless 
countersigned by its double (and vice versa). Second, this splitting permits Joyce a great 
deal of leeway in how he incorporates other characters and identities with the name.428 
Splitting Bruno in half and pitting his identities against each other instantly makes them 
resemble Shem and Shaun, and by extension all of the variant forms in which Shem and 
Shaun appear. It also turns the name of the Italian philosopher into an allusion to a 
particular place in Dublin, the center of the Joycean universe but a place that Bruno 
himself never visited. These three intersections pose a problem for critics of Finnegans 
Wake very much like the one we encountered earlier with “commodius vicus”: each 
instance of a Brown and Nolan variant gestures in different ways to multiple larger 
categories at once, each of which offers us the potential to explain away and “overmine” 
the text. But despite gaining its significance through its relations to other parts of the 
book, no particular sign can be exhaustively described simply by summing up its 
relations. No matter how hard one squints, “Browne yet Noland” will never magically 
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transform into “Brown and Nolan” or “Bruno the Nolan,” any less than “mardred” will 
become “murdered” or “shuit” will become “suit.”  
 This problem of course raises the question of what relation exists between 
categories and their elements in Finnegans Wake. Though scholars have long (and 
usually for good reasons) read particular textual arrangements consistently in terms of 
one of the book’s primary figures – and I confess that the margins of my own copy of the 
Wake are well decorated with HCEs, ALPs, and other similar tags – the question of what 
it is critics are actually doing when they invoke these meta-characters in their analysis of 
a passage has not yet been adequately explored. To approach this problem, I will extend 
the above analysis of Bruno’s name, as well as my critique of his and Harman’s 
philosophies, to a reading of a story often read as an instance of the Shem/Shaun subplot 
– that being the fable of “The Ondt and the Gracehoper” (FW 414.16-419.10). 
 The story, told to the artistic and free-spirited Shem the Penman by his 
conservative and conventional brother Shaun the Post, is in its basic outline a re-telling of 
Aesop’s fable of “The Ant and the Grasshopper.” In particular, it is a revision of the 1912 
translation by V.S. Vernon Jones, which Joyce owned.429 Since, like all of Aesop’s 
fables, it is quite short, I will quote the translation in its entirety: 
THE GRASSHOPPER AND THE ANTS 
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One fine day in winter some ants were busy drying their 
store of corn, which had got rather damp during a long spell 
of rain. Presently up came a Grasshopper and begged them 
to spare a few grains, “For,” she said, “I’m simply 
starving.” The Ants stopped work for a moment, though 
this was against their principles. “May we ask,” said they, 
“what you were doing with yourself all last summer? Why 
didn’t you collect a store of food for the winter?” “The fact 
is,” replied the Grasshopper, “I was so busy singing that I 
hadn’t the time.” “If you spent the summer singing,” 
replied the Ants, “you can’t do better than spend the winter 
dancing.” And they chuckled and went on with their 
work.430 
There are a number of reasons why Joyce would likely have found this particular version 
of the story interesting, the first of which being Jones’s decision to make the tale about 
multiple ants speaking to a single grasshopper. As far as I have been able to tell this is 
Jones’s own invention: though Jones’s edition does not list the specific version of the 
fables he bases his translation on, G.K. Chesterton’s introduction to the book suggests 
that Jones was translating out of the version collected by Babrius,431 a Roman poet from 
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the third century CE whose surviving work consists of 123 fables (originally 160) written 
in Greek. A glance at the Loeb edition of the fable reveals that it is only a single ant 
(“μύρμηξ”) who turns the Grasshopper (or in this version, a cicada) away, rather than a 
team of them.432  
 This shift, though subtle, is significant given the manner in which fables often 
treat their animals not as characters, but as types. The tendency is reflected in the stories’ 
titles and their use of proper nouns – it is, after all, “The Fox and the Grapes” as opposed 
to “A Fox and Some Grapes.” I do not imagine that we are expected to believe that all of 
these stories with foxes in them are about the same fox, who perhaps Aesop had once 
spent the day following around, taking note of everything it did. Rather, as Laura Gibbs 
writes, “the characters in Aesop’s fables . . . are still basically generic representatives of 
their species; they have not yet become specific individuals.”433 The genericizing of the 
animals in Aesop then provides a useful counter-example to the appearance of those same 
animals in Joyce’s fables in Finnegans Wake. In both “The Ondt and the Gracehoper” 
and the other major fable, “The Mooske and the Gripes” (a re-working of “The Fox and 
the Grapes”), Joyce expands on and multiplies the characters, giving them internal 
divisions and individuality quite unlike what they have in Aesop. As Margot Norris has 
argued in relation to “The Mooske and the Gripes,” Joyce’s re-telling of the fable, in its 
anthropomorphization of the fox, grants the animal and its desires a degree of complexity 
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not at all found in Aesop, though at the expense of submerging the genre’s interest in 
non-human life.434 Likewise, as Sam Slote observes, the Gracehoper’s character is much 
more complex than his grasshopper counterpart, in this case as a result of Joyce’s 
“detailed account of [his] predilection for excess.”435 As with Bruno and The Nolan, the 
addition of this complexity and multiplicity permits an extension of the overlapping 
reference structure we saw in Joyce’s non-word portmanteaus to characters and plots.436 
 To see exactly how this similarity works, we should first turn attention to the 
fable’s ethical ambiguity. While readers of the story tend to take the “moral” as an 
endorsement of the ant(s), holding that it is an endorsement of industriousness, planning, 
and the deferment of gratification (certainly traits that Shaun would encourage), the ants’ 
callousness towards the Grasshopper’s apparently mortal danger suggests that we ought 
to give this position a second look. Indeed, even other fables about the ants suggest that 
they are not to be uncritically imitated: one other fable in the Jones translation describes 
how the ants “were once men” who, covetous of their neighbors’ crops, stole them 
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“whenever they got the chance” and so were transformed into ants by Jupiter as 
punishment.437 Another fable, this one not included in Jones, makes the ants the victims: 
they save and gather all winter, only to have their stores raided by pigs – the misfortune 
leading into a moral against miserliness438 (of which I imagine Shem would approve). 
 Already, then, the story has begun to lose both the fixity of its moral stance and 
the unity of its characters, a loss that Joyce both exploits and intensifies. Shaun, who 
begins his tale following Shem’s clamouring for a song, demurs and says instead that “I 
would rather spinooze you one from the grimm gests of Jacko and Easup, fable one, 
feeble two” (FW 414.16-18). “Spinooze,” among other things, provides the first of 
several allusions to insects and arachnids (by way of the German Spinne, or spider). It 
also points both to the brothers Grimm and the Biblical story of Jacob and Esau (as well 
as their Wakeian manifestations, Jerkoff and Eatsup) – allusions that locate the 
proceeding story in the narrative traditions of the fairy tale and the Biblical parable, 
forms that, though similar to the fable, nevertheless undermine the genre’s claim to 
determining the structure of Shaun’s story. Moving on to the first paragraph of the story 
proper, one of its most obvious characteristics is its large number of insect allusions, 
which we find scattered through this section as a whole in much the same way that we 
see river names dropped into “Anna Livia Plurabelle.” Of particular interest is one set of 
allusions in a passage early in the paragraph: “he [the Gracehoper] was always making 
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ungraceful overtures to Floh and Luse and Bienie and Vestpatilla to play pupa-pupa and 
pulicy-pulicy and langtennas and pushpygyddyum and to commence insects with him, 
there mouthparts to him orefice and his gambills to there airy processes” (FW 414.24-28). 
McHugh glosses “Floh and Luse and Bienie and Vestpatilla” as, respectively, “flea” (via 
German), “louse” (via Dutch), “bee” (via French), and “wasp” (via Latin).439 The 
inclusion of bees and wasps via French and Latin (which are part of the same linguistic 
family) is interesting given that the two insects are themselves related, sharing the 
taxonomic family formicidae, which also includes ants.440 This family resemblance 
foreshadows the more explicit signals of the Ondt and Gracehoper’s similarity that we 
encounter later. The four names reappear later in the story, but this time while attached to 
the Ondt, who we see “ameising himself hugely at crabround and martpose, chasing Floh 
out of charity and tickling Luse, hope too, and tackling Bienie, faith, as well, and jucking 
Vestpatillia jukely by the chimiche” (FW 417.28-31). Indeed, the tale seemingly alludes 
to this connection earlier in the same paragraph, where it calls the Ondt “that true and 
perfect hose, a spiter asipnne” (FW 417.24), another invocation of the German “Spinne” 
that we saw Shaun attach to himself earlier with “Spinooze.” 
 This identification between Ondt and Gracehoper is troubling given Shem’s 
apparent rhetorical goals for reciting it, and also the ease by which the two insects can be 
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mapped onto the oppositional Shem/Shaun dynamic. It is also interesting given the 
suggestions in the earlier passage I quoted of the Gracehoper’s sexual impropriety, with 
the four insects having “commence[d] insects with him.” We should recall that the 
Grasshopper’s crime in Aesop was to play his music all summer instead of hoarding his 
food for the winter – behaviour that is quite clearly in line with the carefree artist Shem. 
Shaun’s transposing this error into a sexual transgression would seem to align the 
Gracehoper (and perhaps by extension Shem) with HCE, whose un-described voyeurism 
in Phoenix Park is a matter of much discussion in the Wake, and whose relationship with 
his daughter Issy has itself occasionally been read as incestuous.441 The HCE 
identification continues farther down the paragraph, where Shaun has the Gracehoper 
“always striking up funny funereels with Besterfarther Zeuts, the Aged One, with all his 
wigeared corollas” (FW 414.35-36). There are several HCE connections here: “Zeuts” 
alludes to Zeus, and “the Aged One” is a title given to the god Ra in The Egyptian Book 
of the Dead442 (with both “Besterfarther” gods playing the part of the patriarch), while 
“wigeared” points to earwigs, another insect allusion, and one that is closely associated 
with our Mr. Earwicker. Finally, “funny funereels” clearly points to Finnegan’s titular 
wake, the “funferall” (FW 13.15) that leads to HCE’s arrival in Dublin during I.1.  
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 What then is the moral of the story? The allusion to Aesop and what we know 
about Shem and Shaun suggests that the Ondt both stands ethically opposed to the 
Gracehoper (who, it seems, has found grace hopeless) while also holding the upper hand 
in their power relationship as a result of the Gracehoper’s profligacy. But the 
Shem/Shaun dyad, though it in some ways gestures towards and secures the allusion to 
Aesop, nevertheless prevents the Ondt and the Gracehoper from settling cleanly into their 
roles as the ant and the grasshopper. The ant (or ants, in Jones) are independent from the 
grasshopper in a way that Shaun simply cannot be from Shem. Shaun the postman, after 
all, depends on letter writers like Shem the penman in order for his job to exist. If Shem 
ever ceased to go “jigging ajog, hoppy on akkant of his joyicity” (FW 414.22-23) Shaun 
would be out of a job and out in the cold. Mapping the fable onto the brothers’ 
relationship – though it does take advantage of several clear similarities between the 
stories – drives the fable’s principal characters into a kind of identification that the source 
material simply cannot support. The Ondt, in order to fulfill these roles, must expand the 
scope of his character, becoming “a weltall fellow” (FW 416.3) – “weltall” here being the 
German word for “universe”443 – who, just like the infinity of Bruno’s universe, can 
reconcile even contrary elements. The Gracehoper, meanwhile, becomes an expression of 
those contradictions, appearing as “pooveroo quant a churchprince” (FW 416.13) – which 
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McHugh renders “as poor as a church mouse,”444 but which could also mean that the 
Gracehoper has gotten the grace he hopes for, becoming a Cardinal (or, a “prince of the 
church”), which would hardly make him impoverished. Thus, having taken form as the 
universe and a reconciled opposite, the Ondt and the Gracehoper appear to us as two of a 
kind.  
 Connected to these problems is Shaun’s use of the fable as a rhetorical tool. 
Though today the fable genre is often closely linked to children’s literature, in ancient 
Greece and Rome it was instead more common for fables to be recited as Shaun does 
here – as a tool of persuasion, or as a way to present or clarify an idea. Aristotle, for 
example, invokes Aesop in his Rhetoric while cautioning that the fable’s usefulness is 
often limited, especially in cases where one is advising a course of action based on 
similarities between actual events and those one finds in the story. “Fables,” he writes, 
“are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies; and they have one advantage – they are 
comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past 
events,” but nevertheless it is advisable for the speaker to employ actual historical 
parallels whenever possible, since “quoting what actually happened” makes it easier to 
argue that acting in line with the story will lead to comparable results.445 The rhetorical 
use of the fable therefore creates problems similar to those that we found in Bruno’s 
name and in the Wake’s non-words. Shaun’s attempt to posit a neat identity between his 
irresponsible brother and the irresponsible Grasshopper is bound to fail because, as 
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Aristotle knew, the pre-existing story of the fable cannot relate to the present events as 
closely as the speaker would like it to. Each, then, deforms the other, Shem and the 
Grasshopper becoming instead the Gracehoper, a new entity that exists completely apart 
from them yet which only attains significance in relating to them. And thus we encounter 
the rhetorical failure of Shaun’s attempt to link Shem to HCE via sexual innuendo, since 
that very same innuendo ends up aligning the Gracehoper closer to the Ondt, who, for the 
rhetorical gesture to work, must likewise be identified with Shaun. And all of this 
closeness can be seen in Shaun’s decision to even tell the story – which for a brief time 
turns him into a “penman” like his brother. As John Bishop observed, “an association is 
not an identity” – but what then do we do when associations appear to be all we have?446 
 Thus, in much the same way that Harman’s attempt to circumscribe objects from 
relations and figure each entity as permanently cut off and withdrawn from all other 
existing things eventually causes each object to break down into endless independent 
branching paths of overlapped relations, so does the appearance of narratological unity of 
the Wake’s characters conceal a dispersed and irreconcilable multiplicity. Furthermore, 
just as Bruno’s pantheism is not a subsumption of all entities into a supreme infinity, nor 
the embrace of dissolved particulars without connection, but rather a reciprocal 
interpenetration of larger and smaller entities in relations that relay smoothly between 
large and small, so too are the various interconnected characters of the Wake never pre-
determined by category nor reducible to the particularities of their manifestation. For the 
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characters of Finnegans Wake, singularity is multiple: Bruno, the Nolan, and Brown and 
Nolan all maintain their relations with each other in terms of the historical person 
Giordano Bruno of Nola, but likewise are their particular textual manifestations 
inescapably singular and unique,447 permitting the overlapping of relations in a manner 
that permanently restrict generalized abstraction.448 To put it another way, while we can 
never claim that “the Gracehoper is the grasshopper” or “the Gracehoper is Shem” 
without problem and without remainder, we can also never really understand the 
Gracehoper unless we let Shem and the grasshopper in on the conversation. While, as 
Aristotle cautions us, such mapping cannot help but remove us from the thing under 
discussion, without bringing these relations into play the non-word in question simply 
cannot be discussed at all.  
4.4 There Goes Everybody 
As Federico Sabatini writes, Bruno’s “poetics of the enlarging style,” in which narrative 
and dialogue endlessly expand in size and complexity (and which, it goes without saying, 
makes him and Joyce quite stylistically alike), mirrors the “cosmological expansion” we 
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find in his scientific writings.449 Joyce pursued this maximalist open-ended 
expansiveness elsewhere in his work – in Ulysses most obviously – but its appearance in 
Finnegans Wake is both more intense and more fundamental to the work’s structure than 
previously. We have already seen how the text’s collapsing of the macrocosm and the 
microcosm leads to a simultaneous destabilization and multiplication of character, how, 
just as with words, it is the singularity of a given Wakeian signifier that leads to it taking 
on multiple irreconcilable identities.  
It would thus be misleading to say that a character in Finnegans Wake can 
“contain multitudes” a la Whitman. Though they are indeed multitudinous, these 
characters cannot really be said to “contain” anything, since much (perhaps all) of their 
identities are implicated in textual and narrative objects that at the same time exist 
autonomously from their connection to the name in question. For instance, one could 
imagine a study of Spinoza’s influence on Finnegans Wake which incorporates the 
above-cited “Spinooze” while never mentioning that it also points towards the German 
word for “spider” – a fact that is crucial to my entomological reading of how the Ondt 
and Gracehoper become implicated with each other (one that, similarly, never mentions 
Spinoza, despite how obvious the connection seems). Yet it would likewise be inaccurate 
to say that a given non-word “contains nothing,” that it is an empty signifier, if only 
because no intersection would be possible if the relevant sign had never existed. The 
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relationship I pointed to earlier between “commodi(o)us,” Commodus, and HCE, would 
become illegible if that sign was ever to disappear. Non-words, non-characters, non-
stories – despite their figuration in the negative, in relation to the “non-,” they are crucial 
to the act of reading, even as they fail to be determinate or to resolve into a “clear” and 
non-contradictory set of relationships.  
This multiplication continues even as we scale up to the levels of plots and 
stories. As we have seen already, it is common for Joyce to have one character 
ventriloquize through another – a process that, as we saw with Shaun and the Ondt, 
eventually implicates the ventriloquist in the personality and structure of the mouthpiece. 
This ventriloquism also occurs at the narrative level, like in the multiple uses that Joyce 
gets out of the story of Tim Finnegan’s rise and fall, which is eventually so 
interpenetrated with the stories of Parnell, Adam and Eve, Moses, Noah, Napoleon, and 
the like that it becomes impossible, in the end, to determine who is the speaker and who 
the dummy. This pattern is itself connected to Joyce’s common expansion and 
multiplication of his plots. We can look, for example, to the story of how Buckley shot 
the Russian general, a story in the Wake based on a brief tale originally told to Joyce by 
his father. Richard Ellmann provides the following summary: 
Buckley . . . was an Irish soldier in the Crimean War who 
drew a bead on a Russian general, but when he observed 
his splendid epaulets and decorations, he could not bring 
himself to shoot. After a moment, alive to his duty, he 
raised his rifle again, but just then the general led down his 
pants to defecate. The sight of his enemy in so helpless and 
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human a plight was too much for Buckley, who again 
lowered his gun. But when the general prepared to finish 
the operation with a piece of grassy turf, Buckley lost all 
respect for him and fired.450 
As Ellmann goes on to describe, Joyce ran into a great deal of trouble finding a way to 
incorporate the story into the Wake, much as he wanted to. This remained the case until 
he came to tell the story to a young Samuel Beckett, who upon hearing the part about the 
general wiping himself with the grass “remarked, ‘Another insult to Ireland.’”451 Ellmann 
recognizes how this connection (between Ireland’s national colour and the colour of the 
grass) permitted Joyce to incorporate the story into his larger commentary on the colonial 
domination of Ireland and its subjugation to British goals (such as the fighting of the 
Crimean war, which Ireland, absent England, would have had no stake in). But what I 
find much more interesting is how this linkage came about.  
 Without Beckett’s interjection, Buckley’s revocation of his pity appears rather 
inexplicable. The general, after all, would appear no less human while wiping himself 
than he did while defecating, and certainly he was no less vulnerable. In both the original 
story and the version Joyce adopted in the Wake, Buckley shoots the Russian general 
after watching the general wipe himself with the grass. What Beckett’s addition supplies 
is the because: Buckley shoots the Russian general because the grass reminded him of 
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Ireland, and it reminded Buckley of Ireland because it was green. The importance of 
“because” should already indicate how this narrative expansion connects the story to my 
earlier analysis. “Because,” after all, indicates a causal relation between the events. Or, 
to speak in Harman’s terms, “because” indicates the presence of a mediating object – in 
this case, the grass’s chromatic relation to Ireland. But, as we saw with OOO, a causality 
that rests solely on mediation cannot help but spiral into an infinite regress of more and 
more granular objects, each one failing to connect by tinier and tinier margins.  
Joyce’s dependence on causality as a catalyst for integrating the Buckley story 
with Finnegans Wake opens the story up to the same kinds of divisions and 
interconnections that we have already encountered with (non-)characters and (non-
)words. And the mediations do not stop, for while we have from Beckett the “because” of 
why it was the turf, of all things, that drew out Buckley’s bloodlust, it is now Joyce who 
supplies the “because” of why that was enough to overcome his earlier pity. In the Wake, 
the story is (as with the Ondt and the Gracehoper) ventriloquized through the opposition 
between Shem and Shaun, now in the form of Butt (playing Buckley) and Taff. Butt, as 
in the story, hesitates, and it is Taff who eggs him on, encouraging him to shoot by 
layering invective on the general, who of course has been linked with HCE – a patriarch 
who must be killed and replaced by his sons. As Taff shouts, “the fourscore sloculums 
are watchyoumaycodding to cooll the skoopgoods bloof. Harkabuddy, feign! Thingman 
placeyear howed wholst somwom shimwhit winkledinkledelled Shinfine deed in the 
myrtle of the bog tway fainmain stod op to slog, ffree bond men lay lurkin on” (FW 
346.25-29). To provide a cursory gloss of this section, “sloculums” can refer to the 
General Slocum, a steamboat that caught fire in New York in 1904, killing about a 
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thousand people. Since it occurred on June 15, the day before Ulysses takes place, Bloom 
reads about it in the newspaper and is quite affected by the tragedy (U 8.1146-7). The 
ship’s name also points to the Russian general. Taff has spotted his target, and the story 
already contains the what seem like sufficient causal mechanisms for him to take his shot, 
yet he hesitates. The line “somwom shimwhit winkledinkledelled” suggests the reason in 
its resemblance to the phrase “someone had blundered,”452 repeated throughout 
Tennyson’s “The Charge of the Light Brigade.”453 The clear chain of causation, then, has 
been replaced with a vacillation: then invocation of Irish turf that explains Buckley’s 
decision to shoot, and which opens the story up to comparisons to other historical 
instances of Ireland’s mistreatment in the name of British interests, brings also into view 
questions of other such mis-deeds, particularly those also committed during the Crimean 
War. But the “someone” is dangerous, misleading, in that it posits a definite cause of the 
blunder while obscuring what that cause may be.  
As Jean-Michel Rabaté writes, Beckett’s intervention in the Buckley tale “gave 
Joyce a convenient relay . . . Not only does Joyce fully ‘nationalize’ the story, but he also 
universalizes the national problem.”454 But this integration also mean segmentation, and 
the severing into parts what had once proceeded smoothly as a whole. Beckett’s 
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suggestion, then, did not aid Joyce so much because it filled in a vexing plot hole, but 
rather because in pointing out how the seemingly rounded-off story was full of access 
points and imperfections that implicated it synchronically with other narratives, Beckett 
put the unity and integrity of the entire plot in question. Once cannot chase backwards the 
myriad branches of causality and explanation unto their exhaustion: as one finds so often 
in the Wake, there is simply too much. At some point, one must stop reading.  
And by no means is this OOO-like fragmentation and interpenetration unique to 
the Buckley story. We see it as well in Joyce’s use of the Norwegian captain story, which 
like many of the tales in the wake Joyce first heard from his father.455 As Ellmann 
summarizes, the tale involves “a hunchbacked Norwegian captain who ordered a suit 
from a Dublin tailor . . . the finished suit did not fit him, and the captain berated the tailor 
for being unable to sew, whereupon the irate tailor denounced him for being impossible 
to fit.”456 In Finnegans Wake, Joyce expands this brief story until it runs about twenty 
pages (FW 311-332), with much of the expansion happening in a manner similar to 
before. Perhaps it is because of its brevity that the original Norwegian captain story 
proved so porous, given that it contains so few details (we do not even know why the 
captain was in Dublin, or what he was planning to use the suit for). As David Hayman 
observes in his analysis of the episode’s genetic history, “the structure of the ‘Norwegian 
Captain’ segment echoes that of the chapter as a whole in that the narrative sequences 
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include longer paragraphs and contain references to the pub audience’s response. . . . 
Both developments become increasingly longer and more complex as the tale 
evolves.”457 The expansion, then, not only involves the narrative itself, but also the 
nature of its telling and, as Alison Lacivita describes, its geography and landscape.458 
This narration – which as Thomas Hofheinz remarks depicts a mode of expression that is 
both “compulsive [and] essential” and an “inadequate expression of human desire”459 – 
grasps towards a the consummation of the causal link, the filling out of the story-object of 
the Norwegian captain tale, and yet from the very start has failed to do so.  
4.5 Learning How Not to Read 
I have so far made much of the singularity and uniqueness of the Wakeian non-word, the 
way its hidden multitudes (both external and internal) causes it to resist reduction into its 
component parts, and how this structure extends upwards to characterization and plotting, 
eventually filling out the whole of the Wake. It ought not to be a surprise then when we 
encounter our old friend HCE lost in eternal extensions and expansions of his basic point, 
in which whenever he says one thing “he quickly qualifies it, adds whatever associated 
information occurs to him as he goes along, and wanders farther and farther from where 
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he began.”460 It is a pattern very much like the narration we find in the “Eumaeus” 
episode of Ulysses, with its twisty drunken meanderings that conspicuously fail to ever 
arrive at a point. Non-words can be called “pointless” in two ways. First, in the sense that 
they lack a definite location, which is to say that they cannot be pinned into a coordinate 
structure with neat and knowable values on the X and Y axes. They are instead dispersed 
across the text’s narrative landscape, and penetrated by relations that both define them 
and undermine them at once. The second sense follows from the first: non-words are 
pointless because they are unbounded, lacking clear outlines that define where they begin 
and end. It is impossible to say, for instance, whether “Is is” is one sign or two, for the act 
of combination we perform whenever we gloss it as “Isis” is an act of multiplication as 
well. Thus, what “Is is” is is variable.  
 Given this singularity, I think it is vital to at least address the question of 
iterability as it pertains to language, and in particular how that iterability relates to the 
system of Finnegans Wake. Though Joyce scholars so often reach for the obvious 
nonsense words and portmanteaus when they focus on a single sign as a way to make a 
point or punctuate an argument, it is often the signs that, outside the Wake, exist as 
perfectly normal words which are the most interesting. It is a kind of citation when Joyce 
writes “vicus” or “is.” As Derrida observes in “Signature Event Context,” it is a basic 
trait of linguistic signs that they can be taken from their context, repeated, cited, put in 
quotation marks. Indeed, for nonsense phrases (Derrida cites Husserl’s “green is or”) it is 
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only through citation that they can have any semantic meaning at all.461 But Joyce 
characteristically invades this citation, most directly with his portmanteaus, which often 
possess a “clear” or “obvious” meaning due to their close resemblance (perhaps only one 
character off) to a “real word,” often to the point of obscuring other interpretations from 
view. But what of non-words that are visibly identical to something one would find in a 
dictionary?  
Part of the problem here is that Joyce’s use of these words removes the vital 
distinction between citation and allusion. Citation, as Derrida rightly points out, has the 
power to capture any set of symbols regardless of their agrammaticality, whereas allusion 
must be vicarious, but not so distant as to lack any obvious relation to the text alluded to. 
This is why Aristotle’s wreath no longer works very well as an allusion to the Olympics: 
the old context is no longer present as a mediator between sign and referent. And just as 
one can allude without citing so too can one cite without alluding. For instance, I can cite 
the phrase “he looked at them” (U 4.250) – which I have taken from Ulysses, but which is 
so innocuous and common a phrase that it would not be legible as a reference to the novel 
had I not explicitly said it was so. For a citation to also function as an allusion, then, it 
needs to also possess a metonymic, vicarious connection to some larger aspect of the text 
in question, and in particular to aspects of the text that have themselves been culturally 
recontextualized. If a novelist has their character say “errors are portals of discovery,” 
they are (partially) citing Stephen Dedalus’s line, “a man of genius makes no mistakes. 
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His errors are volitional and are the portals of discovery” (U 9.228-229), but also alluding 
the wider uses that the phrase has been put to. (The line, in all its mis-quotations, has 
taken on a life of its own as blanket statement on the nature of creativity, shorn of the 
complexities contained in the scene where it appears.) Ironically, it is by removing the 
sign one or more steps from its origin that a citation may become also an allusion: the 
most effective allusions are those that employ signs that have taken on significance 
beyond what they possess in their first appearance.  
But when Joyce reconfigures some word or phrase for use in the Wake, he reveals 
the messiness behind this clear distinction. One can, as we saw above, allude with a 
citation, but it is another thing entirely to cite with an allusion – since citation (as it 
appears in Derrida) clearly takes the form of a reproduction of the signs in question. 
Indeed, it is because signifiers have an autonomous existence beyond their semantic 
meaning that nonsense phrases can still be cited and incorporated into a linguistic system. 
Yet when we argue that “vicus” is an allusion to Vico, and in so doing rob it of the U 
sound that its Latinate nature demands – we are, in effect, “citing” the Latin word 
allusively, reaching it through the medium of Vico and his hard V. This is but the earlier 
problem of the “obvious” reading overwriting the alternate ones, but in reverse. Much 
like in Pound’s parable of the sunfish, the Wake extols the reader to treasure what is 
clearly and obviously in front of their nose, taking in it in all of its particularity. It is, 
contra Harman, precisely because the beings of the Wake fail to stand up as closed 
autonomous objects that the text is able to retain its flatness, its ability to hold up both the 
individual sign and the text-spanning monomyth and grant them equal value.  
235 
 
What then do we make of all these connections, of these repetitions without 
repetitions, of these citations that do not cite? It should be clear by now how closely 
implicated the reader is with their interpretation when it comes to Finnegans Wake – but I 
am hardly the first person to say so. What is much more interesting, and what I have been 
trying to emphasize since the beginning of this chapter, is the extent to which any 
interpretation of any word or passage in the Wake relies on a readerly act of de-
mediation, or the extraction of a particular set of relations from their medial position. 
When, for example, I earlier glossed “spinooze” as an allusion to the German word for 
“spider” while ignoring its connection to Spinoza I inserted a regrettable, but necessary, 
omission. As Harman argues – citing Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics – if every 
object were implicated in every other, then there would no longer be distinctions, but 
rather an extended grey ooze of total sameness.462 In systems like Leibniz’s monadology, 
the explanation for why the monads look different despite all being metaphysically the 
same is that human perception is limited in such a way that their sameness remains 
hidden. Finnegans Wake does not offer that luxury: though readers are in no sense 
omniscient, they can be (and often are) aware of the several overlapping connections 
condensed into any given word. We cannot see everything, but we can see enough – 
which is to say, too much.  
To de-mediate, then, is essentially to ignore – or it might be better to say, to 
“bracket off” – the myriad connections so that the non-word may provisionally take on a 
definite shape. It is, in a sense, a voluntary apprehension such as what Harman describes 
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all objects engaging in, by which I mean that the act of reading a given passage of 
Finnegans Wake requires that part of that passage’s “content” be allowed to withdraw so 
that another part may rise to the surface. One must translate the non-words into words in 
order to read them, a process that, as with all translation, always leaves something 
behind. This is as true for Eco’s reading of “sansglorians” as it is for my reading of 
“commodius vicus,” and indeed there is nothing about Eco’s gloss that is incorrect, since 
every word that he derives from “sansglorians” intersects with it in some way. The 
problem arises when one fails to see the reading – any reading – as a willful deformation 
of the singularity of the text, and instead registers it as a successful disassembling of a 
non-word into its obvious component parts. But as the God of Cusanus, Finnegans Wake 
cannot be bounded by perception, so that to seek knowledge in its shadow is to recognize 
our criticism as the plaything of our ignorance. If a word is a painting, then ignorance is 
its canvas, subtending it, lending it shape, making the image possible even as it fades 
from view. One gropes through Finnegans Wake as one might through a darkened room – 
not because the book, like some mystery cult, has hidden its form from view, but because 
Finnegans Wake is not the room, but the darkness, a book of the night as much as Ulysses 
was a book of the day.  
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Conclusion 
On Knowing What We do not Know 
 
A text presents itself as the simulacrum of a forward, a 
discontinuous series, an archipelago of aphorisms: an 
intolerable composition in this place, a rhetorical and 
architectural monster. Demonstrate it. Then read this book. 
You will perhaps begin to have your doubts. 
— Jacques Derrida, “Fifty-two Aphorisms for a Forward”463 
As I began, so I will end – with a foray into science fiction, that great factory of ideas. In 
2005 the American author Ted Chiang published the flash-fiction story “What’s Expected 
of Us” in the journal Nature (it is one of several Chiang stories the science journal has 
published). The story describes the release of a new novelty toy called a “Predictor” – “a 
small device, like a remote for opening your car door. Its only features are a button and a 
big green LED. The light flashes if you press the button. Specifically, the light flashes 
one second before you press the button.”464 As the story explains, there is no way to 
“trick” the light by, for instance, pretending to press the button and then moving away, or 
by clearing one’s mind of all intent to press the button and then pressing it anyway. The 
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device is not precognitive, it does not “see” the future, but is instead under the future’s 
direct and mechanical influence: pressing the button activates a “negative time delay” 
which sends a signal one second back in time, activating the light.  
 Predictors are not mere party tricks, for each one is effectively empirical proof of 
the inexistence of free will. If you see the light flash then you know with absolute 
certainty that the button is about to be pressed in one second’s time, since it is the 
pressing of the button that causes the light to turn on. The widespread dispersion of these 
Predictors results in what we might call an epistemological disaster (as opposed to a 
natural disaster): for a large portion of the population, the sudden realization that they 
lack free will, unclouded by the feeling of possessing it, is such a shock that it inflicts a 
state of near-catatonia. As Chiang writes:  
Some people, realizing that their choices don't matter, 
refuse to make any choices at all. Like a legion of Bartleby 
the Scriveners, they no longer engage in spontaneous 
action. Eventually, a third of those who play with a 
Predictor must be hospitalized because they won't feed 
themselves. The end state is akinetic mutism, a kind of 
waking coma. They'll track motion with their eyes, and 
change position occasionally, but nothing more. The ability 
to move remains, but the motivation is gone. 
I imagine that everyone who has studied the topic has entertained the possibility that 
there is no free will, whether or not they find the arguments for determinism convincing. 
But even the most emphatic determinists must face the position’s key weakness: the 
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dearth of practical repercussions. As I have observed already, the hypothetical scenario of 
a super-intelligence encompassing all of the universe who is able to make perfect 
predictions is a pure thought experiment – no entity will ever know enough to be able to 
actualize determinism’s key postulate. Chiang’s story imagines a solution to this 
problem, bringing the issue down from omniscience and reducing it to its key elements. It 
is not actually necessary to predict all of the things that could happen; one need merely 
predict one thing over and over again with absolute certainty in order to resolve the 
question once and for all. The force of the blow, which sends the Predictor’s victims to 
the hospital, is purely epistemological – Chiang is, in effect, a rationalist Lovecraftian, 
whose characters have gone mad from an encounter with that which we were never meant 
to know.  
 But for my purposes the more interesting question here is what was going on 
before these people pressed the button. What makes Chiang’s story interesting in the 
context of this study is the manner in which it demonstrates the active effects of 
ignorance, or the manner in which an unawareness of some aspect of the world (in this 
case the inexistence of free will) forms a part of the general worldview within which the 
people of his story operate. Their ignorance is as much a component of their world of 
their perception as their knowledge, it takes on a presence, it acts, and when the 
ignorance is removed so too is the force of that action. The mutism of Chiang’s story is 
but an extreme and distilled version of the kinds of effects I have been discussing 
throughout this study, and is indeed a good excuse to clarify a potential 
misunderstanding. As I discussed in the introduction, ignorance, when taken up as a topic 
of academic study, is often treated as necessarily a problem, necessarily a disease in need 
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of a cure – and certainly for good and understandable reasons. The topics studied in the 
Agnotology collection from which I took my key-term (climate change denial, anti-
vaccination, tobacco industry disinformation, etc.) indicate the dangers of a cultivated, 
willful ignorance, the manner in which an unwillingness to pursue new knowledge and 
integrate new information can lead to irreparable harm. And yet, as ought to be clear by 
now, the automatic equation of “ignorance” in general with its most extreme and 
damaging forms ignores the (perhaps unsettling) fact that we will never not be ignorant, 
both in terms of a generalized “we” (i.e. “we know how to split the atom,” though I 
personally do not know how to split an atom) which will never arrive at a perfect 
rationalized description of the universe’s physical laws, and also in terms of a localized 
“we” of individual subjects who always tread above an ocean of unknowns. When I say 
that we must cease treating ignorance in general as a problem, I mean simply that we 
must recognize its mundanity, its inescapability, and the manner in which it constructs 
our daily lives.465  
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 Which returns us to Chiang’s story. When I wrote earlier in the introduction of 
agnotological processes producing ontological entities – “black boxes” – out of 
epistemological gaps, the easiest examples to point to were things like vitalism (c.f. 
chapter one) or nature (c.f. chapter three). Part of the problem with treating these 
instances as the poster-children for agnotology is that they have, to a certain extent, been 
“overcome,” both among scientists (who no longer speak of vital energies that divide the 
living from the dead) and theorists of ecology (who are often loathe to talk of “nature” as 
a unified entity). But I do not wish to create the impression that agnotological entities lie 
along some positivist teleology with each passing era refining their theories en route 
(though asymptotically) towards a perfect state of scientific enlightenment. Agnotological 
entities are not problems, they are not overcome, though they may be swapped out for 
others as the landscape of ignorance changes, and for this reason the question of the 
nature of ignorance must in many cases be asked in isolation from questions of the 
history of science. Chiang’s story provides an instructive example: within the world of 
the narrative, the people’s belief in free will is clearly and empirically incorrect, an 
artifact of their ignorance as to the existence of retroactive causality. Yet the revelation of 
the Predictors is nevertheless a catastrophe, robbing untold numbers of their will to live. 
The story in a sense studies the agnotology of free will in the way that one might study 
the structure of a Roman archway by removing its keystone – the importance of which 
becomes manifest in the structure’s collapse.  
                                                 
subjects perhaps a means of coping with this otherwise unsolvable problem. The study itself provides a 
highly detailed description of several process that I have only been able to speak of in the abstract.  
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 My desire for a non-antagonistic study of ignorance in part explains the structure 
of this study. As I have said earlier, each chapter approaches its central author in terms of 
a particular black box: Lewis and vitalist life, Woolf and panpsychist life, Pound and 
nature, Joyce and words. It is not for nothing that the Joyce chapter is at the end, for 
while it has been most convenient to explain agnotology with reference to the other 
chapters it is the agnotological structure of Finnegans Wake which I consider the best 
expression of what wanted the study of agnotology to look like. For the ignorance one 
encounters in Finnegans Wake is impossible to overcome, being structured not in terms 
of concealment but rather undecidability. Indeed, even a novice reader will often find in 
certain passages of the wake an overwhelming abundance of information, and will 
remark, much like Freud remarks in The Interpretation of Dreams, that though the text 
under analysis “may perhaps fill half a page” its explication “may occupy six, eight, or a 
dozen times as much space.”466 The problem here is not a lack of information, as one 
could possibly say of the vitalists, or even of a defect in the managing and arranging of 
information (as one might see in Pound) – for as I demonstrate, the potential readings of a 
given passage are not merely multiplicities, but are instead irreconcilable. Thus, 
ignorance appears to the reader of Finnegans Wake as a basic constituent fact of any 
productive engagement with the text, a kernel of it present in any act of reading. In a 
sense, then, the agnotology of Finnegans Wake manifests an extreme naturalism, for by 
constructing within itself an irreducible ignorance Joyce’s final work forces us to engage 
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with the necessity of agnotology as a pre-condition for reading the text at all – an 
“invincible ignorance” (to pilfer an old phrase) well in keeping with the mundane 
ignorance of daily life.  
 The difficulties with Joyce can point us towards a non-teleological model for 
understanding agnotology. As one shifts from one network of signification to the other, 
selectively attending to and ignoring different textual relations, one encounters an effect 
much like the duck-rabbit of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, which is 
always perceived as either a duck or a rabbit despite being both (and neither).467 To say 
that a given sign in the Wake is this in one reading and then that in another is not to move 
from an early, imperfect reading towards a better one, or even to recognize and correct a 
previous mistake. Which is to say, the relationship between hermeneutics and ignorance 
in the Wake does not at all resemble the teleological model of scientific progress (even to 
the extent that anything does). In science, the ignorance underlying an old, discarded 
theory is treated like a flaw – one says, for instance, that while Copernicus’s 
contributions to astronomy were great, he was nevertheless hampered by his belief in a 
finite universe, an error that Bruno would overcome and thereby “advance” science even 
further. In this case, one recognizes, as one should, that Copernicus’s ignorance of the 
universe’s unboundedness is a constituent element of his cosmology, an essential fact of 
its configuration. But one also treats that ignorance as a flaw to be expunged, and the 
destruction of the Copernican universe in favour of a Brunoian (or Newtonian, or 
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Einsteinian) replacement as an uncomplicated good – and perhaps, if one’s interests are 
strictly scientific and ahistorical, it is. However, a drawback of this ranking is that it 
implicitly treats ignorance as fully expungable, and thus binds our thinking to a 
counterfactual assumption, impairing our capacity to study the role and function of 
ignorance as such.  
 The shifting ignorance of Finnegans Wake provides a much more felicitous 
framework, one that permits us to ask not what ignorance is present and how it might be 
eliminated (for the study of agnotology must begin with an acknowledgement of 
ignorance’s omnipresence) but rather what role or function it plays within its particular 
conceptual framework. The issue, then, is how one frames the question of what ignorance 
is and what it does, and how that framing limits and conditions one’s investigations. And 
once we recognize that ignorance is productive because it has to be, because its 
omnipresence makes it inevitable that it will ground and modify our perceptions, then the 
decision to see ignorance as always and in all places a flaw waiting to be repaired seems 
like utter folly, as it places needless restrictions on the manner in which we may study 
and discuss the topic. It would be as though we discussed the human lung only in terms 
of its susceptibility to drowning, discussing at length its inability to extract oxygen from 
liquids, the tendency of the breathing reflex to fill the lung with water when the person 
breathing is submerged, their tendency to fill with fluid under the influence of certain 
diseases (“they even drown themselves on dry land!”). Would it not be great, given that 
the earth’s surface is covered in water, for humans to instead sprout gills? Or better, 
develop some hybrid, amphibious arrangement permitting us to breathe wherever we may 
be? In a strictly literal sense these observations are all correct, but they also drastically 
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limit the field of discussion – imagine attempting to study pulmonology under such 
ridiculous conditions! It would mean allowing the problems inherent in the subject to 
overwhelm the discussing of the subject itself, never permitting scholars to take it on as 
an object of analysis on its own terms.  
 I thus placed my Wake chapter at the end so that it may function as a short-circuit 
on this problematic way of thinking. Criticism of Finnegans Wake can often treat the 
book as a kind of scavenger hunt, a repository of blank spaces that can be filled by any 
intrepid scholar willing to hunt through Joyce’s notebooks and the eleventh edition of the 
Britannica. But as I have argued, the manner in which different lines of meaning overlap 
and intersect with each other means that even in a hypothetical ideal reading condition in 
which one “got” all of the puns and allusions contained in the text, no singular complete 
reading would be possible. One cannot exhaust the Wake – not because it is infinite 
(though it might be) but because one can never see all sides of it at once. Indeed, as much 
as I criticize Graham Harman in that chapter, there is a certain compatibility between 
Finnegans Wake and his infinitely deep, withdrawn objects, in the shared impression of a 
cyclopean eternity beneath the manifold of our perceptions. But whether or not 
Finnegans Wake is inexhaustible in the same way that, for instance, the digits of pi are 
inexhaustible – by going on forever so that no element in the set is ever final – what is 
important for my purposes is that it is inexhaustible in the same way that the duck-rabbit 
is inexhaustible, through a constant oscillation that makes impossible any final meaning, 
regardless of the finitude of the object itself. Thus, since perfect knowledge of the Wake 
is impossible, one has no choice but to accept ignorance as a constant traveler through the 
246 
 
text, an acceptance that begs us to treat that ignorance itself as a neutral object of 
analysis. The old excuses simply will not fly.  
 From this standpoint, it is useful to return to my initial chapter to see how this 
short-circuiting plays out. I can imagine that, despite my frequent mention of vitalism as 
the key term of the chapter and the black box of Bergson and Lewis’s thinking, it is 
monism that takes the chief position in the chapter’s title and indeed through much of the 
text. In large part my purpose there was to begin the work that I would complete in the 
Joyce chapter, i.e. the decentring of the ignorance-as-problem position from my 
agnotological readings. As I have said, a black box is essentially the ontological 
projection of one’s own ignorance, as kind of phenomenological machine that permits 
one’s world-picture to function despite the gaps embedded in it. “Monism” is, in a sense, 
the name we give to the gap that Lewis was trying to fill with vitalism, just as in Joyce 
the notion of a “word” fills in the gap created by the non-word’s undecidability. It is for 
this reason that Ravaisson’s attempt to rehabilitate habit leads to a system that is 
strikingly homologous to Bergson’s, since the two essentially perform the same feat: they 
see the gap between living and non-living matter and attempt to place a black box in the 
middle. Bergson’s box treats the gap as essential and offers an explanatory mechanism 
for how the gap comes about and where the line is drawn (a line that Lewis fights to re-
draw). Ravaisson’s box treats the gap as inessential and offers an explanatory mechanism 
for how an entity might move from one side to another. For Bergson “monism” is a null-
hypothesis that must be avoided while for Ravaisson it is a fact of existence that needs to 
be explained – and, importantly, neither of them actually knows what the “real” answer to 
the question of monism is, which is to say that neither provides a complete and correct 
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answer to what, if anything, separates living and non-living things. As Bergson’s critics 
(like Bertrand Russell) were fond of pointing out, élan vital does not actually explain all 
that much (a fact that Bergson himself acknowledges), but then again Herbert Spencer 
and the Behaviourists were hardly correct in their belief that all human thought could be 
explained mechanistically, or at the very least they grossly underestimated the difficulty 
of actually pulling that off. But what Bergson, Lewis, and Ravaisson have over people 
like Spencer is that the black boxes of their systems draw in their elucidation the outlines 
of the problem they were attempting to solve, enabling a productive engagement with our 
ignorance of the “true” answer in a way that Spencer’s dogmatism simply does not. Thus 
it is monism which takes center stage in the chapter, because it is ultimately monism to 
which all of the questions in the chapter point.  
 The etiology of the black box is likewise the key issue in my Woolf chapter. Once 
again it is not so much the box itself at issue – not a matter of identifying panpsychism as 
an element in Woolf’s writing and then listing its instances – but of using that box as a 
means of accessing the void in which it fits. Whereas for Lewis the notion of “life” fills a 
void of – for lack of a better term – taxonomy, explaining a split between two categories 
of existence, for Woolf it arrives as a means of overcoming discontinuity. The chief value 
of introducing Richard Bucke’s ideas to Woolf criticism is not that they explain the origin 
her panpsychism – for one because a connection between them, though in my opinion 
very likely, is not definite enough for one to argue for a direct line of influence. Bucke is 
also, furthermore, not strictly necessary as a perquisite for a reading of panpsychism in 
Woolf, since panpsychism has a history independent from him, one which Woolf could 
conceivably have drawn. Bucke is valuable here primarily because he provides a clear 
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origin for cosmic consciousness, a process by which one achieves this awareness of the 
inter-connectedness of all things which (as I show in the chapter) closely parallels the 
origins of both traumatic experience and scientific discovery. With Bucke, then, we are 
able to see that Woolf develops her agnotology as a response to perceptual discontinuity, 
and in particular the historical shock of the Great War. In To the Lighthouse, it is not 
merely the case that the sudden tragedy of the war was traumatic (though certainly it was) 
but also that it demanded a fundamentally new mode of thinking – not only in terms of 
how one thought about the war itself, but also everything peripheral to the war, up to and 
including all of one’s perceptions generally. Thus, while among the texts I analyze it is 
only Septimus Smith who provides a definite example of cosmic consciousness (with 
Clarissa Dalloway seeming to stand on the threshold) the basic logic of Bucke’s system, 
and its relation to the “cotton wool” of everyday life, pervades Woolf’s writing, and 
particularly the mature works upon which her literary reputation rests. Panpsychism thus 
becomes not an argument, but an epistemology – and thereby also appears to us as an 
access to the world behind the box.  
 What, then, does “nature” hide for Pound? The matter is somewhat more 
complicated, in part because of the disconnected nature of his non-fiction. While Woolf 
and Lewis produced sustained and focused expositions of their philosophical ideas (most 
notably for my work Time and Western Man and “A Sketch of the Past”) Pound’s 
writing, though voluminous, are highly discordant and scatter-brained. For sure, this 
erraticism is part of the joy of reading Pound, part of what gives his works their vibrancy, 
but it nevertheless makes him difficult to write about. It is in part for this reason that I 
had to triangulate from his work the notion of an imperative logic – to give a name to a 
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pattern of thinking that I found manifest throughout his works but never fully articulated. 
As I concluded in the chapter, this logic is Pound’s answer to a question implicit in his 
political and artistic theories: how does one integrate certain kinds of human action with 
the natural world while excluding others? Or, put more crudely: why is agriculture good 
and usury bad? Indeed, the double-bind for Pound was that his many suggestions of an 
ultimate cohesion beneath our perceptions – one that in some cases gives his work a 
resemblance to Woolf’s – seems to imply no distinction between different kinds of 
human action. But for Pound, an opposition to usury was axiomatic, part of the system 
from its inception and therefore impossible to exclude. Pound’s problem can therefore 
seem to resemble Lewis’s, in that he saw a suggestion of a perfect contiguity and so 
formulated a principle by which he could assert a distinction. But we must avoid too 
much haste in our comparisons. For while in Lewis the enemy is never only 
Behaviourism or Bergsonism, but rather monism and flat ontology generally, for Pound 
the flatness of a continuous relationship between humans and nature (what Morton calls 
“ecological thought”) is in many ways desirable. We should not forget that imperative 
thinking begins with an assertion that what is ethically right is that which proceeds as 
though it were a natural law – even when (as Bergson and Lewis both argue) that kind of 
mechanistic behaviour is inherently humorous and worth mocking. Indeed, if we follow 
the argument of Bergson’s Laughter to its extremes we can say that Kant’s categorical 
imperative might be the greatest joke ever played by a philosopher. As the ending of his 
Cantos suggests, Pound never managed to resolve these problems – but in the death of 
Herakles we can see what form that resolution might have taken.  
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 What, then, does all this tell us about modernism? In a sense an agnotology of 
modernism re-assert’s Deleuze’s observation that “the effort of invention consists most 
often in raising the problem, in creating the terms in which it will be stated.”468 The study 
of agnotology is not the study of black boxes, but rather the study of ignorance. The 
boxes are interesting most often as the tags of ignorance, as puzzle pieces that suggest the 
shapes of the holes they fit. Research, then, often resembles a game of Jeopardy!, where 
you are given the answer and then have to guess the question it aligns with. Scholars of 
modernism often speak of its questions – the dissolutions of Victorianism and history and 
the unified subject which make up the boilerplate summation of the period – but then 
spend their research focusing on the answers: montage, religion, monomyth, anxiety. We 
have treated these answers as though springing from a virgin birth, standing on their own 
with neither origins nor pasts – never asking from what questions they have sprung, what 
eternal need gave birth to them, what void they represent. These are not matters of 
explanation, or of teleologies of development, but rather of origins, pathways, histories 
instead of historicisms. I mean to say that we must not think of these answers as 
solutions, because the baseline problem is never solved, but rather as responses or, 
perhaps better, as coping mechanisms. A true awareness of one’s ignorance does not 
mean a compulsion to remove it, but rather demand to cope with it and live with it, to 
accept that opening the black box never lets inside the light but rather, like Pandora’s 
box, permits the darkness to creep out, pervading all. The shocks of modernism, the 
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 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 
1991), 15. 
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historical schisms of which scholars so often speak, were such an opening, and the story 
which followed is not one of resolution but rather of the end of resolutions all together. 
To study modernist agnotology is to take this observation not only as a fact, but as a 
method, to see in the work of modernist studies precisely the same questions from which 
modernism sprang.   
 To a certain extent, then, the problems of modernism are the problems of 
epistemology. When reading accounts of how knowledge is created, collated, 
disseminated, arranged, often (and for good reasons) the focus is academic. We speak of 
knowledge as it relates to research – analyzing the epistemologies of the sciences, social 
sciences, and humanities, their different and multivalent relationships to doubt and 
ambiguity, their various modes of argument and standards of evidence. But we forget that 
while a physicist and an art historian have very different relationships to knowledge and 
knowledge production, the fact that they are both engaged in a scholarly enterprise means 
that they have a very similar relationship to ignorance. The presumption that ignorance is 
bad and must be eradicated is built into the whole scholarly enterprise, within which it is 
self-evident that, for instance, the fact that we have no theory of quantum gravity is a 
problem, and that its solution is worth a considerable expenditure of time, money, and 
expertise.  
My point here, I should state directly, is not that ignorance of science and of 
natural laws is a non-problem, but simply that it isn’t the only type of ignorance we 
should be concerned with. For example, what do we make of the fact that if you asked a 
random person to draw a blueprint for a flushing toilet, or an inkjet printer, or a 
microwave oven, or a wrist-watch, they would probably be incapable of doing so? And 
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that even if they could describe one – say they happened to be a trained watch-maker – 
the odds are clearly against them being able to describe the others? Yet people use these 
objects every day, despite being entirely unaware of how they work. Certainly this 
simple, everyday ignorance, by simple virtue of its commonality and the impossibility of 
ever eradicating it, is worthy of greater attention by philosophers, historians, and literary 
critics, yet precious few conceptual tools exist for pursuing this end. Creating these tools, 
and establishing their importance, was an overriding goal of this study. What I tried to, 
and what I hope I have done, is establish the conceptual importance of ignorance, while 
also sketching the outlines of how we might go on to understand its place in our various 
modes of knowing the world. Ignorance is not the enemy of knowledge, but its older 
sibling – preceding it, guiding it, and introducing it to the world. And truly, if we wish to 
understand this world, we must learn as well the nature and the limits of our 
understanding.  
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